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ABSTRACT
In recent years, issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism are increasingly being 
understood through the construct of ‘radicalization.’ At its most basic level, radicalization 
is most often conceptualized as a transition from “normal,” conventional political, 
religious or otherwise ideological beliefs towards extremist views and ultimately 
violence. The process is now adopted by governmental officials and politicians, police 
authorities, journalists, and even scientists to justify various forms of governmental 
intervention, such as policing, social and public policy, education, and surveillance. 
Notably missing from the scholarly literature is a distinctly sociological understanding of 
the implications of the proliferation of radicalization discourse in contemporary society. 
Considering the relative absence of sociological research on radicalization as a construct, 
this project develops a theoretical perspective based on insights from the sociology of 
social control to explore the emergence and genesis of radicalization discourse and its 
social implications.  
In particular, this study engages with theories of governmentality, literature within 
critical policing studies and the othering paradigm traced back to the work of Edward 
Said, to explore the global diffusion of radicalization discourses across three Western 
liberal democracies – the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada – from 1969 to the 
present. More specifically, utilizing critical discourse and case study analysis, I explore 
how social institutions of law, politics, media, and science conceptualize radicalization 
vii 
and investigate the material practices of risk, security, and policing for which such 
discourses give rise. Following the analysis of thousands of publicly available 
governmental and non-governmental documents, this study finds that not only has 
radicalization become a dominant framework for understanding terrorism, but that 
modern discursive labeling mechanisms associated with preemption disproportionately 
affect certain cultural and ethnic minorities. The data illustrate this trend across social 
institutions in all three countries. The findings also highlight how notions of risk and 
security are increasingly embedded in the daily lives of citizens through discourses of 
radicalization in order to more efficiently govern the threat of terrorism. The study 
therefore broadens sociological and criminological debates on processes of social 
exclusion, social control, and cultural change in the context of terrorism and highlights 
some of the ways in which social distance is constructed and represented in the public 
sphere.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION
I think that in terms of radicalization…Our security agencies work with 
each other and with others around the globe to track people who are threats 
to Canada and to watch threats that may evolve…I think, though, this is not 
a time to commit sociology, if I can use an expression…  
- Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
 
In 2012, following the foiled plot to derail a VIA passenger train travelling from Toronto 
to New York, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper unknowingly set an 
undergraduate student studying criminology outside of Toronto on a path towards 
understanding the ways in which we, as social beings, comprehend terrorism and the 
practices of counterterrorism which now proliferate our daily lives. His disregard for the 
value of sociological insight in matters related to counterterrorism challenged those, like 
me, interested in exploring the social dynamics of terrorism and, in particular, the myriad 
counterterrorism interventions which now proliferate our airports, schools, universities, 
hospitals, religious institutions, and community organizations. Meanwhile, his official 
evocation of the concept of radicalization stood out as an assault to the very core of 
knowledge production processes that might produce such theories of individual 
trajectories towards political violence – for pathways to unconventional behaviors and 
activities seem quite explicitly in the purview of scientific discourse. This paradoxical 
understanding of radicalization thus spurned questions related to how the concept is 
adopted, configured and reconfigured, and deployed in different contexts and by various 
authorities. What is this idea of radicalization? What does the frame mean and how do we 
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use it? How has radicalization become such a dominant framework for understanding 
terrorism that a Prime Minister of a major Western liberal democracy is adopting it? 
What are some of the social implications of the development of radicalization as a central 
concept for understanding transitions towards political violence? While the former 
Canadian Prime Minister did not know at the time of his remark, and likely would not 
have cared, it was his undermining of the value of sociological insight that gave an 
impetus to the present work.   
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a central 
theme of concern for academics, government officials, and policymakers alike. While 
there has been much terrorism-related research conducted in various social sciences, it 
was not until quite recently that scholarly studies of terrorism and related issues have also 
been taken up in sociology (Deflem 2010, 2015). Recent work by American sociologists 
Mathieu Deflem (2004, 2010), Austin Turk (2004), and Donald Black (2004), and 
internationally by Domenico Tosini (2007), Lorne Dawson (2010), and Ulrich Beck 
(2002), have contributed to the development of the study of terrorism as a new specialty 
area within the sociological community. Scholars have addressed important questions 
related to terrorism in modern societies by focusing on diverse issues such as policing 
(Bonino 2012; Grabosky 2008; Greene 2011), globalization (Ericson 2007), surveillance 
(Lyon 2003, 2007), intelligence (Hutchinson 2014), and criminalization (Pieth 2006). 
With some notable exceptions, much of this work conceives of terrorism as a form of 
behavior or activity (exceptions include Beck and Miner 2013; Deflem 2010; Hutchinson 
2014; Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005). Most of the existing literature on terrorism thus 
focuses on a search for causes of terrorist activities and behaviors and/or the practical 
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arrangements of counterterrorism strategies, and thus fail to problematize how terrorism 
and related phenomena come to be socially constructed. Relatively less attention has been 
paid to the symbolic, cultural, discursive, and linguistic frames by which society’s 
influential institutions come to communicate about, intervene upon, and shape 
understandings of terrorism related phenomena.  
One novel framework for understanding terrorism focuses on the concept of 
‘radicalization.’ Since the early 2000s, a growing body of literature has emerged which 
seeks to understand how individuals and groups shift from relatively moderate and 
accepted political, religious, or ideological beliefs to radical extremist views and violent 
activities (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009; Koehler 2017; Sageman 2004; Silber 
and Bhatt 2007). Often referred to as radicalization, this process has received increasing 
political, legal, and popular media attention. Perhaps nothing has heightened the attention 
paid to radicalization discourse more than the tragic events that took place in Boston 
(April 15, 2013), Paris (January 7, 2015), and Brussels (March 22, 2016), and the media 
frenzies that ensued. Particularly salient in this respect has been the dominance of 
governmental discourses which postulate a process whereby individuals and groups 
become indoctrinated into extremist activities in order to formulate counterradicalization 
policy and law enforcement strategies. These discourses typically evoke 
conceptualizations of radicalization to justify various forms of governmental intervention, 
such as policing, social and public policy, education, and surveillance.  
While the psychological and practical aspects related to the transitional matrix 
from conventional political and religious beliefs to violence has been widely addressed 
(see Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Horgan 2009), much less discussed is how radicalization 
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has emerged as a dominant discursive framework for understanding terrorism. Notably 
missing from the literature is a distinctly sociological understanding of the implications 
of radicalization discourse in contemporary society. Considering the relative absence of 
sociological research on radicalization as a construct, this project will develop a 
theoretical perspective based on insights from the sociology of social control to explore 
the emergence and genesis of radicalization discourse and its social implications. In 
particular, I engage with theories of governmentality, othering, and discourse analysis to 
explore the global diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout dominant institutions 
and illustrate how practices of governing terrorism disproportionately impact certain 
individuals and groups preemptively identified as risky. I also examine some of the 
sociohistorical shifts related to the governance of terrorism. Here I investigate how 
counterterrorism has transitioned from a reactive logic based predominantly on military, 
law, and security, to a proactive, preemptive style of governance founded on notions of 
risk that attempt to make unknowable futures known. This discursive shift related to 
counterradicalization, as I shall illustrate, has now spread throughout the social system to 
entrench our schools and universities, local law enforcement agencies, and community 
organizations, and these discourses help construct the very notion of radicalization used 
to disproportionately label certain individuals and groups as a risky.   
In the following chapters, I explore how three Western liberal democracies have 
come to manage the problem of terrorism through the identification, intervention, and 
suppression of individuals and groups who are judged to be at risk of radicalization. 
Many scholars argue that post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies, designed to increase 
powers for law enforcement and intelligence agencies and criminalize terrorist related 
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activities are insufficient, on their own, for dealing with the threat (Hutchinson and 
O’Malley 2007; Lyon 2003; Pieth 2006). Many governments agree, as anti-terrorism 
policies in several Western countries have been significantly re-articulated around pre-
empting radicalization, here understood as strategies which aim to intervene at an early 
stage in the development of radical or extreme political views to the manifestation of 
violence. However, relatively little research has been conducted on the pattern and causes 
of this shift towards radicalization preemption. This dissertation therefore investigates the 
complex and interrelated processes that have presupposed and influenced this new way of 
thinking about terrorism and practices of counterterrorism.  
I highlight how the project situates the dynamics of radicalization as part of a 
broader trend toward governance through preemption. This study will thus contribute to 
an important emerging body of work on theorizing this new mode of governance. From 
an empirical standpoint, this study examines ways in which radicalization has been, and 
is being, problematized and addressed in three different countries: The United States, 
United Kingdom, and Canada. These countries were selected because of their political, 
social, and cultural synergies as well as substantial policy transfer between them (see 
Monaghan 2014). In the following chapters, I will discuss how I explore the 
radicalization framework empirically, and outline methods of textual analysis, discourse 
analysis, and case-study analysis which will be employed to investigate political archives, 
debates, and reports, legislation and case law, news media, and academic texts related to 
radicalization. These sources will be used to examine the proliferation of discourses 
about radicalization and how such frames lead to the emergence of practices that seek to 
govern political violence through preemption. 
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Structure of the Dissertation 
The following eight chapters present the theoretical and methodological perspectives and 
approaches adopted in this study, and provide empirical data and analysis to unpack some 
of the sociostructural implications of the diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout 
the public sphere.  
In Chapter Two, I outline the key theoretical frameworks used to explore the shift 
towards governing terrorism through preemption. In this chapter, I engage with broad 
theoretical traditions advanced in the sociology of social control, including the well-
established notion of governmentality developed by French social philosopher Michel 
Foucault, theories of governance through practices of preemptive intervention, and the 
analytic approach to society as structural systems developed by German sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann.  
 Chapter Three highlights the methodological approaches utilized in the empirical 
chapters which follow. In this chapter, I outline how the study adopts a broadly abductive 
comparative-historical approach which utilizes critical discourse and content analysis and 
case studies to explore the structural conditions for which counterradicalization, as an 
overarching governmental logical, emerges in Western liberal democracies. I also sketch 
out the ways in which this project approaches methodological pluralism, utilizing 
methodological triangulation, to explore a diverse corpus of data.  
 In the next four chapters, I discuss various dimensions of radicalization discourse, 
more specifically political, legal, media, and scientific conceptualizations. Chapter Four 
sketches out some of the shifts in political discourse related to counterradicalization and 
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counterterrorism more generally. Through an analysis of official government documents 
related to counterterrorism, congressional and parliamentary debates, and high-ranking 
governmental speeches, this chapter argues that counterterrorism strategies throughout 
the West have been significantly rearticulated around notions of counterradicalization, 
and practices of surveillance, intelligence gathering, and policing, rather than the more 
reactive, military understandings which have been relied upon by past governments. 
 In Chapter Five, I explore legal communications related to counterterrorism to 
explore questions related to how law, and the legal system more generally, understands 
and constructs radicalization as a legal element. Through an in-depth analysis of legal 
decisions making use of the concept of radicalization, I argue that law is able to 
creatively adopt extra-juridical radicalization discourses to legitimize legal decision-
making on issues of terrorism and criminality. I also maintain that law’s adoption of 
ambiguous definitions of radicalization are reflective of its own biases and discriminatory 
practices towards cultural and ethnic minorities. I thus advance established notions of 
related to legal violence and exclusionary mechanisms. 
Chapter Six examines the proliferation of media discourses about radicalization 
through the analysis of nine high-profile newspapers, three from each of the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Canada, to highlight how media conceptualizes issues 
related to radicalization and counterradicalization. In total, 8,072 newspaper articles are 
analyzed within traditions of content and discourse analysis to advance the argument that 
radicalization discourses in the cultural apparatus, reflected by media coverage, have 
increasingly focused on cultural and ethnic minorities, most notably Muslims. This 
chapter highlights the historical transformation of media conceptualizations of 
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radicalization, from a concept denoting political opposition to a symbol of religious 
opposition to Western liberal democracies. I further argue that our cultural 
representations of radicalization influence public understandings of a variety of issues 
related to risk, security, surveillance, and policing.  
In Chapter Seven, I explore scientific discourses about radicalization and related 
issues and highlight how the scientific system adopts a very narrow definition of the 
concept. I further illustrate how scientific discourses related to radicalization are taken up 
in other social systems and how such adoption is indicative of a preoccupation with 
framing Muslims in terms of ‘risky’ identities.  
In the final empirical chapter, I ground the findings from the previous four 
chapters in a case-study analysis of three counterterrorism policing programs which have 
emerged in each of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. I thus explore 
the New York Police Department’s Community Affairs Bureau, the Calgary Police 
Service’s ReDirect Program, and the City of London Police’s Muslim Contact Unit, to 
highlight how changing political, legal, cultural, and scientific understandings of 
counterterrorism, around notions of governance through preemption, influence the 
material practices of law enforcement officials. As a sociology of terrorism policing, this 
chapter represents the first attempt to draw out connections between broad 
understandings of radicalization and the practices of police aimed at countering such 
behaviors.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical perspective adopted in this research is rooted in the tradition of the 
sociology of social control, specifically the governmentality framework associated with 
French philosopher Michel Foucault and its relevance for theories of preemption. A brief 
literature review of existing research on radicalization will help situate my perspective.  
Literature Review on Radicalization, Deradicalization, and Counterradicalization 
As noted by Della Porta (1995), “radicalization” emerged in academic discourse during 
the 1970s as a term to describe the interactive and processual dynamics associated with 
the formation of violent, most often clandestine, social movement groups. Here, 
radicalization denoted the actual manifestation of violence and focused on its 
differentiation and escalation vis-à-vis form and intensity (Della Porta and LaFree 2012). 
Since then, however, the concept of radicalization and the related term ‘radicalism’ have 
become more prominent in research on terrorism seeking to explain individual-level 
processes influencing transitions toward violence and memberships in violent groups.  
Outside of sociology, researchers have identified different ‘risk factors’ or ‘soft 
pressures’ which steer individuals and groups toward radicalization and, ultimately, 
terrorist activity (Aly 2015; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009; Bartlett, Birdwell, and 
King 2010; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 2013; Waldmann 2009). Some studies 
focused on the role of groups and particular environments (i.e., mosques, religious and 
political associates) in relation to general trajectories of radicalization and de-
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radicalization (Ali 2015; Bjørgo 2004; Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Cronin 2009; Horgan 
2009; LaFree and Miller 2008). Others approach radicalization and deradicalization as 
psychological processes and thus search for causes that may form the basis of 
government interventions (King and Taylor 2011; Kruglanski, Gelfand, and Bélanger 
2014). Much of this body of work seeks to identify a generalizable trajectory from 
conventional political beliefs towards violence at the individual level, on ideological and 
psychological processes, and on producing case studies of extremist groups disconnected 
from particular social and political contexts (Della Porta and LaFree 2012). As such, 
much of this research is largely etiological and approaches ‘radicalization’ as an 
unproblematic and taken for granted concept.  
Some scholars have problematized counterradicalization governance strategies in 
other disciplines. Most notable in this respect is the work of political scientist Lasse 
Lindekilde (2012a) who argues that Danish counterradicalization policies are oriented 
around “logics of repressive liberalism” (p. 123) – that is, radical identities can be 
prevented by disciplining those with counter-liberal identities into liberal (read: 
productive) democratic citizens. By situating Danish counterradicalization policies and 
practices in relation to neoliberal governance strategies, Lindekilde (2012a) 
simultaneously problematizes the logic of Denmark’s radicalization policies whilst 
illustrating how targeted populations (i.e., the Muslim community) demonstrate 
skepticism about the effectiveness of the measures. While Lindekilde’s (2012a) analysis 
is based on in-depth interviews and fieldwork, it focuses solely on the perceived impact 
of counterradicalization policies. It was therefore not within the study’s scope to 
highlight more than the historical antecedents for the implementation of 
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counterradicalization policies rather than grounding the explanations and logics for such 
strategies in particular social, political, and cultural contexts. 
Others working in areas such as international relations and global politics have 
also interrogated the logic of radicalization which underpins modern counterterrorism 
efforts (Birt 2008; Heath-Kelly 2013; Martin 2014). This body of work, mostly focusing 
on counterradicalization efforts in the British context and drawing on theories of 
governmentality, have highlighted some of the disciplinary practices embodied in state 
engagement with Muslim communities. A dominant theme of academic discourse has 
been the focus on counterterrorism policies as indicative of an overall trend towards 
securitization of the state’s interaction with ‘risky’ communities (Pantazis and Pemberton 
2009; McGhee 2008). The Prevent strategy, for these scholars, creates a context of 
security and integration policies while increasing state control of Muslims across areas of 
social, cultural and religious life (Birt 2008; O’Toole et al. 2016). Charlotte Heath-Kelly 
(2013), for instance, argues that the invention of the concept ‘radicalization’ and related 
discourses about pathways to terrorist activity has led to the adoption of a series of 
practices which render certain communities as ‘risky’ through the application of 
‘vulnerability indicators.’  
Radicalization is therefore a series of discourses that perform the function of risk 
governance within the British counterterrorism apparatus. While these studies have 
contributed to our understanding of the dynamic, constructed, and often paradoxical 
nature of radicalization discourses, they are most often grounded in the empirical study of 
a jurisdictionally isolated location or single government policy (i.e., the Prevent strategy 
in the UK) – thereby approaching the construction of discourses related to radicalization 
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within the realm of public policy or security studies. The present study, by contrast, aims 
to approach radicalization discourses in a more topographical way. In other words, this 
project aims to explore the transformation of counterterrorism discourses, practices, and 
policies, around the logic of radicalization throughout the social system.  
Sociologists, on the other hand, have yet to pay much attention to radicalization 
practices and strategies as a topic of research (Della Porta and LaFree 2012). Yet, there 
are some notable recent exceptions, such as Jeffrey Monaghan’s (2014) work on 
Canadian counterradicalization practices and Therese O’Toole and colleagues’ (2016) 
exploration of UK counterterrorism policies, which offer sociological analyses of the 
implications of counterradicalization strategies. This body of work moves beyond the 
study of specific policies and governmental practices to explore the interconnectivity of 
radicalization discourses within social systems and answer questions related to how those 
discourses are linked with practices external to the policy development process.  
Jeffrey Monaghan (2014) eschews a one-size-fits-all model of radicalization to 
address the emergence of governance practices aimed at countering radicalization as a 
dynamic and complex process affecting a variety of individuals and groups. He engages 
with surveillance theories to argue that counterradicalization practices are not reflective 
of the current context of violent extremism, but rather they are premised on abstractions 
of an ominous and threating Islam. The author thus raises questions of what he calls the 
“dubious categories and motives in contemporary practices of the ‘war on terror’” 
(Monaghan 2014: 485). Monaghan (2014) highlights some of the implications for 
counterradicalization policy which has spread to the Canadian prison context, and how it 
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is reflective of overall shifts in penal discourse surrounding notions of preemption rather 
than punishment.  
In other contexts, Monaghan (2015) has also focused on Canadian 
counterradicalization policy transfer in penal settings, arguing, from a criminal justice 
standpoint, that Canada is what he calls a “norm-taker” of counterradicalization policies – 
that in the context of transnational counterradicalization policy transfer, Canada is a net 
importer of the “best-practices” (p. 394). While approaching Canada as “norm taker” 
might be premature and, as this project will demonstrate, empirically inaccurate, this 
research does highlight problematic and often contingent nature of counterradicalization 
discourses and illustrates how related practices may lead to what he calls a “security 
trap,” or how counterradicalization practices have diffused to such an extent that all may 
be captured in a ‘net’ of security. Additionally, Monaghan (2014) seems to overlook the 
potential for whatever gains and positive contributions of such practices in providing 
security (p. 487). In line with a common critique of the field of surveillance studies (see 
Deflem and McDonough 2015), Monaghan’s research approaches counterradicalization 
practices and policies as inherently negative and focuses solely on their menacing 
characteristics. As such, there remains a scarcity of scholarship on governance strategies 
that accounts for the multiple logics, contradictions, and inconsistencies involved in 
counterradicalization practices.   
In the UK, Therese O’Toole and colleagues (2016) draw on theories of 
governmentality to highlight the disciplinary nature of state engagement with Muslims 
through the UK’s counterradicalization strategy known as Prevent. The authors maintain 
that Prevent is highly problematic for engagement between Muslims and the state 
14 
because of its often contradictory, incoherent, and contested practices. They suggest that 
the governance-as-discipline model in the governmentality literature may not completely 
capture the contested practices of governing through the Prevent strategy, and that while 
disciplinary mechanisms are still at work, actors across governance arenas do not 
necessarily comply with all of its logics (O’Toole et al. 2016).  
In other words, the authors argue that governance practices are often “messier” 
than many scholars suggest and highlight the possibility that actors may not align with 
the logics of the governance framework (Birt 2008; McGhee 2008; O’Toole et al. 2016: 
15). This critique opens up new ways of thinking about Prevent as not only a form of 
discipline but also a set of contested practices that engage with actors in different 
governance arenas in unexpected, contradictory, and sometimes paradoxical ways. This 
work is therefore a useful theoretical springboard for the present study. Approaching 
counterradicalization as a set of contested governmental practices, this dissertation 
explores how the logic has been constructed and adopted by a variety of actors within the 
social system.  
As the use of the concept of radicalization has increased in academic and popular 
discourse (Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall, and Jarvis 2015; Kundnani 2015) and has been the 
basis of numerous governmental and law enforcement interventions, so too has the need 
to understand the historical, cultural, and social contexts by which the concept takes 
shape, transforms, and both constitutes and is constitutive of innovative logics aimed at 
governing terrorism. While the psychological and practical aspects related to the 
transitional matrix from conventional political and religious beliefs to violence has been 
addressed, much less discussed is how radicalization has emerged as a dominant 
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discursive framework for understanding terrorism and its implications across society. 
Notably missing, then, is a distinctly sociological understanding the implications of the 
radicalization framework in contemporary society. Considering the relative absence of 
sociological research on radicalization, this project will develop a theoretical perspective 
based on insights from the sociology social control – in particular Michel Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality – to explore the emergence and genesis of the framework and 
its social implications. 
 
Theoretical Perspective: Governing Terrorism Through Preemption 
The proposed research is theoretically based on two traditions in the in the sociology of 
law and social control: 1) Michel Foucault’s framework of governmentality, which refers 
to the complex and interrelated processes of how collectivities come to be governed and 
2) theories of governance through preemption.   
Governmentality 
 Theoretical contributions in the sociology of social control have been relied upon 
in studies of terrorism, but have yet to make substantial contributions to the study of 
radicalization. Within the sociology of terrorism, scholars have drawn upon the work of 
Max Weber (1922) and Michel Foucault (1977) to examine the role of policing as a 
mechanism of social control deployed against terrorism (see Deflem 2004, 2010). In this 
context, policing extends beyond conventional understandings of the practices and 
activities of the police and is conceived as one of the most important forms of social 
control in modern society. This body of research often highlights the transformation of 
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policing activities as part of broader social changes in the post-9/11 world (De Guzman 
2002; Turk 2013).  
In studies of radicalization, however, little attention has as yet been paid to 
policing. Relevant sociological investigations have approached counterradicalization 
strategies in terms of the actual activities of police institutions and the practices involved 
therein (see Akbar 2013; Monaghan 2014), but have not focused specifically on 
counterradicalization policing as a new governing logic. This research points to some of 
the important implications relating to the policing of radicalization vis-à-vis transnational 
policy transfer, human rights, security, and surveillance, but underpins the relative lack of 
sociological work that currently exists on the topic. In addition, policing is but one form 
of social control. It is thus important to investigate the policing of radicalization in 
relation to other influential aspects of social control such as legal structures, intelligence 
and surveillance, economic policy, and culture.  
Engaging with theoretical perspectives that conceive of policing as part of a 
broader context of social control would, I argue, contribute to a more complete 
understanding of the radicalization framework and its implications across society. One 
such perspective is developed in Michel Foucault’s (1991a) later work on the 
transformation and evolution of rationales of social control, which he labeled 
governmentality. Foucault’s ideas of governmentality are extended from in his theory of 
disciplinary power (Deflem 1997), outlined in Discipline and Punish (1977), which 
posits that practices of correction, oriented at the normalization of subjects in prison, 
have gradually spread throughout all of society. The perspective of governmentality 
explains how the expansion of disciplinary power has led to the production of a citizenry 
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capable of fulfilling governmental needs. According to Foucault (1991b), 
governmentality, also referred to as the “art of government,” entails the organized 
practices through which all aspects of thought and action of members of a population are 
rendered governable. In other words, governmentality focuses on representations of 
social problems, the logics, means, and rationalities of remedy, and how these 
representations and remedies effect constructions of subjectivity. Social control, for 
Foucault, it is not simply a matter of the control of crime, but it is a myriad of power-
knowledge systems that combine with a series of techniques, practices, and technologies 
to ensure the maintenance of government rationalities and thus the security of the nation 
(Walters 2012). In this way, governmentality can be approached as a lens to explore the 
heterogeneous discursive and material elements that develop as part of a logic of 
governing terrorism through preemption.  
Although Foucault focused on the analysis of prisons and punishment, his ideas 
about governmental power provide an ideal backdrop for which to consider modern 
techniques of governance (see Dean 2010; Rose and Miller 1992), including modern 
counterradicalization strategies. Positioning their analyses of political power beyond the 
state, scholars from the Foucauldian tradition have noted already that the global ‘war on 
terror’ has led to the emergence of a myriad of new risk-based governmental techniques 
which seek to manage the risk of terrorism as part of a broader shift toward governance 
through preemption (Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 2008b; de Goede 2008a). In line with 
neoliberal mechanisms of social control that characterize much of the developed world, 
these strategies work to intervene in the daily lives of various populations and groups in 
order to affect an uncertain future and ensure so-called national security. The shift 
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towards preemption has been read in the context of migration (Amoore 2006), risk 
(Aradau and Van Munster 2007), legal exceptionalism (Said 2015), surveillance (Amoore 
and de Goede 2005), citizenship (Salter 2008), uncertainty (Ericson 2007), 
criminalization (Garland 2001; Simon 2007), and policing (Bonino 2012; Ventura, 
Miller, and Deflem 2005).  
Theorizing Governance Through Preemption 
 Based on the governmentality framework, this project approaches radicalization 
discourse as a new form of governmental power aimed at governing populations through 
preemption. Studies of preemption and counterterrorism form part of an emergent body 
of work seeking to establish linkages and continuities between the governmentality 
literature and Ulrich Beck’s (2002) notion of the risk society (see de Goede 2008b; 
Amoore and de Goede 2008a). Aradau and Van Munster (2007), for instance, adapt 
Beck’s macro-sociological thesis that maintains all practices of security can be reduced to 
one form of risk to argue that the ‘war on terror’ is a novel type of governmentality that 
reconfigures risk based on elements of ‘precaution.’ The authors contend that new 
conceptualizations of risk as ‘precautionary risk’ is governmental inasmuch as it provides 
a set of logics, practices, and technologies that deal with social problems, most notably 
terrorism. 
In this way, counterterrorism policies, such as the targeting of Muslim 
communities by counterterrorism measures or executive detention of suspected terrorists, 
can be viewed as a function of a so-called “dispositif of risk” – a heterogeneous 
constellation of both discursive and material elements of precautionary governance 
through risk (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). I maintain that one such element in the 
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‘war on terror’ is the framework of radicalization, which has its own assemblage of 
diverse rationales and practices which aim to govern terrorism through preemption. The 
proposed study will thus explore the heterogeneous logics, rationalities, practices, and 
technologies that have developed and transformed historically in order to deal with 
emergent problems of terrorism through preemption. As such, this project is informed by, 
and contributes to, the governmentality literature on terrorism and counterterrorism 
measures.  
The term preemption has been used in criminological research on management 
practices associated with terrorism. Richard Ericson (2008), for example, used the term to 
illustrate how preemptive security measures, enacted to deal with terrorism, require a 
reconfiguration of law which he calls “counter law” (Ericson 2008). Counter law, 
according to Ericson (2008), acts in the form of ‘law against law,’ in which “new laws 
are enacted and new uses of existing law are invented to erode or eliminate traditional 
principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get in the way of preempting 
imagined sources of harm” (Ericson 2008: 57). He further suggests that terrorism 
reconfigures law around “surveillant assemblages” (Ericson 2008: 57; Haggerty and 
Ericson 2000), or constellations of surveillance practices that result in the abstraction of 
human subjects from their territorial contexts and separates subjects into a series of 
“discrete flows” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000: 605).  
As an expansion of Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) “state of exception,” Ericson 
(2008) highlights how the logic of preemptive security has led to the erosion of 
traditional legal standards, principles, and procedures to the extent that it has resulted in 
the permanent reconfiguration of law. Here, Ericson certainly problematizes legal 
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structures aimed at facilitating preemptive security, however he fails to account for the 
complex and heterogeneous developments which led to the emergence of those legal 
structures in the first place. In other words, Ericson (2008) proclaims that the state of 
preemption has become the rule, yet assumes that the rule is determined by particular 
legal structures. In this way, he fails to account for how law takes shape and transforms 
within particular social, political, and historical contexts. The proposed study will aim to 
examine questions of legal preemption by exploring the relationship between sovereignty 
and the rule of law and problematizing sovereignty as a central modality of power 
(Foucault 1977).  
 The developing body of research on risk and counterterrorism law highlights how 
the notion of preemption has become a key way of theorizing governance. Particularly 
salient in this respect is the emergence of policing strategies aimed at intervening before 
individuals engage in criminal activity (Bonino 2012; Grabosky 2008). These so-called 
community-policing projects are not new (Stenson 1993), but they are increasingly being 
relied upon in counterterrorism policing under the framework of countering radicalization 
(Akbar 2013). Despite the attention paid to preemptive policing strategies, little 
sociological attention has been paid to the policing of radicalization in analyses of 
preemption. This dissertation will thus be informed by, and contribute to, this important 
scholarly work by analyzing how preemption has emerged as a novel framework for 
practices which seek to govern the problem terrorism and how radicalization discourses 
are objects through which these practices are further transformed and refined. By 
investigating strategies, techniques, practices, and technologies involved in preemptive 
governance related to radicalization, this project explores the complex dynamics involved 
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in counterradicalization rationales without reducing developments to a single 
propositional explanation. Instead, radicalization will be approached in terms of the 
specific historical, political, and institutional contexts through which it emerged and 
developed as an innovative mechanism of social control. 
Said’s Orientalism and the Othering of Muslim Communities 
Added to the theoretical perspective of governmentality outlined above is the 
influential work of legal scholar Edward Said (1978, 1981). In his highly influential book 
Orientalism (1978), Said transformed the ways that we conceptualize traditional power 
relations between the mostly Christian West and Islamic East. In it Said offers a critique 
of the inaccurate cultural representations that form the basis of the ‘Occident’ (the 
Western world) perceptions of the ‘Orient’ (the East). Said (1978) broadly defines 
Orientalism at the intersection of three levels: (1) Orientalism is an academic discipline; 
it is a set of ‘objective’ ideas whose function is to build an edifice of knowledge about the 
Orient; (2) Orientalism is, as Said puts it, a “style of thought based on an ontological and 
epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’” (Said 1978: 
2); and (3) Orientalism is the corporate institution that holds authority over, makes 
statements about, and discursively configures the Orient (Said 1978: 2).  
In other words, Orientalism is a Western style of thought used to maintain 
hegemonic power over the East. Furthermore, as Said argues, Western Occident 
scholarship has been quite successful in maintaining power over the Orient because it is 
the emergence of that scholarship that constructed the concept of the Orient in the first 
place. On the basis of these three characteristics, the West is able to create distinctions 
between itself and ‘other’ cultures of the Islamic East. To maintain social hierarchies, the 
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Occident produces false perceptions of Islamic cultures, including the assumption that 
that “Islam remained forever the Orientalist’s idea (or type) of cultural effrontery, 
aggravated by the fear that Islamic civilization originally (as well as contemporaneously) 
continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West” (Said 1978: 42). 
Sociologists, anthropologists, and criminologists have engaged with Said’s 
perspective to explore the proliferation of counterterrorism practices throughout society 
and highlight how they disproportionately impact Muslim populations living in Western 
jurisdictions (see O’Toole et al. 2016; Poole 2002; Poole and Holohan 2011). While this 
perspective has been highly influential in media studies, it has yet to be fully developed 
as a critical tool for exploring the host of discursive mechanisms put in place in a variety 
of social contexts to further marginalize individuals and groups. To this end, I adopt 
Said’s Orientalist perspective as a critical analytic perspective that is complimentary to 
Foucault’s ideas on governmentality and the governance through preemption framework.  
Said’s Orientalism is an exploration of Western representations of the East, 
thereby contributing to discourses of the West’s power and authority over the Eastern 
world. Certain chapters of this study recognizably contribute to this discourse by 
epistemologically grounding its analysis in American news media coverage of Islamic 
fundamentalism (most notable Chapter Six). While scholars have proclaimed that this 
perspective is by nature Eurocentric (Khatib 2006), this study does not assume that such a 
relationship exists. Rather, this research explores the strategies by which Western 
representations might work to ‘other’ the Islamic community. This project does thus not 
make use of the terms Orientalism/Islam or East/West, as mutually exclusive monolithic 
dichotomies, but rather engages with them as conceptual frameworks for understanding 
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of how influential discourses are formed in very strategic ways about particular cultural 
groups. My aim is to identify the hegemonic discourses which are constructed, 
restructured, and transformed and which influence popular imaginaries of the Islamic 
community. I also seek to empirically demonstrate how the construct of radicalization has 
emerged as a proxy for specific issues associated with Islamic cultures and how it is 
deployed to conceal practices which would otherwise be considered discriminatory, 
problematic, and unjust.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY
This dissertation seeks to address a number of important issues related to the governance 
of terrorism and related phenomena. The project is guided by the central question: How 
have distinct Western liberal democracies come to manage the problem of terrorism 
through discourses of radicalization? I hypothesize that the shift to managing terrorism 
through preemption is part of broader historical, cultural, and political developments 
resulting in the emergence of a variety of governance strategies aimed at preventing 
social problems by acting on uncertain futures. As more than simply descriptions of how 
counterradicalization emerged as a governmental framework, this study will explore how 
radicalization has been deployed in various domains as a guiding logic that rationalizes 
and justifies material and discursive elements resulting in the permanent realignment of 
traditional forms of preemptive intervention vis-à-vis terrorism.  
 In other words, this study pays particularly close attention to how the underlying 
logic of radicalization discourse has permeated influential social institutions such as 
politics, law, media, and science, and how that logic is connected to a series of novel 
counterterrorism practices that work to preemptively deter terrorism before it takes place. 
This study thus aims to address important questions related to the diffusion of 
radicalization discourses throughout political, cultural, academic, and legal discourses, 
including: 
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1. How has ‘radicalization’ come to be understood and represented throughout the 
cultural apparatus? 
2. What legal frameworks have been put in place to deal with legal problems related 
to radicalization? In what socio-political contexts do these legal frameworks 
emerge? And how do these emergent legal frameworks differ from reactive anti-
terrorism policies which have been deployed in the past? 
3. How is ‘radicalization’ understood and constructed by nation-states and formal 
governments? How is this similar, or dissimilar, to legal and cultural 
understandings of the concept? 
4. In what ways has the scientific system contributed to our understandings of the 
concept or ‘radicalization’ in the public sphere? In what ways have 
counterradicalization discourses in the academic system been adopted by media, 
government, law, and politics, and how have these discourses contributed to the 
reorientation of antiterrorism policy around notions of preemption? 
 In addition to exploring how radicalization has emerged as a set of conceptual 
tools used to frame diverse practices seeking to prevent terrorism, this study seeks to 
investigate how radicalization comes to be discursively (re)constructed in politics, law, 
culture, and science. Subsequently, one of the aims of this research is to interrogate 
power relationships between influential institutions and the procedures, practices, and 
apparatuses that are involved in the production of discourses and knowledge about 
radicalization. To put it differently, this dissertation explores the social, institutional and 
historical conditions under which authorized statements about radicalization are 
constructed and widely accepted as valid (Miller 1999). It is important to note, however, 
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that this study does not give ontological or epistemological primacy to questions of who 
is authorized to make truth claims. Instead, I aim to connect how truth claims about 
radicalization come to be made and taken up elsewhere, while also considering the 
material elements that emerge based on those truth claims.  
 The independent variable considered most central to this project is the emergence 
of material radicalization preemption programs, strategies, and/or interventions. This 
dissertation therefore seeks to ascertain the socio-political context in which interventions 
seeking to prevent terrorism through preemption materialize in similar or contradictory 
ways in various jurisdictions. Most, but not all, of these preemption programs are state-
sponsored (i.e., UK and Canada’s Prevent strategies and the Empowering Local Partners 
to Prevent Violent Extremism strategy in the United States). Therefore, this study 
approaches the state as one of the central modalities of power, but not the only powerful 
institution in society. I approach the state as an influential institution that is able to enact 
policy and pass legislation related to counterradicalization. However, such decisions are 
not made in a vacuum but, rather, in response to (and influenced by) a complex set of 
heterogeneous discursive and material conditions that take place outside of the state 
apparatus. Indeed, while there are certain similarities in the material development of 
counterradicalization interventions, there are simultaneously many inconsistencies among 
Western states. Canada and the UK, for instance, both have official policing programs 
aimed at engaging with Muslim communities, while the US does not. This dissertation 
thus utilizes a comparative-historical dimension to explore how counterradicalization 
intervention programs develop in similar, or distinct, ways dependent upon different 
cultural, political, legal, or scientific contexts. 
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To answer the research questions outlined above, I will trace discursive 
formations of radicalization that take shape and transform within some of the important 
institutions of society noted, including: 1) the political system; 2) culture; 3) law; and 3) 
science. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to explore how radicalization discourse 
emerges within each of these four institutions and is used (or not used) to justify various 
governance strategies oriented around preemptive intervention. Thus, the current project 
adopts a mostly qualitative research dimension to assess the continuities, overlap, and 
interconnectivity of radicalization discourses while also exploring the conditions of 
possibility, inconsistencies, and contradictions.  
 
Research Design  
In general, this project adopts an analytic approach to society that aligns with the 
functional perspective of classic and contemporary systems theory (Parsons 1951; 
Luhmann 1995). While that is not to suggest that this project evokes a grand theory of 
society which dovetails structural functionalism, but that a functionalist perspective is 
useful when considering complex social phenomena which transverse between influential 
social systems. Adopting an analytical approach to society in terms of subsystems (see 
Luhmann 1995) does not necessarily lead to structural-functional hypothesis or findings, 
but rather allows for the organization of the project in terms of: 1) social systems (i.e., 
explore the unit of analysis, in this case counterradicalization discourses and practices, 
through various social systems); and 2) efficient sampling of data (i.e., to identify a 
‘sample’ of data from all communications related to counterradicalization discourses and 
practices). For example, this study challenges the idea that radicalization is a static 
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concept used consistently throughout the social apparatus. Evoking a functionalist-
analytic, rather than functionalist-theoretical, approach allows for the researcher to 
explore how different subsystems of society communicate about radicalization without 
necessarily advancing theoretical claims related to intersystemic causality.  
One of the principal methodological concerns of this project relates to the 
construction of theoretical ideas based on empirical data. Generally speaking, there are 
two broad traditions in social scientific approaches to theory construction: deduction and 
induction. Deductive analyses impose analytic frameworks a priori, whereas inductive 
approaches let theoretical assumptions emerge from within the analysis of the data. 
Deductive analysis has a long tradition in the social sciences, and much of the 
mainstream sociological and criminological literature remains to this day based primarily 
around deductive approaches to theory generation. Inductive approaches, largely led by 
the emergence of grounded theory within the social sciences (see Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Strauss 1987; Charmaz 2006), emphasize the efficacy of data-driven theory 
construction. However, in spite of grounded theory’s widespread popularity in sociology, 
anthropology, law, criminology, and other academic disciplines, even key proponents of 
the grounded theoretical tradition have questioned whether the framework is capable of 
constructing new empirically driven theories (Bryant 2002; Charmaz 2006; Clarke 2003). 
For example, Kathy Charmaz (2006; 2009), a student of Glaser and Strauss, has called 
upon social scientists to adopt a “constructivist” grounded theory, drawing attention to 
the reflexive and fluid nature of the inductive theoretical perspective.  
 Challenges to the inductive approach of grounded theory have led some 
sociologists to adopt a new form of theory construction, one rooted in an abductive 
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approach that aims to produce new hypotheses and theories based on interesting and 
surprising research evidence (Timmermans and Tavory 2012. 2014). Whereas deduction 
begins with some rule and proceeds to analyze a case to arrive at an observation and 
induction begins with the collection of cases and then examines their implied results to 
develop an inference, abduction starts with consequences and then proposes reasons 
(Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Peirce 1934).  
Abduction thus implies the recursive, reflexive, and incessant movement between 
data and theory. It involves, as both inductive and deductive approaches do, a preliminary 
hypothesis based on the relationship between existing theories and research for which 
data either verifies or contradicts. When observational anomalies emerge, both at the 
empirical and theoretical level, abductive approaches develop new tentative theories built 
upon inductive conceptualization of data through coding and other methodological 
techniques (Timmermans and Tavory 2012). However, an abductive approach moves 
beyond induction because it accepts that one observational anomaly suggests other 
elements in the original hypothesis may no longer be appropriate within the emergent 
theoretical model (Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Agar 2006). Abduction therefore does 
not reconfigure an original hypothesis by including an observational anomaly a priori, but 
recursively explores the anomaly’s relationship with other elements which may or may 
not remain present.  
This dissertation therefore makes use of an abductive approach to generating 
theoretical claims from empirical data. By approaching abduction as a guiding principle 
of empirically based theory construction, this study aims to produce truly reflexive and 
fluid theoretical contributions based constant revisitation of theory, method, and data 
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throughout the research process. Adopting an abductive approach also allows for the use 
of complimentary forms of analysis and methodological techniques. I therefore deploy 
well-established methodologies to broad corpus of data. This methodological approach, 
combined with the abductive approach to theory generation, I argue, produce rich and 
‘thick’ descriptions of some of the social processes involved in the reconfiguration of 
counterterrorism around logics of radicalization and counterradicalization. In the pages 
that follow, I highlight the specific methodologies utilized in this chapter and highlight 
how they coalesce to produce methodologically triangulated and abductive theoretical 
claims.    
 
Comparative Historical Methods 
This study is broadly defined as a comparative-historical project that utilizes a mostly 
qualitative methodology, using a combination of document analysis in the form of critical 
content and discourse analysis of political, scientific, legal, and mass media texts on 
terrorism and the problem of radicalization, and case studies of counterradicalization 
programs. The project’s design can be described as a comparative-historical study of the 
radicalization framework across three major Western Liberal democracies: Canada, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom. As noted above, these countries were selected 
due to cultural and political similarities in addition to notable policy transfer between 
them, particularly in the case of antiterrorism policy (Monaghan 2014; Monaghan and 
Molnar 2016). For example, Canada, the US, and the UK are all democratic nation-states. 
Canada and the UK share parliamentary monarch political systems and are both 
commonwealth countries. Canada and the US share the longest border in world whilst 
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also cooperating on intelligence and border policing policies and practices (Deflem 
2010). All three are active members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the UK and US hold permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. 
Canada has held a seat on the Security Council six separate times, with the last term 
ending in 2000 and a planned bid to win a seat announced for 2021 (Nichols 2016). 
Finally, all three countries are signatories to United Nations conventions on international 
police cooperation and international counterterrorism issues (Deflem 2010). Due to 
practical limitations and the scope of this scholarly endeavor, some culturally and 
politically similar and dissimilar cases, including France, Australia, and Saudi Arabia, are 
excluded. While this case selection strategy limits the generalizability of the research, it 
will lay some of the empirical and conceptual foundations for comparative analyses 
beyond Western liberal democracies.  
Comparative case studies utilizing methodological triangulation are often better 
suited to offer historically grounded explanations of substantively important outcomes 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). This project will thus employ a comparative-
historical approach to compare and contrast the social processes involved in the 
emergence of radicalization frameworks across time and space in order to offer 
sociologically relevant explanations of how preemption has become a dominant form of 
governance. Comparative-historical methods offer tools for causal and descriptive 
inference that in many ways go beyond statistical techniques associated with mainstream 
quantitative sociology (Mahoney 2004). As James Mahoney (2004) notes, comparative-
historical methodologies offer rigorous tools for exploring hypothesis about necessary 
and sufficient causes and conditions of social phenomena that evade traditional statistical 
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tools since standard regression frameworks will incorrectly factor temporal causal effects 
(see Brady and Collier 2004; Ragin 2000). Comparative-historical scholars have offered 
several solutions to such concerns that are relevant to this study, to whit strategies of 
analyzing necessary or sufficient causes in some probabilistic fashion (e.g. necessary or 
sufficient X% of the time), “typological theory,” and process analysis (George and 
Bennett 2005).  
Comparative-historical research can be characterized in part by the analysis of 
temporal sequences of events that occur among and between cases. Commonly referred 
to as ‘process analysis,’ this methodological technique works to examine the specific 
mechanisms through which independent variables influence and effect dependent 
variables (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2003; 2004). The researcher begins with 
an observed association and then evaluates hypotheses of causation based on examining 
mechanisms that link cause and effect in a series of cases (Mahoney 2004). For instance, 
if one hypothesizes that in modern globalized societies, police autonomy and operational 
motives to combat international crime are almost always sufficient for the emergence of 
international police cooperation networks (see Deflem 2002), then a process analysis can 
be useful to further explore the connections through which structural conditions and 
operational motives generate such networks. If the researcher cannot discover clear 
processes, any causal relationship is put in question.  
This type of analysis is thus a powerful tool for exploring cause and effect 
because the researcher points to specific connecting mechanisms through which 
independent variables influence dependent variables. For example, one might find a 
direct quantitative correlation between increase in media references to radicalization and 
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counterradicalization policing programs, but claims of a causal relationship would be 
strengthened with information on the processes through which media accounts of 
radicalization are adopted by, and permeate, the policy generation process. This project 
utilizes process analysis to explore the linkages between discursive formations of 
radicalization in various contexts and the material structures and practices which emerge 
to counter so called radicalization. The aim of this study is thus to uncover some of the 
necessary and sufficient causes of the diffusion of the radicalization framework while at 
once highlighting the process through which discourses are adopted and spread 
throughout the most influential social systems.    
Comparative-historical analyses of necessary and sufficient causes have been 
adopted by sociologists exploring a variety of topics, including: international police 
cooperation (Deflem 2002), emergence and maintenance of political democracies 
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992), the creation of a welfare state (Hicks, 
Misra and Ng 1995; Walters 2000), and likelihood of social revolution in agrarian-
bureaucratic societies (Skocpol 1979), among others. The use of comparative-historical 
methods to explore intervening processes has led to robust theoretical and conceptual 
understandings of complex phenomena which continue to elude (or differ from) findings 
of statistical research (see Lange, Mahoney and Hau 2006; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens 1992). Focusing on processes whilst engaging in methodological triangulation 
also lends legitimacy to claims of causality related in inherently complex social 
phenomena, such as the unit of analysis for this study. While the language of cause-and-
effect might be evoked here, I do not underestimate the complexity involved in social 
relations and processes. I therefore timidly evoke the language of causality and approach 
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comparative-historical methods not to identify definitive causal links, but rather I seek to 
uncover social processes which make counterradicalization frameworks, strategies, and 
practices more or less likely in various social domains.  
This study will highlight the extent to which certain conditions make 
radicalization preemption interventions more or less likely. As such, this dissertation 
aims to explore primary data vis-à-vis governmental, political, cultural, legal, and 
academic discourses on radicalization to offer an historically grounded sociological 
account of how governance strategies directed at preventing radicalization come to take 
shape and transform, whilst highlighting the discursive and material effects of those 
interventions. Adopting this approach, this study will make use of critical discourse and 
content analysis and in-depth case studies of official governmental counterradicalization 
programs as new forms of governing terrorism through preemption. 
 
Critical Discourse and Case Study Analysis 
To analyze the data, I employ two specific methodologies often used within the 
comparative-historical literature: critical discourse analysis and case study analysis. 
Critical discourse analysis is used to examine differences, patterns, and similarities in any 
number of statements, problem-objects, concepts, and themes (Fairclough 1995), where 
possible with the aid of qualitative software (e.g. NVivo). By deploying critical discourse 
analysis, this study focuses on the ways in which radicalization comes to be represented 
within popular, legal, scientific, and government discourses, such as mass media frames, 
academic papers, legislation, and political debates and speeches. As this project focuses 
on the body of discourse by which statements about radicalization are organized, I first 
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conduct textual analyses of data outlined above to explore how radicalization is presented 
and represented in terms of the internal relations of the text: the vocabulary (specific 
words chosen to describe something), grammatics (the use of active or passive, neutral or 
positive phrases), and its structure, to identify general linguistic features (Fairclough 
1989: 110-111). I then explore the external relations of the text vis-à-vis identification of 
the action (how texts represent acting in social events), representation (how text 
represents aspects of the social and material world), and identification (relation of the text 
to the persons involved) that give meaning to the text (Fairclough 2003). Following this, I 
deploy discourse analysis of political, cultural, legal, and scientific narratives related to 
radicalization.  
Based on the results of the textual analysis, I identify the genres (ways of acting), 
discourses (ways of representing), and styles (ways of being) in order to uncover what 
Fairclough (2003) calls the ‘order of discourse,’ i.e., “relatively durable structuring and 
networking of social practices,” which links particular texts with more abstract structures 
in society (p. 3). In other words, orders of discourse can be conceived of as the “social 
organization and control of linguistic variation,” or the network of social practices as 
reflected by language (Fairclough 2003: 24). They are the relatively fixed ways of acting 
and speaking in particular contexts (i.e., politics, law, culture, and science). In 
governmental practice, for instance, evoking notions of national security when speaking 
about terrorism is acceptable and often indeed accepted while referencing the score of the 
local baseball team’s game may be impossible, or at the very least unusual. I am thus 
most interested in the ‘orders of discourse’ that are present in texts on radicalization.   
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To explore each institution’s (politics, law, science, and culture) radicalization 
discourse, I follow the same systematic analysis: textual analysis, analysis of external 
relations, and discourse analysis. I then compare and contrast the synthesis of the genres, 
discourses, and styles in each of the communicating institution’s texts on radicalization in 
order to explore the similarities and differences of radicalization discourse across 
institutions and highlight the power relations at play which result in a set of material and 
discursive elements relating to preemption. 
This project also makes use of in-depth case studies of counterradicalization 
programs in each of the three countries. Case studies have a long tradition in social 
science, particularly in comparative sociological and criminological work (see Chalk and 
Jonassohn 1990; Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991; George and Bennett 2005). Case 
studies are in-depth investigations, using both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, of a single social phenomenon (Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991). The research 
is conducted in great detail and often makes use of several sources of data. The case can 
be a geographic location (i.e., city), an individual or group (i.e., a police agency) a role 
(i.e., terrorists) or role-occupants (i.e., the Boston Bombers, Parliament Hill Shooter, or 
Osama Bin Laden), policies or investigations.  
While many traditional case studies in sociology and criminology utilize methods 
such as ethnography and examinations of total biographies, researchers have recently 
utilized document and discourse analysis of specific cases to highlight connections with 
broader social phenomena (see, for example, Larsen and Piché 2009; Luscombe and 
Walby 2014; Monaghan and Molnar 2016). The key to case study analysis is that the case 
is usually observed as an instance reflective of broader social phenomena, or as part of 
37 
parallel instances. In other words, the case tells us something about patterned social life 
(Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991). When we compare cases, we are able to highlight 
some of the tensions, consistencies, and inconsistencies in those patterns and highlight 
some of the social implications associated with those case studies.  
A case study approach helps uncover some of the concrete practices and logics 
engrained in counterradicalization governance strategies. By combining critical 
discourse, content analysis, and case studies, this project explores how discursive and 
non-discursive practices related to radicalization come together in ways that may never 
be assembled in a coherent or logical pattern. In addition, the aim of this project is to 
explore how the social world, expressed through practices and discourses, is affected by 
various sources of power. As such, it fulfills the critical goal of breaking through the 
taken-for-grantedness of the concept of radicalization and its associated practices, 
techniques, and implications. In addition, combining multiple methods and approaches 
will strengthen the overall project by providing a triangulated explanation for the 
emergence of the counterradicalization framework, which, I argue, will lead to a more 
robust, ‘thick’ description (Geetz 1973).  
I triangulate the findings of discourse analyses with in-depth case studies of 
several counterradicalization intervention programs in each of the three countries. Each 
of the ‘cases’ are defined as official policing initiatives with the intended goal of 
countering radicalization toward terrorism.I will then conduct a multiple-case study 
design, with each case representing an official counterradicalization intervention program 
in each of the US, UK, and Canada. Following this, I will conduct analyses of each case 
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with the methodological strategies comparative-historical, critical and content analysis 
outlined above.  
 
Sample and Data Collection 
The proposed project will keep to the 20th and 21st century to explore how the construct 
of radicalization has emerged and has reconfigured governance around notions of 
preemption. While the scope of this research is intentionally broad (see ‘Scope and 
Limitations’ below), the analysis of each institution will require careful 
operationalization and discussions of its limitations. Due to the limitations of this project 
in terms of scope, I am unable to explore the entire sociocultural apparatus by which 
discursive formations relating to radicalization take shape and transform. Rather, as 
highlighted above, I will approach important institutions of society (i.e., politics, law, 
culture, and science) in analytical terms. While the analysis of each institution will 
provide rich, thick, and deep interpretations of how narratives of radicalization contribute 
to a variety of discursive and material elements, they will inevitably be limited by the 
scope of the project. I will therefore be purposefully selective in the data included as part 
of the analysis of each institution. For example, I plan to explore cultural representations 
of radicalization vis-à-vis in-depth analyses of news media frames and texts on 
radicalization and related phenomena. 
To explore political discourse related to radicalization, I analyze archival 
materials held at the National Archives in Washington, Toronto, and London, data for 
which were gathered in a series of trips to each location from Summer 2016 to Spring 
2017, political and parliamentary debate accessed through the Hansard database, policy 
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documents and reports from different eras, and the deliberations of, and publications 
relating to relevant parliamentary committees (for example, the United States’ 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and Canada’s Special Senate 
Committee on Anti-Terrorism). In addition, I explore key governmental counterterrorism 
programs and policies, such as the United States’ Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism, Canada’s Building Resilience Through Terrorism, and UK’s Prevent 
Strategy for their linguistic construction, guiding logics, and material practices. These 
policies and programs represent the overarching counterterrorism strategies in each 
country and include, to varying degrees, elements of counterradicalization practices. 
It is also important to examine the ways in which the legal system has responded 
to the problem of terrorism by reviewing legislation and major legal cases (e.g. the 
PATRIOT Act, Anti-terrorism Act, and the Terrorism Act 2000). In addition, I adopt a 
case study approach to analyze various counterradicalization police initiatives, such as 
London Police Service’s Muslim Contact Unit (UK), Calgary Police’s ReDirect Program, 
and NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau (US), in terms of both their logic, mission and 
rationale, and their jurisdiction and concrete practices. I collected public data available on 
law enforcement websites, reports and publications pertaining to each program’s 
rationale and practices, and governmental debate and policy regarding 
counterradicalization policing programs from September 2014 to January 2017 on a 
rolling basis. 
This study also makes extensive use of the databases LexisNexis, Factiva, and 
Communication and Mass Media Complete to examine news media through a sample of 
print and television outlets reporting on terrorism and related phenomena. This project 
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approaches the analysis of cultural representations of radicalization with a narrower 
scope than other institutional communications (i.e., politics, law, and science), and thus 
explores a selection news articles pertaining to radicalization from a diverse set of news 
outlets (i.e., moderate, left, and right outlets) from each country. The purpose of this 
portion of the project is to identify themes of radicalization discourse which contribute to 
collective understandings of terrorism and related phenomena. This dissertation will 
broaden the scope of our understanding by engaging in a comparative analysis of how 
different countries’ news outlets frame radicalization and the implications of this on 
certain populations. I return to questions related to methodology throughout the 
dissertation.  
This project adopts an analytic perspective of functional subsystems developed by 
Niklas Luhmann (1995; 2004). While that is not to suggest that this study develops a 
functionalist perspective of society – i.e., that each system of society functions as a vital 
organ of a working whole – Instead, I approach how radicalization discourse is 
constructed and permeates each social system. No system is given ontological or 
epistemological priority in this approach (i.e., that legal constructions of radicalization 
are more important than political constructions), nor is each system considered in 
vacuum. Rather, I approach data in this study as reflective of particular samples of the 
entire subsystem (i.e., the population of available communications). In other words, data 
gathered in this study reflect some purposive samples of all possible communications that 
relate to radicalization. I therefore do not intend to analyze every systemic 
communication regarding radicalization and counterradicalization. Instead, I will present 
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justification for the sampling and data selection methods and highlight how I aim to 
empirically examine data in each chapter of this project.  
 Critiques of the governmentality literature sometimes center on the framework’s 
inability to distinguish between social institutions (Lemke 2002). Where might law end 
and governmental power begin? While I do not seek to explicitly address this question 
here, I attempt to overcome some of the potential methodological shortcomings within 
the governmentality literature by adopting an approach to social systems as my empirical 
foundation. A functionalist analytic perspective is deployed here on strictly empirical 
grounds; to explore the construction, diffusion and adoption of radicalization discourses 
throughout the public sphere requires an understanding of what makes up the very social 
institutions being examined.   
The scope of this project is purposively broad, albeit sufficiently restricted to 
illustrate how the logic of radicalization has proliferated throughout several Western 
liberal democracies. There are two reasons for this restriction. The first is practical and is 
related to challenges arising from access to sensitive information (i.e., data related to 
national security). Problems associated with the collection of so-called ‘dirty-data’ (Marx 
1984) have been illustrated in studies related to counterterrorism and national security 
(Monaghan and Walby 2012), but scholars have suggested that broadening strategies can 
be used to assist researchers in gathering sufficient and reliable data (Larsen and Walby 
2012). As such, engaging with an intentionally broad scope yields more results in the data 
collection process and therefore provides a backdrop for richer, more theoretically 
descriptive, analysis.  
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The second reason that this study takes a relatively broad scope is more empirical. 
Simply put, in order to adequately explore the complex social dynamics involved in the 
emergence and transformation of radicalization frameworks, the research design must 
include data from a myriad of institutions (i.e., politics, law, media, culture, religion, 
economy, etc.). As such, this dissertation focuses on the intersections of communication 
about radicalization without reducing them to one dimension or giving primacy to certain 
political ideologies. This, however, is viewed as a strength of the project. The evolution 
and development of internet technologies relating to archive materials is such that more 
information is presently available than ever before.  
 
A Brief Note on Conceptualization of Radicalization Discourses 
Prior to engaging in the empirical analysis of radicalization discourses throughout the 
public sphere, it is important to highlight a conceptual note that marks the object under 
investigation in this study. Following my previous work (see Silva 2017), this dissertation 
focuses on conceptualizations of radicalization as its unit of analysis. I therefore do not 
focus on related terms such as “radicalism,” “radical,” or “radicalized” because these 
emphasize not a process of becoming, but a state of already become, and must therefore 
be distinguished from the term radicalization. While these terms will become secondary 
to empirical investigations into radicalization discourses, I make a conceptual distinction 
between radicalization as a process and the state of already become. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NEW POLITICS OF TERROR
In the immediate aftermath of the first World Trade Center attacks in 1993, Western 
governments, particularly so in the United States, took an overwhelmingly reactive 
approach to countering terrorism. States used criminal and penal policy, military 
interventions, and investigative techniques to criminalize, detain, and punish perpetrators 
of terrorist activities targeting the West. United States President Bill Clinton’s now 
infamous refusal to modernize law enforcement and intelligence operations by launching 
preemptive investigations into terrorism risks is reflective of the US government’s 
longstanding approach to terrorism as first and foremost a military concern (Washington 
Times 2003). Similar approaches to combatting terror were often adopted in other 
Western liberal democracies. Canada’s enactment of the War Measures Act during the 
1970 “October Crisis,” a period of political conflict between Québec nationalist group 
Front de libération du Québec and the Canadian government resulting in the kidnapping 
and murder of provincial cabinet minister Pierre Laporte, illustrates the country’s own 
application of a reactive, military-centric logic to threats of terrorism. In the United 
Kingdom, the government’s deployment of the British Army to Northern Ireland, known 
as Operation Banner (lasting from 1969 to 2007), highlights the historically reactive 
approach taken to issues of terrorism and counterterrorism in Europe.  
 Following the 2005 London Bombings, however, the government took a very 
different approach to countering terrorism. In the months following the attacks, the UK 
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government passed a series of legislation and public policies directed at combatting the 
terrorism threat through mechanisms of preemptive intervention. Eleven days after the 
bombing, the Home Secretary announced that the Home Department would fast-track an 
anti-terror bill, to become known as the Terrorism Act 2006, focusing not on persecuting 
terrorist activities following an attack but of criminalizing a series of activities that might 
put individuals at risk of perpetrating such attacks.1 In the United States, following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, the Bush administration 
passed the PATRIOT Act, which enhanced domestic security and surveillance, tightened 
anti-money-laundering provisions, expanded law enforcement investigative powers and 
criminalized a host of activities leading up to the commission of terrorist activities. 
Analogous approaches have been recently adopted in Canada, where, immediately 
following the 9/11 attacks, the Government passed Bill c-36, to be known as The Anti-
Terrorism Act 2001, which included provisions for “preventative arrest,” expanded law 
enforcement’s intelligence apparatus and criminalized a series of activities in support of 
terrorism. Recent legislative responses to terrorism throughout the West highlight 
political reconfigurations of terrorism and practices of counterterrorism around notions of 
preemptive intervention rather than more traditional military or penal concerns.  
As I shall demonstrate, such developments are not entirely new. What is relatively 
novel, however, is the reconfiguration of the guiding logical framework of 
counterterrorism practices in Western liberal democracies around notions of preemption. 
While certainly forms of prevention existed prior to 2001 – for instance, governments 
                                                
1 Such criminalized activities include: encouragement of terrorism, dissemination of terrorist publications, 
preparation of terrorist acts, training for terrorism, attendance at a place used for terrorist training, amongst 
others. 
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have long criminalized activities leading to the commission of terrorism through legal 
mechanisms of conspiracy and aiding and abetting – preemptive has historically been 
most often viewed as supplementary, rather than a primary form of counterterrorism 
practices. It is therefore important to trace the sociohistorical conditions under which the 
redevelopment of counterterrorism around the framework of preemption has taken place 
and flourished throughout the political sphere, and how a new governmental paradigm 
has developed in relation to ideas of radicalization and counterradicalization. 
In this chapter, I attempt to highlight some of the social conditions whereby 
current discourses and practices related to counterradicalization emerge and proliferate. I 
therefore seek to offer empirically grounded evidence to answer the following research 
questions: What political and legal frameworks have been put in place to deal with legal 
problems related to radicalization? In what sociopolitical contexts do these legal 
frameworks emerge? And how do these emergent strategies differ from reactive anti-
terrorism policies which have been deployed in the past? 
 This chapter is divided into three sections. The first outlines some of the 
sociolegal, political, and historical antecedents to the emergence of counterradicalization 
policies in the US, UK, and Canada. In the second section, I explore shifts in approaches 
to terrorism and counterterrorism centered on notions of preemptive intervention and 
counterradicalization. In this section, I empirically examine some of the changing 
discourses of counterterrorism and counterradicalization in the political system through 
an in-depth analysis of governmental policies and political debates, official government 
documents and policies, and high-ranking government official communications. Here I 
deploy methodological approaches to (mostly) content and (sometimes) discourse 
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analysis of numerous governmental communications. Data were derived from several 
sources, including political databases such as Hansard and Congress.gov, public reports 
and publications available on numerous governmental websites, speeches and 
government communications gathered from repositories and archival research conducted 
in the Summer of 2016 (and some in the Summer of 2017) at the National Archives in 
Ottawa, Washington, and London. Data were inputted in qualitative software suite NVivo 
and coded on the basis of numerous important themes.2 In the third and final section, I 
highlight how the system of politics aims to represent its counterradicalization strategies 
in a relative agnostic, apolitical way, while illustrating how the underlying logic of 
official counterradicalization programs contribute to conceptual and practical 
understandings of radicalization centered on problems associated with ‘at risk’ Muslim 
communities.   
 
Historical and Legal Antecedents of Counterradicalization Strategies in the US, UK, and 
Canada 
 
United Kingdom  
To many observers, the United Kingdom’s preventative policy has been the benchmark 
for effective counterterrorism governance strategies throughout the West, with other 
countries acting as ‘net policy importers’ (Monaghan 2015). Indeed, the first organized 
counterterrorism unit in the UK was developed by Home Secretary Sir William Harcourt 
                                                
2 I used the same coding schema as deployed in Chapter Six. Data were coded based on the following 
sixteen themes: activities, adjectives used to describe radicalization, age of subject, government agencies 
involved, references to specific events, groups subject of radicalization discourse, individual subject of 
radicalization discourse, geographic locations, governmental and public policies, political affiliation, 
religious problematization, political problematization, prospective solutions, target of 
radicalization/terrorism, nationalism (i.e., references to Britishness, Canadianness, patriotism, etc.). 
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in the 1880s to deal with increased political conflicts with Irish republican terrorism. The 
Special Irish Branch was formed as part of the London Metropolitan Police in 1883, and 
Harcourt envisaged a unit devoted to countering politically motivated violence through 
traditional policing techniques such as undercover infiltration and intelligence gathering 
(Masferrer and Walker 2013).  
While the United Kingdom has adopted a mostly reactive approach to issues of 
terrorism throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, certain events were the impetus for a 
realignment of priorities and strategy after 2001. Largely due to a rise in terrorist attacks 
throughout the Western world before the turn of the 21st century, and propelled by the 
attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the British Parliament 
passed a series of omnibus anti-terrorism acts that shifted the focus from Irish republican 
violence to a more generalized conceptualization of terrorism and political violence. In 
July 2000, the Terrorism Act 2000 received royal assent and was the first 
counterterrorism legislation introduced since the amendments made to the Terrorism 
Prevention Act in 1989. This legislation offered a broadened redefinition of terrorism and 
provided new powers to police related to preventative stop, searches, and arrests.3 In 
2001, following the events of 9/11, British Parliament passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 which denoted a shift towards legislating tangential aspects of 
terrorism, such as property used during the commission of a terrorist crime, financial 
tracking and civil forfeiture, new confidentiality and disclosure of information for law 
                                                
3 The broadened definition of terrorism outlined in the Terrorism Act 2000 expanded the definition of 
terrorism beyond activities related to terrorism in Northern Ireland. The legislation allowed police to detain 
suspects for questioning related to terrorism activities for up to 7 days. It also allowed police to stop and 
search any persons or vehicle in designated areas without the need to suspect that person of terrorist 
activities.  
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enforcement, and detaining non-British citizens suspected of terrorism. While the Act 
received notable resistance and criticism from civil society organizations and scholars 
who argued that civil rights would be violated under the new legislation, ultimately it 
passed with little political opposition (Walker 2002). In 2003, UK Parliament extended 
some of law enforcement’s proactive powers by doubling the period allowed for 
detention of a terrorist suspect for questioning to 14 days.4 The preemptive turn in 
legislation was again demonstrated in 2005, when the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
established the “control order” – an order made by the Home Secretary that restricts an 
individual’s freedom (what the person can possess, where they can work and live, whom 
they can speak to, and where they can travel) for the purpose of “protecting the members 
of the public from a risk of terrorism” (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005). From 2006 to 
2010, a series of Acts were passed relating to increased powers for government and police 
in terms of civil forfeiture (see The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006), 
policing questioning of suspects after charges (see Counter-Terrorism Act 2008), and the 
freezing of assets of suspected terrorists (see Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 2010). Finally, in 2015, British Parliament passed the Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015, which is most reflective of the preemptive turn in government 
legislation, gives new powers that enable: (1) the seizure and retention of the passport of 
a person suspected of leaving the UK for purpose of terrorism-related activities; and (2) 
enable the “temporary” exclusion of individuals from the UK if they are believed to be 
involved in terrorism-related activities.5 The legislation also requires certain authorities, 
                                                
4 As outlined in Section 306 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
5 This provision allows for the “temporary” exclusion of individuals for up to two years. 
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including universities, schools, and some private companies such as internet service 
providers, to cooperate with authorities when they suspect that individuals are at risk of 
becoming involved in terrorist activities. The legislation thus provides provisions for the 
Prevent leg of the UK’s ‘CONTEST’ strategy, now legally requiring specified authorities 
to align with and deliver the program’s initiatives.  
The Prevent strategy was developed in response to the 2005 London bombings 
and other cases of ‘domestic’ terrorism and revealed in 2007 as an all-encompassing, 
proactive, and community-participatory counterradicalization strategy. As part of the 
country’s overarching counterterrorism strategy known as ‘CONTEST,’ Prevent is one of 
four key components: (1) Pursue, the surveillance and detection leg; (2) Prepare, the civil 
emergency and preparedness led; (3) Protect, the domestic security leg; and (4) Prevent, 
the leg tasked with countering so-called radicalization. I shall return to an analysis of the 
Prevent strategy in the next section.  
 
United States 
As noted by elsewhere by Mathieu Deflem (2010), similar to other Western jurisdictions, 
the development of counterterrorism law in the United States progressed in a piecemeal 
fashion, evolving from legislation oriented around activities tangentially associated with 
terrorism to a more omnibus approach. In the months following the events of 9/11, 
President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224, which authorized the seizure 
of assets of organizations or individuals whom assist, sponsor, or otherwise provide 
material support or who are associated with terrorists or terrorist organizations. Shortly 
thereafter, the Bush administration passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
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Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 
otherwise known as the USA PATRIOT Act, and established the United States 
Department of Homeland Security and a cabinet-level position of Secretary of Homeland 
Security in 2002. The omnibus PATRIOT Act covered a wide array of counterterrorism 
practices, including the enhancement of domestic security and surveillance, expansion of 
financial tracking and anti-money-laundering mechanisms, broadening of border security, 
widening restitution mechanisms for families of victims of terrorism, passing of new 
criminal laws relating to terrorism, and the creation of new formalize cooperation 
networks.  
With the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, prevention 
became a fundamental aspect of the US approach to terrorism, reflected in its mandate, 
which includes: “preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the 
vulnerability of the United States Terrorism at home, and minimizing the damage and 
assisting in the recovery from any attacks that may occur” (U.S. Congress 2002). To 
these ends, the Department of Homeland Security is charged with oversight of a diverse 
group of governmental agencies, among them: US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Secret Service, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and the US Coast Guard.  
On the level of law enforcement, the FBI was given lead-agency counterterrorism 
authority in 1982. The FBI also leads coordination efforts among DHS agencies through 
the establishment of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (partnering the FBI with 
the CIA, ICE and Department of Defense), and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). 
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JTTFs bring together agents from a variety of law enforcement agencies, including 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as well as first-responders, to share 
intelligence, investigate terrorist activities, and arrest those suspected of terrorism 
(Deflem 2010). Currently, task forces are based in 104 US cities, 71 of which have been 
created since September 11, 2001 (FBI 2017).  
While the US has been a world leader in developing post-2001 counterterrorism 
legislation and modeling operational governance structures for increasing inter-agency 
coordination, the country has thus far remained relative adverse to the development of an 
official counterradicalization strategy. However, governmental policies and Offices have 
been developed that aim to investigate and combat pathways to terrorism. In the United 
States, the Department of State leads the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering 
Violent Extremism, which oversees governmental efforts to counter terrorism abroad. 
The predecessor of the Bureau was the Office for Combatting Terrorism, created in 1972 
following the recommendation of President Nixon following an attack at the Olympics in 
Munich. The committee suggested an office to increase coordination and develop policy 
responses by the U.S. government to foreign terrorism. In 1985, the Office changed its 
name to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1985, and then the Bureau 
of Counterterrorism in 2012. Congress officially mandated the Bureau of 
Counterterrorism (Public Law 103-236 [H.R. 2333] in 1994, and further defined the role 
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1998 (Public Law 105-277 [H.R. 4328]). The 
Bureau, and the Office which preceded it, were formed with the intention of combatting 
foreign terrorist threats through coordinating disparate government agencies with the aim 
of eliminating redundancy and silos of intelligence amongst them to efficiently track and 
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counter international terrorism threats. In 2016, the Bureau’s name was expanded to 
include “countering violent extremism” within its mandate (Hudson 2016).  
This notable shift was reflective of broader changes to US counterterrorism policy 
towards proactive, preventative policies and practices, but also highlighted the country’s 
timid approach to countering so-called radicalization. Following 2001, US policy 
operatives began focusing widely on issues of domestic terrorism and local, state, and 
federal counterterrorism policing initiatives, aiming to combat the threat of terrorism 
through more preventative measures. Much slower in terms of development was an 
official federal counterradicalization strategy. While the US does possess a set of 
domestic counterradicalization guidelines – in the form of a 2011 paper entitled 
“Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” and 
follow-up paper called the “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” – it remains far less robust 
and developed than alternative strategies in the West (i.e., in the UK and Canada). The 
US counterradicalization guidelines offer mostly knowledge-based initiatives that seek to 
understand the radicalization process and how to build community engagement networks 
with American Muslim communities. This focus on research and engagement is evinced 
by steps taken by the Department of Homeland security, which was tasked by Congress 
with overseeing counterradicalization in 2007. I will return to these policy guidelines in 
the following section. 
Canada 
Much like the development of counterterrorism legislation in the United States, pre-2001 
Canadian law concerning terrorism was primarily restricted to immigration and refugee 
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regulations, border security, and aviation security. Beforehand, Section 19(1) of the 
Immigration Act (1976) provided perhaps the most robust characterization, stating that 
those involved in ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist organizations’ were to be refused entry into the 
country. However, the Act fell short of formally defining the concept of terrorism and 
focused predominantly on terrorism as an issue of international immigration. Other 
legislation, including the Aeronautics Act (1985), the National Defence Act (1985), and 
the State Immunity Act (1985) also failed to provide a legal definition of the concept and 
instead increasingly legislated criminal offences germane to terrorist activities.  
In 2001, following the attacks in New York and Washington, and in line with the 
UK and US, Canada passed its omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), which for the first 
time introduced the definition of ‘terrorist activity’ into section 83 of the Criminal Code 
of Canada, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which replaced the 
Immigration Act 1976. The Anti-Terrorism Act expanded the powers of government and 
institutions under the Canadian security establishment umbrella, including the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and 
the Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSEC). The legislation included 
provisions allowing for ‘secret’ in-camera trials deemed issues of national security, 
preemptive detention of individuals suspected of carrying out, or planning to carry out, 
terrorist activities, and an expansion of police powers.6 The extension of police powers, 
however, were notably focused around preventative arrest and the expansion of 
investigative mechanisms, such as compelling a person to answer questions relating to 
                                                
6 One notable changed brought about by Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act was that suspects cannot refuse to 
answer questions relating to terrorist activities on the grounds of self-incrimination.  
54 
terrorist activities (Roach 2004). In February of 2007, led by opposition from the Liberal 
and New Democrat parties, provisions related to preventative arrest and in-camera 
investigative hearings were not renewed. However, in 2012, the Conservative majority 
government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper introduced Bill S-7, known as the 
Combatting Terrorism Act, which again renewed the expired Anti-Terrorism Act 
provisions for a new five-year term and introduced new crimes for leaving Canada to join 
or train with entities labelled as terrorist organizations by the Government. Following the 
bombings at the Boston Marathon in 2012, the Conservative government fast-tracked Bill 
S-7 to a vote on April 23, 2003, and the Bill became law on April 25, 2013.   
In response to notable attacks against Canadian Armed Forces soldiers and the 
infamous shootings at Parliament Hill in Ottawa, deliberations on a new omnibus 
antiterrorism bill began in the House of Commons in 2014. Bill C-51, a series of new 
legislative mechanisms to become known as the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, broadened the 
authority of Government agencies to monitor the activities of all global citizens on the 
Internet, as well as expanded the mandate of CSIS to include more powers related to 
obtaining court-ordered warrants authorizing security investigations abroad. Additionally, 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 established and amended several Acts including the Security 
of Canada Information Sharing Act, Secure Air Travel Act and changes to the Criminal 
Code, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act. New legislation and amendments offered provisions related to the 
disclosure and coordination of information amongst Canada’s security intelligence 
community, new legislation for identifying and responding to persons who pose a threat 
to transportation security or critical infrastructure, and new Criminal Code offences 
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relating to assisting in the commission of terrorist offences and new powers of 
preemptive detention. The development and expansion of Canada’s counterterrorism 
policy thus aligns with the historical and legal development across other Western liberal 
democracies. The broadening of counterterrorism legislation and the expansion of police 
powers related to preemptive detention and investigative techniques highlight the 
Country’s approach to terrorism post-2001 in terms of shifts towards more proactive legal 
frameworks for countering terrorism.  
Canada’s governmental counterterrorism structure was realigned beginning with 
the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001. From 2001 to 2003, in a reorganization 
of the federal government, Canada worked to create Department of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness to establish a single entity to oversee all programs related to 
public safety in Canada. In 2005, the Department was established and, in similar fashion 
to the US Department of Homeland Security, included other offices, agencies, and review 
bodies within its portfolio, such as: Canada Border Services, RCMP, CSIS, Correctional 
Service Canada, the Parole Board of Canada, the Department of National Defence, the 
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, the Civilian 
Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CRCC), 
the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI), and the RCMP External Review 
Committee. The Department changed its name to Public Safety Canada in 2006, and its 
mandate includes “ensuring coordination across all federal departments and agencies 
responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. Our mandate is to keep 
Canadians safe from a range of risks such as natural disasters, crime and terrorism” 
(Public Safety Canada 2017).  
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The New Terror Threat? Modern Terrorism Governance and Problematizations of Islam 
in Counterradicalization Strategies 
 
Justifications for the notable shifts in political and legislative discourses surrounding 
preemptive intervention in the case of counterterrorism often reflects a perceived increase 
in threat level amongst certain populations. Legislators and government officials in the 
UK, US, and Canada have overwhelmingly pointed to Islam as the source of the most 
pressing terrorist threats to the Western world. Part of the legislative changes brought 
about by the diffusion of omnibus anti-terrorism legislations following 2001 was an 
increase in governmental reporting on terrorist “threat levels.” In the United States, the 
State Department has released an annual “Country Reports on Terrorism” report since 
2003. The Home Office in the UK has published a similar report since 2012, and Public 
Safety Canada introduced a terrorist threat annual report to be published annually in its 
overarching counterterrorism strategy in 2011. The aim of these reporting systems is to 
highlight emerging trends in terms of terrorist threats to each country. Each report is 
similar in structure, albeit the US’ report is far more detailed, and indicates an overall 
terror threat level,7 lists groups labelled as “terrorist entities” by government officials, 
and offers “strategic assessments” of the threat level by geographic area and by group. 
The reports often isolate specific religious backgrounds as sources of those perceived 
threats.  
                                                
7 The “terror threat” level is often illustrated in the form of, or similar to, the color-coded Homeland 
Security Advisory System, which associates the perceived threat level on the basis of five colors: green for 
“low,” blue for “guarded,” yellow for “elevated,” orange for “high,” and red for “severe.” 
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An analysis of all “threat level” reports in the US, UK, and Canada reveals how 
each country frames terrorist threats by religious background (see Table 4.1). While 
reports from the US quantitatively overshadowed threat assessments from the UK and 
Canada in terms of number and depth, the analysis did indicate some similar trends. 
Threat assessments in the United States and Canada overwhelmingly framed Islam as the 
source of perceived threat. In the United Kingdom, associations between terrorism and 
religious threat were few, but most often referenced Islam as a source of such threats. 
Other religious backgrounds, such as Christianity, Judaism, and Catholicism, were 
sometimes referenced, but they were notably included as a juxtaposition to so-called 
Islamic fundamentalism. Other religious backgrounds were therefore most often 
referenced in terms of victimization, rather than perpetrator of terrorist activities.   
 
 
Table 4.1: References to Religion in Major Reports on Terrorist Threats 
     
 UK US Canada  
Christian - 149 1   
Sikh 1 5 3   
Islam 7 4566 60   
Judaism 1 182 -   
Protestant - 40 -   
Catholic - 102 -   
Othera - 24 -   
Data from Annual reports on terrorist threats available online at the State Department website since 
2003 (https://www.state.gov), Public Safety Canada since 2013 (http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca), and 
the Home Office, since 2012 (https://www.gov.uk). US terrorist threat reports were, on average, 300 
pages longer than those from the UK and Canada, which results in a massive discrepancy between the 
reports' references. 
 
a Other includes Buddhism, Hinduism, Atheism, Hellenism, and Paganism. 
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The use of “threat” reports has proliferated Western security, intelligence, and law 
enforcement communities and is often referenced by politicians and governmental 
officials in response to legislative debates regarding counterterrorism. Indeed, in both 
Canada and the United Kingdom, the government’s overarching counterradicalization 
strategies begin with an outline of the “terrorism threat” prior to outlining governmental 
response initiatives and programs.  
However, threat assessments conducted by governmental offices do not seemingly 
align with historical and modern trends in terrorist attacks and radicalization. Since the 
1970s, terrorist activity in the US, Canada, and UK has substantially declined (see Figure 
4.1). While, since 2007, there has been a minor increase in the prevalence of terrorist 
attacks on the West, terrorist activity was much more pervasive in the United Kingdom 
and United States during the 1970s and 1960s. In Canada, terrorism has remained 
relatively rare since the 1970s. Despite these trends, governments are producing more 
threat assessments which indicate quantitatively heightened threat levels than the data 
would suggest are necessary.   
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Terrorist Attacks in Each Country, 1970-2015 
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Not only have terrorist attacks against the US, UK, and Canada declined in 
number since the 1970s, data suggests the perception of terrorist threats coming from 
Islam are disproportional to actual and planned terrorist attacks. As Charles Kurzman 
(2011, 2014) notes, since 9/11, 33 Americans have died as a result of terrorist activities 
perpetrated by Islamic practitioners.8 During that same period, over 180,000 Americans 
were murdered for reasons not related to terrorism. In 2016, 46 Muslim Americans were 
associated with violent extremism, which represents a 40 percent drop from 2015, and 65 
Americans were identified as having traveled to join Islamic inspired terrorist groups 
overseas (Kurzman 2017). Lorenzo Vidino (2009) has suggested that homegrown 
‘jihadist,’ despite receiving notable political and media attention is actually a more stable, 
but relatively occasional phenomenon. In addition, according to the FBI (2005), 94% of 
terrorist attacks carried out in the United States from 1980 to 2005 were perpetrated by 
non-Muslims. Even RAND corporation, which is notorious for representing terrorism as 
an issue amongst primarily Muslim communities (I return to this in Chapter Seven), 
suggests that the threat of homegrown Islam-inspired terrorism is exaggerated (Jenkins 
2010). According to Europol, the European equivalent to Interpol, less than two percent 
of terrorist attacks in the European Union from 2009 to 2013 were ‘religiously motivated’ 
(Europol 2010). In Canada, of the 74 recorded terrorist attacks in University of 
Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database,9 five have been carried out by individuals 
associated with Islam (6.8% of all terrorist attacks).  
                                                
8 This number would be increased by 63 following the attacks in Orlando (2016) and San Bernardino 
(2015). However, the overall point remains valid.  
9 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist 
events worldwide from 1970 to 2015. It was developed by Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Erin Miller and 
is housed at the University of Maryland. It can be accessed at https://www.start.umb.edu/gtd. 
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Kurzman (2011; Kurzman, Schanzer and Moosa 2011) has repeatedly shown that 
terrorism perpetrated by those associated with Islam remains extremely rare in the United 
States and hypothesizes that part of the reason has to do with demographic differences of 
American Muslims in comparison to Muslim populations in places like the United 
Kingdom. American Muslims, so Kurzman and colleagues suggest, are less segregated 
and more aligned with the political views of the American mainstream. Another 
explanation offered by Kurzman is that US law enforcement has been aggressive in 
preventing the carrying out of terrorist threats through the use of undercover informants, 
expansion of surveillance practices, and heightened security measures at airports and 
other critical locations (Kurzman, Schanzer and Moosa 2011). More interestingly, 
Kurzman and colleagues suggest that there have been relatively few acts of terrorism 
related to Islam in the US because Muslim communities have been effective in “self-
policing” (Kurzman, Schanzer and Moosa 2011: 475). Through public denunciations of 
terrorism from Muslim community leaders and civil society organizations and 
community-level monitoring against “signs of radicalization,” Kurzman and others 
suggest (2011), Muslim leaders have been successful in preventing terrorism within their 
communities. I will return to the idea of “self-policing” in the final section of this 
chapter.  
Despite data and scholarly research findings that suggest otherwise, politicians 
and government officials have largely focused on terrorism threats from cultural and 
ethnic minority communities (see Table 4.1). Part of the political response to perceived 
threats has been the rearticulation of counterterrorism strategies around notions of 
counterradicalization, guided by the logic of combatting terrorism by identifying and 
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intervening in the process by which individuals shift towards violent extremist views and 
activities. Since the mid-2000s, political approaches to issues of counterterrorism have 
been significantly reconfigured around discourses of counterradicalization (see Figure 4.2 
and Table 4.2). In data collected from Parliamentary and Congressional debates from 
1969 to 2016, there were notable increases in use of the term radicalization in the US, 
UK, and Canada. Moreover, government officials increasingly used the construct of 
radicalization to frame counterterrorist strategies. For instance, both Canada and the 
United Kingdom released specific policies directed at countering radicalization. While 
the United States released no such policy, there was a notable increase in usage of the 
concept of radicalization amongst Congressional debates following 2004.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: References to “Radicalization” in Political Debates10 
                                                
10 Data from US Congressional debates since 1969 (available from https://www.congress.gov), UK 
Parliament debates since 1969 (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/), and Canadian Parliamentary debates 
since 1970 (available from (http://www.collectionscanada.ca/primeministers/h4-4000-e.html). 
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The rearticulation of counterterrorism strategies around notions of preemptive 
intervention is reflected both in governmental discourse as well as public and social 
policy. Across the Western liberal democracies analyzed by this study, political efforts 
have been made to shift from the reactive approaches traditionally associated with 
counterterrorism through military intervention, towards a more preemptive, proactive 
approach that engages local communities, law enforcement, research and knowledge 
production, and techniques of surveillance and intelligence in order to intervene prior to 
perpetration of terrorist activities. The policies, strategies, and practices associated with 
these novel intervention mechanisms aim to disrupt the “radicalization process” by which 
individuals and groups adopt radically extremist views. In many ways, they have 
reconfigured the entire logic and approach of counterterrorism in the West, and have been 
driven, at least partially, by political and public pressure to move beyond military 
intervention strategies. The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have each 
developed their own approach to counterradicalization. While there are indeed notable 
similarities amongst the three approaches, there are also several important differences. 
This chapter new turns its attention to the exploration of each country’s approach to 
counterradicalization.   
 
Table 4.2: Use of The Term ‘Radicalization’ in Major Governmental 
Communications Pre- and Post-2000 
 
      
 
United 
Kingdom United States Canada 
 
1969-
1999  2000-16  
1969-
1999 2000-16  
1969-
1999 
2000-
16  
Major Governmental Speeches - 2 - 3 - - 
Legislative debates 8 476 8 291 3 41 
Major CT policies - 261 - 26 - 8 
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Data sources from the United States: 46 "State of the Union" addresses, 579 major Presidential 
speeches, and 271 high-ranking governmental communications; Congressional debates since 1969, 
available from http://www.congress.gov; Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism; Major FBI Reports on Terrorist Threats 
Data sources from the United Kingdom: UK Parliamentary debates since 1969 
(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/); Major political speeches from party leaders since 1985 
(http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/); CONTEST and PREVENT Strategies 
Data Sources from Canada: 32 Speeches from the Throne from 1969-2015 
(http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/compilations/parliament/ThroneSpeech.aspx), all debates from 
42 Canadian Parliamentary sessions (http://www.collectionscanada.ca/primeministers/h4-4000-
e.html); All federal case law from 1969 to 2016 (http://www.canlii.org); Building Resilience 
Against Terrorism Strategy; Annual Report on Terrorist Threats since 2013 (Public Safety 
Canada) 
 
The Prevent (UK) program explicitly seeks out the participation of communities 
labelled ‘at risk,’ most notably Muslim community members, in hopes of countering 
radicalization before in culminates in terrorism. It thus presents a significant 
rearticulation of counterterrorism practices around notions of preemptive intervention and 
community engagement. As the strategy suggests, “we believe that radicalisation – in this 
country – is being driven by: an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, 
highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both 
obliges and legitimizes violence in its defence” (The Home Office 2011a: 18). Building 
on the international, multi-agency “Channel” program,11 it also entails major changes in 
the government’s relations with cultural and ethnic minority comminutes. As noted by 
O’Toole et al. (2016), the Prevent (UK) strategy focuses on Muslim community 
engagement, with a particular focus on religious, youth, and women’s de-radicalization 
projects. Prevent (UK) is delivered by three government departments: The Home Office 
                                                
11 “Channel” is a multi-agency intervention strategy designed to safeguard people from being drawn into 
extremist or violent behavior. It brings together leaders from the European intelligence, law enforcement, 
and social services communities to refer vulnerable individuals and groups to the “channel process” where 
those individuals and groups are put through screening, assessments, and, if necessary, monitoring and 
interventions are conducted.  
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(in particular the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, created in 2007), the 
Department for Communities and Local Government, and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.  
Prevent (UK) was the impetus for government funding of a range of community-
based projects with the goal of providing counter-narratives to religious and ideological 
sentiment. For example, the New Labour majority government funded the establishment 
of the Radical Middle Way project, an intervention project aimed at preventing youth 
radicalization, and the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) to 
regulate the growing body of UK mosques. Prevent also aimed to “fundamentally 
rebalance” government engagement with Muslim women and youth by creating the 
National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and the Young Muslims Advisory group in 
2008, which created a direct link between the government and Muslims women and 
youth. The diffusion of Prevent (UK), and the expansion of counterradicalization 
practices in the United Kingdom is made explicit in the strategy:  
• Over the lifetime of this strategy, DfE will undertake the following 
Prevent-related work in England: Over the lifetime of this strategy, DfE 
will undertake the following Prevent-related work in England:  
• ensure that teachers and other school staff know what to do when they see 
signs that a child is at risk of radicalisation; 
• continue to collaborate and encourage collaboration with policing and the 
development of products for teachers; 
• as part of the planned changes to the inspection arrangements for 
maintained schools, give due weight to schools’ activities in support of our 
shared values, and for any concerns to be reflected in the report; 
• strengthen the Independent School Standards to ensure that schools 
understand their obligations; 
• establish a set of standards for teachers which clarifies obligations 
regarding extremism; 
• provide effective financial and non-financial ‘due diligence’ to minimise 
the risk that those with unacceptable views can set up Free Schools or gain 
control of academies or other publicly-funded schools; 
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• work with the Charity Commission to ensure that schools that are charities 
and under their jurisdiction comply with charity law; 
• work to reduce the risk that children and young people are exposed to 
extremist views in out of school hours provision; and  
• help children’s services work with schools and other agencies, including 
Channel, to identify children at risk of radicalisation and take necessary 
steps to protect them from harm. (The Home Office 2011a: 73) 
 
 Critics of Prevent (UK) have offered several important challenges to some of the 
programs key features. Pantazis and Pemberton (2009), for instance, argue that Prevent’s 
(UK) focus on preemptive intervention and community engagement construct Muslims as 
a ‘suspect community,’ thereby making individuals and groups part of such communities 
more susceptible to governmental interventions. Thomas (2012) echoes this concern, and 
suggests that by focusing on Muslim communities, Prevent (UK) and the set of 
heterogeneous practices therein, securitizes state engagement with Muslim community 
members. Even more, Thomas (2012) argues that connecting community engagement 
practices emphasized the connection between those communities and themes of 
terrorism, thereby discursively linking Islam explicitly with terrorism. Birt (2009) also 
highlights this tendency, but argues that Prevent might work to stigmatize individuals in 
already vulnerable communities, thereby further alienating and isolating some 
community members and thus pushing them towards radicalization. Finally, O’Toole and 
colleagues (2016) highlight the disciplinary mechanisms at work in Prevent (UK) and 
critique the program on the grounds that it creates a problematic form of Muslim-state 
engagement, rather than the program’s objective of building positive community 
relations.  
 The United States, on the other hand, does not currently have an analogous 
strategy to the UK’s Prevent program. It does, however, have a loosely connected set of 
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guidelines for counterradicalization initiatives for which stakeholders may consult when 
drafting their own policies. The guidelines, entitled Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, is a concise document drafted by 
President’s Office which provides a set of overarching ideas to counter radicalization. 
The title of the document highlights its approach to the broadening of counterterrorism 
across a variety of organizations at the local, state, and federal levels. Unlike the UK’s 
Prevent strategy, however, the guidelines do not reflect an all-encompassing 
governmental strategy nor does the President’s Office grant specific authority to 
individual organizations. 
Despite the lack of strategic organization, several attempts have been made to 
centralize the counterradicalization apparatus in the United States. In 2010, DHS 
Secretary Janet Napolitano designated the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s 
Countering Violent Extremism Working Group – comprised of community leaders, 
security experts, and local and state police representatives – with responsibility for 
drafting recommendations for how the Department could better support efforts to combat 
violent extremism (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2010). Based off the Working 
Group’s recommendations, Napolitano released a series of recommendations to counter 
crime and violent extremism at the local and state law enforcement levels (DHS 2010), 
therefore falling well short of adopting an overarching counterradicalization strategy.  
A second aspect of the DHS’ counterradicalization strategy centers on 
engagement with American Muslim communities. For example, the 2010 National 
Security Strategy suggests that the “best defense” against radicalization is to foster “well 
informed and quipped families, local communities, and institutions” and “broader 
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engagement with Muslim communities around the world will spur progress on critical 
political and security matters” (The White House 2010: 4, 19). Official DHS responses to 
community engagement with American Muslim comminutes, however, reflects a 
reserved approach to framing engagement not solely in relation to issues of terrorism and 
radicalization.12 The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRCL) is the 
office tasked with engaging American Muslim, Arab, Somali, South Asian, and Sikh 
community leaders through a variety of initiatives. The OCRCL, for instance, established 
the National Security Internship Program which provides internship positions at the DHS 
and FBI for Arabi-speaking college undergraduates. The FBI has also established 
community-engagement programs with Muslim and Arab community members. For 
example, the FBI’s Community Relations Unit established a Specialized Community 
Outreach Team, pioneered in Minneapolis, to engage local communities (predominantly 
Muslim communities) who are labelled at risk of radicalization. Finally, a variety of 
jurisdictions with larger Muslim populations have created engagement initiatives at the 
local level, not least of which have been developed in New York and Los Angeles.  
Interestingly, unlike other jurisdictions, steps have been taken to define the 
concept of radicalization in US law. In 2007, Jane Harman introduced the Violent 
Radicalization and Home-grown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, which would have, 
among other things, defined “violent radicalization,” and establish grant programs and 
university-based knowledge centers for the study of radicalization, but ultimately died in 
                                                
12 According to the testimony of DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Margo Schlanger, at the 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment hearing in 2010, 
Muslim communities are viewed as at risk to be “targeted by violent extremist recruitment efforts…but as 
solutions if they are appropriately engaged, supported and included.” 
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the Senate during the 110th Congress due to concerns over Internet censorship, racial 
profiling, and potential constitutional violations (Giraldi 2011). Still, however, even if the 
legislation were successful, changes would have remained predominantly knowledge- 
and research-based, rather than based in intervention practices and/or law enforcement.  
On a political level, amongst the most active politicians to focus on 
counterradicalization has been Representative Peter King, who is a member of the 
Homeland Security Committee and Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism 
and Intelligence. King has been a vocal proponent of the development and diffusion of 
counterradicalization initiatives and programs at the local, state, and federal levels. 
Indeed, Representative King’s website explicitly mentions his approach to issues of 
international and domestic terrorism: “the threat of homegrown terrorism and violent 
Islamic extremist radicalization, as evinced by the terrorist attacks at Orlando, San 
Bernardino, Times Square, and Boston, is the most prolific threat facing the Homeland” 
(King 2017). In 2011, following an attack at Fort Hood, King held a series of 
congressional hearings on the threat of “homegrown Islamic extremist radicalization” 
titled “The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That 
Community’s Response.” This followed Senator Joseph Lieberman’s 14 hearings 
between 2006 and 2009 and Representative Jane Harman’s six hearings from 2006 to 
2008, on similar issues relevant to ‘homegrown’ terrorism.  
Like the United Kingdom, Canada has an official counterradicalization strategy. 
Introduced in 2013, the strategy, called “Building Resilience Against Terrorism: 
Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” is overseen by Public Safety Canada and includes 
four strategic arms modelled similarly to the UKs CONTEST strategy. The four arms 
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include: (1) Prevent, focusing on the prevention of individuals from engaging in 
terrorism; (2) Detect, in charge of identifying the activities and individuals who may pose 
a terrorist threat; (3) Deny, which aims to stop the means and opportunity to carry out 
terrorist activities; and (4) Respond, which focuses on proportionate and rapid response 
and mitigation strategies to mediate effects of terrorist activities.  
One of the overarching goals of the Building Resilience Against Terrorism 
strategy is to “help focus and galvanize Canadian law enforcement, and the security and 
intelligence community around a clear strategic objective” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 
4). The purpose of the Canadian Prevent strategy is to prevent individuals from engaging 
in terrorism by: (1) establishing community level engagement initiatives to counter 
violent extremism; (2) work with international partners to coordinated “like-minded 
countries to stabilize fragile states and limit the conditions conductive to the development 
of violent extremism globally” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 17); and (3) providing 
counternarratives to contradict “sophisticated propaganda and outreach strategies” from 
terrorist organizations (Public Safety Canada 2013: 17).  
Unlike the UK’s Prevent strategy, the Canadian program does not explicitly 
mention Islam in the Prevent portion of the strategy. However, as data analyzed here 
suggest, Canada’s – like the US and UK – plan does frame its Prevent strategy in relation 
to problematics of Islam and with issues of engagement with Muslim communities. For 
example, the foreword of Canada’s Prevent strategy sets up the “terrorist threat” as an 
issue of “violent Islamism extremism” and approaches it as “the leading threat to 
Canada’s national security” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 2). As I have demonstrated, 
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statements such as those do not appear to align with objective empirical reality nor the 
findings from some of the areas foremost experts.  
An important difference in the emergence of counterradicalization programs in 
the US, UK, and Canada, is the establishment of large scale federal commissions to 
investigate issues of terrorism post-2001. While the United States established the 9/11 
Commission Report following the attacks in Washington and New York on September 
11, 2001, the government has not commissioned an investigation into issues of terrorism 
since. The United Kingdom and Canada, on the other hand, have had substantial public 
pressure to adopt new counterterrorism prevention measures in response to the release of 
highly publicized public inquiries. In the United Kingdom, the bombings in London in 
2005 spurned a federal investigation into the country’s counterterrorism and, more 
specifically, its preventative mechanisms in response to perceived failures of the 
government to stop the attack. In Canada, the Government called a Commission of 
Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 as a result of 
increasing public and political pressure to prevent similar incidents in the future. In June 
2010, the Commission released its final report, Air India Flight 182: A Canadian 
Tragedy, which found massive failures in Canada’s terrorism prevention strategy. The 
damning indictment of Canada’s terrorism prevention apparatus thus called on the 
Government to reevaluate and modernize its terrorism prevention strategy, particularly so 
following cases of effective law enforcement investigations, such as the successful 
conviction of the “Toronto 18” in 2006.13 The amount of political and public pressure on 
                                                
13 The “Toronto 18” case refers to the plotting of a series of terrorist attacks against targets in Southern 
Ontario during 2006 and the preventative investigation which led to terrorism raids in the Greater Toronto 
Area and resulted in the arrest of 14 adults and 4 youth (the “Toronto 18”) 
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the government, evinced by the launch of public inquiries, to focus on prevention of 
terrorism through community-level engagement, monitoring, and intervention, might 
explain the emergence of explicit counterradicalization strategies, which followed closely 
after the completion of both inquiries. 
 Another potential structural difference between the US, UK, and Canada, which 
may make the emergence of explicit counterradicalization programs more or less likely is 
the established domestic surveillance and security apparatus in the UK and Canada. As 
noted by Deflem, Silva and Rogers (forthcoming), Canada and the UK have a long and 
established history of engaging in surveillance and intelligence gathering on within their 
borders and on their own citizens. The United States, on the other hand, has no official 
government agency responsible with collecting information on American citizens.14  
Moreover, important difference which may explain the development of official 
counterradicalization initiatives in the UK and Canada has to do with government 
responsibility for issues of counterradicalization. Both countries have tasked individual 
government agencies or offices with responsibility over counterradicalization strategies 
(Public Safety Canada and the UK’s Home Office). In the United States, as noted by 
Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman (2010), there is no such office: 
[I]t is fundamentally troubling, given this collection of new threats and 
new adversaries directly targeting America, that there remains no federal 
government agency or department specifically charged with identifying 
radicalization and interdicting the recruitment of U.S. citizens or residents 
for terrorism (p. 29) 
 
                                                
14 Although recent information released from whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning and Edward 
Snowden suggest that the US government is indeed collecting information on its citizens.  
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The result has been a fragmentation of responsibility over counterradicalization 
initiatives, with local and state law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, 
DHS, and the State Department all employing different strategies with different 
operational motives and outcomes. Indeed, the large bureaucratic structure, Vidino 
(2009) maintains, is part of the explanation for why governmental counterradicalization 
strategies have been slow to develop in the United States.  
Finally, constitutional concerns have in some ways prevented the expansion of 
police powers of surveillance and intelligence gathering in the United States. While 
Canada and the UK have had traditionally less public opposition to advanced forms of 
government surveillance (illustrated in part by the existence of a domestic intelligence 
agency in each country). According to a survey of US citizens conducted by the Pew 
Research Center in 2014, a 54 percent of US citizens disapprove of governmental 
collection of telephone and Internet data as part of counterterrorism efforts (Pew 
Research Center 2014). In comparison with Canada and the UK, 64 percent of Canadians 
say that government surveillance is acceptable in certain situations, such as 
counterterrorism (Canadian Internet Registration Authority 2013), and when asked about 
the balance between privacy and security in the UK, only 17% percent of British citizens 
responded that the government must do more to protect privacy considering 
counterterrorism threats (YouGov 2016).15 The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, introduced by Jane Harman, would have gone some 
length in legally authorizing new surveillance measures on American citizens.  The 
                                                
15 34 percent of British citizens responded that the government should “do more to help security forces” 
and 28 percent indicated that the “balance is about right.” 
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legislation would have prevented DHS’ intelligence efforts from violating constitutional 
and civil rights protected by the First Amendment. Ultimately, however, those provisions 
of increased surveillance were a large part of why the bill died in the Senate in 2007. 
While Canada and the UK have a long history with domestic intelligence gathering 
practices, which might reflect on public opinion related to privacy and terrorism, the 
United States public strongly opposes such intervention. Consequently, governmental and 
law enforcement authorities tend to be averse to official counterradicalization strategies 
that emphasize preemptive intelligence gathering due to First Amendment rights and 
freedoms.  
Governmental counterradicalization strategies in the UK and Canada, at least 
officially, attempt to represent radicalization as process that can affect any individual or 
group, regardless of cultural, religious, or ethnic background (Molnar and Monaghan 
2016). For example, the Prevent (UK) strategy explicitly suggests that “Prevent will 
address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose 
to our national security” (The Home Office 2011a: 6). Indeed, counterterrorism policies 
are quick to remind us that “the threat of violent extremism does not originate from a 
single source, but a diverse range of groups and individuals who either actively 
participate in or who support violent extremist activities” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 
16). Official responses to the threat of radicalization, however, are underpinned by an 
increasing focus and problematization of Islamic communities in relation to so-called 
radicalization processes. The final section of this chapter explores the underlying logic 
and construction of counterradicalization strategies and highlights how even those 
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explicitly referencing the ‘diversity’ of threats are based primarily in constructions of 
Muslims as risk communities vis-à-vis radicalization. 
 
Beyond the ‘Agnosticism’ of Prevention Strategies 
While UK, US, and Canadian governments continue to assert that 
counterradicalization policies are not directed solely at Islam,16 the data suggest that is 
not necessarily the case (See Tables 4.2-4.4). While explicit counterradicalization 
policing policies and government strategies indeed approach radicalization in a relatively 
agnostic manner (see Table 4.2) – as if the process can affect anyone – the underlying 
logics of those policies and frameworks, and the discourses in which they are 
constructed, include numerous explicit references to radicalization as a fundamental issue 
amongst predominantly Muslim communities (see Tables 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4). Echoing 
previous research into counterterrorism policing and surveillance strategies (see Breen-
Smyth 2014; Croft 2012a; de Goede and Simon 2013; Eroukhamanoff 2015; Monaghan 
and Molnar 2016), findings here suggest that while surface-level analyses of 
counterradicalization strategies might indicate an agnostic approach to processes of 
radicalization (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4), the discourses that construct those very 
frameworks are imbued in disproportionate levels of fear, distrust, and suspicion of 
Islamic communities.  
Table 4.3: References to Islam in National Security Strategies 
 
                                                
16 Canada’s 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, for example, defines “radicalization to 
violence” as: “radicalization to violence is a process by which individuals are introduced to an ideology 
that encourages movement towards extreme views which, in turn, lead to violence. Radicalization to 
violence can occur anywhere: in religious institutions, schools, prisons, online and other places where like-
minded people come together” (Public Safety Canada 2014: 40) 
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 References to Radicalization References to Islam: 
 
United 
States 
United 
Kingdom Canada United States 
United 
Kingdom Canada 
1998 0 - - 2 - - 
1999 - - - - - - 
2000 0 - - 4 - - 
2001 0 - - 5 - - 
2002 0 - - 2 - - 
2003 - - - - - - 
2004 - - 0 - - 0 
2005 - - 0 - - 3 
2006 0 - - 14 - - 
2007 - - - - - - 
2008 - 0 0 - 3 0 
2009 - 6 - - 9 - 
2010 2 1 - 4 7 - 
2011 - 0 - - 0 - 
2012 - 2 8 - 2 20 
2013 - - - - - - 
2014 - - - - - - 
2015 1 6 - 2 12 - 
Data: US national security policies since 1987 (available at https://http://www.nssarchive.us); 
Canadian National Security Policy and national security reports (available at 
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca); Major National Security Strategies and updates in the UK 
(available at https://www.gov.uk). 
 
The areligious manner in which official governmental discourses problematize 
terrorism and radicalization are reflected in Table 4.3. An analysis of official 
counterradicalization programs in each country highlights the dearth of explicit 
references made to religious ideologies and backgrounds. Counterradicalization strategies 
in the US, UK, and Canada problematize issues, ideas, and concepts that are not 
associated with one particular religious group or institution. For example, the Canadian 
strategy, Building Resilience Against Terrorism, most often problematizes terrorism (and 
radicalization more specifically) as an issue of national security and focuses on the 
prevention solutions planned to combat radicalization (i.e., intelligence, law, community 
building, etc.). The US and UK programs similarly focus on strategies of community 
building, while problematizing radicalization in a general way through frames of violence 
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and extremism. As noted above, the data here suggest that the US indeed frames research 
and knowledge production as a key aspect of the counterradicalization strategy, while 
offering very little by way of intervention strategies (i.e., law enforcement, intelligence, 
law). 
Table 4.4: Top Themes Referenced in Counterradicalization Strategies 
   
 
Count 
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%) 
Similar Words 
Building Resilience Against Terrorism (Canada) 
security 193 1.76 secure, securing, security 
threats 125 1.14 threat, threats 
international 109 1.00 international, internationally 
counter 106 0.97 counter, countered, countering 
response 98 0.89 response, responses, responsibility, responsible 
support 85 0.78 support, supported, supporters, supporting, 
supportive, supports 
intelligence 75 0.68 intelligence 
agencies 70 0.64 agencies, agency 
informed 67 0.61 inform, information, informed, informs 
community 63 0.58 communities, community 
law 59 0.54 law, lawful, laws 
building 54 0.49 build, building, builds 
respond 52 0.47 respond, responder, responders, responding, 
responds 
prevention 51 0.47 prevent, preventative, preventing, prevention, 
preventive 
CONTEST (UK)    
prevention 908 1.50 preventability, preventable, preventative, 
prevented, preventing 
terrorism’ 879 1.46 terror, terrorism, terrorism’ 
security 431 0.71 secure, secured, securely, securing, security 
community 397 0.66 communities, community 
policing 393 0.65 police, policed, policing 
countering 375 0.62 counter, countering, counters 
support 366 0.61 supported, supporter, supporting, supportive 
locally 333 0.55 local, localism, locally 
country 288 0.48 countries, countries’, country 
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activity 278 0.46 active, actively, activism, activities, activities’, 
activity 
attack 273 0.45 attack, attacked, attacking, attacks 
threats 268 0.44 threat, threat’, threats 
risk 253 0.42 risk, risked, risking, risks 
organisation 249 0.41 organisational, organised, organising 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism (US) 
community 160 2.47 communities, community 
cve 122 1.88 cve 
local 104 1.60 local, locally 
extremism 86 1.33 extremism 
support 63 0.97 support, supported, supporters, supporting, 
supportive 
engaging 58 0.89 engage, engaged, engagement, engagements 
violence 52 0.80 violence 
force 51 0.79 force, forces 
extremist 50 0.77 extremist, extremists, extremists’ 
prevention 50 0.77 prevent, preventing, prevention 
stakeholders 43 0.66 stakeholder, stakeholders 
development 42 0.65 develop, developed, developing 
research 41 0.63 research, researchers, researching 
information 39 0.60 inform, information, informed, informs 
 
Counterradicalization plans in Canada and the US rarely reference Islam in their 
official documents (See Table 4.4). Comparatively, the United Kingdom does reference 
Muslim communities far more often than other countries, however, as Table 4.4 
illustrates, the Prevent strategy (UK) focuses much more on generalized risks and 
prevention strategies to deal with those threats. Counterradicalization strategies in all 
three countries do reference Islam more than any other religion, but that most often 
occurs in the lead up to outlining institutional responses and initiatives to combat the 
problem. For example, in Canada’s Building Resilience Against Terrorism strategy, Islam 
is not mentioned one time in the Prevent section. Rather, all 20 references to Islam in the 
document were made in an introductory section entitled, “The Terrorist Threat” (Public 
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Safety Canada 2013: 6-9). This discursive strategy is unsurprising and highlights how 
official governmental counterradicalization initiatives strategically problematize threats 
coming from Islamic communities while remaining areligious in their outline of 
operational practices seeking to counter those threats. Framing counterradicalization 
programs in this way diffuses questions and critique related to discriminatory practices, 
while also emphasizing that the supposed “threat” is coming from particular cultural and 
ethnic groups (see Table 4.1 and subsequent discussion highlighting the paradoxical 
nature of “terror threat” assessments).  
 
Table 4.5: References to Religions in Counterradicalization Frameworks 
   
 UK US Canada 
Christian 2 (0.01%) - - 
Sikh 2 (0.01%) - 1 (0.01%) 
Islam 174 (0.17%) 14 (0.14%) 20 (0.06%) 
Judaism 2 (0.01%) - - 
Protestant - - - 
Catholic - - - 
Other - - - 
Data: Building Resilience Against Terrorism, UK's Prevent Strategy, Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
Other includes Buddhism, Hinduism, Atheism, Hellenism, Paganism 
 
 
As data suggest, the discourses in which official government counterradicalization 
strategies are constructed reflect an overwhelming focus on Islam as the predominant 
source of so-called radicalization. In Congressional and Parliamentary debates in the US, 
UK, and Canada since 1969, which represent the most influential stages of the 
governance policy creation process, radicalization has been increasingly used to frame 
terrorism and counterterrorism practices (see Figure 4.3). Even more notable in light of 
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this chapter’s discussion is the overwhelming association of radicalization with Islam in 
Congressional and Parliamentary debates. Governmental debates are fundamental aspects 
of the legislative and social policy creation process; debate amongst legislators fuels 
legislative decisions and policy frameworks which form the output of government. 
Approaching social policy and law as a byproduct of the legislative process in terms of, 
to borrow from Luhmann (1995), ‘structural coupling’ or more traditional approaches to 
sociological jurisprudence (Pound 1954; Parsons 1959), one can identify how 
problematizations vis-à-vis political discourses about radicalization influence 
subsequence policy outputted by the political system.   
 
 
Figure 4.3: References to “Radicalization” and Islam in Congressional and 
Parliamentary Debates17 
 
 
                                                
17 References to Islam are here only included when used in relation to communications about radicalization. 
Parliamentary debates were analyzed for inclusions of references to Islam in the main clause or sub-clauses 
of references to radicalization. Data: US congressional debates (https://www.congress.gov), Parliamentary 
debates in the UK and Canada (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com and http://www.parl.gc.ca) 
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By framing the “terrorist threat” of so-called radicalization as an issue amongst 
predominantly Islamic communities, despite evidence that suggests otherwise, official 
counterradicalization policies are able to construct practices of counterradicalization in a 
generalized manner whilst still discursively connecting the concept to those already 
marginalized communities. The political system’s focus on Islam as the source of 
radicalization, evinced by governmental debates and self-referenced “threat levels,” is 
thus masked in its approach to the practices and intervention strategies that are included 
in its counterradicalization programs. Political officials are therefore able to profess the 
agnostic characteristics of counterradicalization practices, such as community 
engagement interventions and surveillance and monitoring programs, while indirectly and 
inexplicitly indicting Muslim communities. In other words, official counterradicalization 
strategies like Prevent (Canada and UK) and Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism, frame the “threat” of radicalization in terms of Islam, but the 
intervention practices outlined in the strategies are represented as areligious. This, I 
argue, is strategic based on political and legal pressures which prevent government from 
discriminating against particular populations. The practices must, officially speaking, be 
agnostic and applied equally across the populous to avoid charges of discrimination, 
however the logic and development of those intervention strategies are imbued with 
connections between the radicalization subject and Islam. This is particularly evident in 
the US, where counterradicalization strategies have been slow to develop because of the 
potential civil rights violations involved in preemptive intervention practices. The 
political system must ensure it does not present radicalization interventions focused on 
specific populations or risk violating the very legal mechanisms for which it constructs.   
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 Finally, as highlighted in Table 4.4, each country’s current counterradicalization 
policy highlights the importance of community level policing initiatives. The focus on 
community policing is particularly relevant in the United Kingdom, which has the most 
developed counterradicalization framework of the three countries. Also in the United 
Kingdom and Canada, and to a lesser extent the United States (which provides very little 
detail regarding concrete intervention practices), counterradicalization strategies focus 
greatly on law enforcement-community engagement initiatives. Indeed, as noted in the 
United States’ guidelines, “well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and 
local institutions are considered “the best defenses against violent extremist ideologies” 
(The White House 2011: 2). The logic of such strategies are to build “resilience” (Public 
Safety Canada 2013), “cohesion” (The Home Office 2011a: 27), or “empower” local 
communities to “help them protect themselves” (The White House 2011: 1, 3).  
In the Foucauldian tradition, scholars have highlighted how these community-
level preemptive counterterrorism strategies seek to create a sense of self-discipline 
amongst Muslim communities by aligning ‘technologies of the self’ with ‘technologies of 
government’ (see Birt 2008; Dean 1997; Heath-Kelly 2013; McGhee 2008: Martin 2014; 
O’Toole et al. 2016). Such programs can therefore not be entirely disconnected from 
relations of power which disproportionately impact cultural and ethnic minorities. Indeed, 
practices of preemptive policing cannot be approached as ‘objective’ merely because the 
policing apparatus is supposed to be autonomous from political influence. Rather, as 
Mann and Lee (1979) and Brodeur (2010) illustrate, policing is intimately connected with 
government and political institutions and therefore also implicated in the construction and 
maintenance of hegemonic power. As the analysis here suggests, the very logics that 
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form the basis of counterradicalization strategies is one founded primarily in the 
construction of a “terrorist threat” coming from Islamic communities.  
Whereas Charles Kurzman (2014) has argued that Muslim communities have 
been successful in “self-policing” and thus effective of countering radicalization from 
within, a broader approach to governance strategies, even largely disjointed ones like the 
current structure of counterradicalization in the United States, suggests that any such 
“self-policing” are potentially effected by legislative and public policy changes. In other 
words, political constructions of the “threat” of counterradicalization amongst certain 
populations puts those individuals and groups under a public microscope, making said 
groups more susceptible to adopting “self-policing” strategies, even if the objective 
“threat” level is not present. Furthermore, as the above analysis has illustrated, the 
diffusion of policing programs – now extending far beyond law enforcement, to areas 
such as schools and universities – and the political construction of terrorist threats vis-à-
vis Islam highlight the relative impossibility of disconnecting the logic of such initiatives 
with the material practices outlined in those strategies. The strategies are constructed, 
justified, and maintained through continuous reference to the “threat” of radical Islamic 
extremism, regardless of political statements highlighting the agnostic approach of 
counterradicalization practices.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sketched out some of the historical, legal, and political developments 
antecedent to the emergence of counterradicalization as a policy framework. Through the 
in-depth analysis of anti-terrorism law, political debates, official government 
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communications and reports, and counterradicalization strategies in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Canada, I have aimed to highlight how radicalization has become a 
dominant framework for counterterrorism governance throughout Western liberal 
democracies. In the first part of the chapter, I traced some of the legal and political 
precursors to counterradicalization governance. Here, I explored questions related to how 
counterterrorism legislation has developed throughout the US, UK, and Canada, and how 
anti-terrorism policy has shifted from a relatively reactive approach to terrorist activities 
focusing on issues of military intervention and penal policy, to a more proactive, 
preemptive approach guided by notions of security, surveillance, intelligence, and 
community law enforcement.  
I then moved to a discussion of how the political system has followed a similar, if 
not more pronounced, trajectory in terms of political approaches to counterterrorism and 
radicalization. I argued that shifts in governmental discourses around preemptive 
intervention strategies are reflective of a broad new approach to countering terrorism. I 
also outlined some of the structural and political conditions which make the emergence of 
official counterradicalization programs, centered on this innovative approach to 
terrorism, more or less likely. Finally, through the in-depth analysis of official 
counterradicalization strategies in the US, UK, and Canada, and the discursive contexts in 
which those strategies are constructed, I illustrate how the logic of counterradicalization 
is inextricably linked with representations of Islamic communities as the source of so-
called radicalization. Even when official deradicalization programs, political leaders, and 
government officials emphasize that radicalization is a process that can affect any 
individual, regardless of religious background, the very construction of intervention 
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strategies related to counterradicalization are imbued with meaning that constructs 
Muslim communities as the problematic.  
 Following the discussion of how radicalization and counterradicalization are 
framed in the legal and political systems, the following chapters present similar analyses 
of the counterradicalization framework in some of the other dominant social institutions 
which influence the ways in which the public sphere approaches issues of terrorism. To 
this end, the next chapter highlights the discursive construction of radicalization in news 
media as a sample reflective of the broader cultural apparatus. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SEEING RADICALIZATION THROUGH LAW
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, policies have been enacted that enlist teachers, 
professors, and community leaders, who are to be turned into informant systems that 
stretches beyond Muslim communities to areas of education, religious institutions, 
hospitals, and other community organizations. This is particularly evident in the United 
Kingdom, where the Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015 has mandated state-run 
organizations, such as schools, university, hospitals, and government-funded community 
organizations, to enact counterradicalization initiatives and report to government 
authorities when radicalization if suspected. Similar, albeit less juridically authorized, 
governance structures have been enacted in Canada and the United States. For instance, 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2015 has expanded the country’s law enforcement 
apparatus by criminalizing promotion of terrorism and expanding interagency 
information sharing networks. While I have thus far approached legislation that adopts 
such strategies as an output of the political system, it is also important to explore how 
similar issues are conceived of, and communicated about, by the legal system in relation 
to such legislation. This chapter thus aims to investigate juridical conceptualizations of 
radicalization in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada in order to understand 
the ways in which legal systems adopt, maintain, and communicate about the construct. 
Through in-depth analyses of federal case law in each country, this chapter offers an 
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empirically grounded exploration of juridical communications about radicalization and 
related phenomena.  
 Data for this chapter were derived from online searches of federal case law in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. United States’ state and federal case law 
were gathered from Westlaw, Google Scholar law, and The Public Library of Law.18 In 
the United Kingdom, data were gathered through Westlaw, and in Canada, federal case 
law was identified using the Canlii database. Databases were searched for the terms 
“radicalization” and “radicalisation,” and duplicate documents were excluded. In total, 
the search resulted in the inclusion of 103 legal decisions referencing radicalization, 58 in 
the United States, and 26 in the United Kingdom, and 19 in Canada. Analytic techniques 
adopted in this chapter include discourse and content analysis of federal case law. More 
specifically, I analyzed the data based on several emergent themes, including how case 
law defined, or attempted to define, radicalization; who, or what extra-legal elements, did 
the legal system refer to when offering defining characteristics of radicalization; and how 
radicalization was represented in reference to other social phenomena (i.e., religious 
background, criminality, psychology, social characteristics, etc.). Themes are presented 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively, in the form of theme counts, below.  
 The chapter is broken down into two sections based upon the advancement of 
separate, albeit interconnected, arguments. In the first section I highlight the legal 
systems’ apprehension to employing radicalization as a legal construct and suggest that 
                                                
18 Westlaw is a pay-for-use legal database available at https://lawschool.westlaw.com. Google Scholar law 
and The Public Library of Law are free search engines available at http://scholar.google.com and 
https://www.plol.org. Canlii is a non-profit organization that provides free access to Canadian case law and 
legislation, available at http://www.canlii.org. 
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the conceptual ambiguity of radicalization allows it to be used by law in specific contexts 
(most notably when referencing Islam-related terrorism). In the second chapter, I build 
upon the first argument by illustrating how law uses the frame of radicalization in 
association with Islam to differentiate those cases from other crimino-legal elements, 
despite its noted ambiguity. I therefore aim to demonstrate the legal system’s creativity in 
terms of how it defines and gives meaning to radicalization and suggest that this 
inventiveness is founded in discriminatory legal practices. Prior to the empirical sections 
of the chapter, however, a brief outline of theoretical approach to the study of law is 
necessary.  
 
The Social System of Law and Legal Violence 
Within the governmentality literature, the rule of law is often viewed as a mechanism of 
governance and therefore sometimes ignored as an object of study in Foucauldian-
inspired work. Indeed, law was not one of Foucault’s major objects of inquiry, nor did he 
advocate for a specific theory of law. Scholars working within this framework have 
grappled with contemporary issues in legal studies (for instance, see Hunt and Wickham 
(1994) or the more recent contribution from Golder (2013)), but, for the most part, 
Foucauldians continue to side-step analyses of law in their work, instead highlighting law 
as part of the art of government. While this has resulted in fruitful analyses of 
governmental power vis-à-vis law, governmentality studies have yet to develop robust 
theoretical tools for exploring the mechanisms by which legal decision-making 
specifically justifies and sustains new forms and strategies of government. Broadly within 
the governmentality framework, then, I attempt to broaden understandings of legal 
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decision-making in the context of terrorism. I do this by utilizing a theory of 
communication that can make sense of how law maintains and justifies new forms of 
governance aimed at intervening in the so-called radicalization process.  
German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (2004) conceives of law as the autopoietic 
system that maintains normative expectations in the face of counter-factual examples. 
When there is a violation of normative expectations of law, the legal system counter-
factually reaffirms those expectations with the binary code legal/illegal (Deflem 2008: 
168). However, the coding legal/illegal is not self-sufficient – it is not enough to say that 
the autonomy of law stems from its orientation to stabilize normative expectations. As 
Luhmann (2004) maintains that “since the values legal and illegal are not in themselves 
criteria for decisions between legal and illegal, there must be further points of view that 
indicate whether or not and how the values of the code are to be allocated rightly or 
wrongly” (p. 192; italics in original). Here, Luhmann evokes the concept of law’s 
programs to which the application of the code is associated. The program of law, which 
Luhmann maintains are always conditional and a purely cognitive matter, consist of all 
the pre-existing principles, procedures, rules, statutes, and rulings that are made valid by 
past decisions linked to the code legal/illegal. Law’s programs include the selection of 
extra-juridical communications to justify its indication based on law binary code. For 
example, when faced with a legal decision without precedent (i.e., another one of law’s 
programs), the legal system can select from its environment – for example, scientific 
research, governmental communications, international law – to justify its decisions.  
These programs operate on the bases of an “if-then” structure: if certain legal 
conditions are met, then a certain legal decision will be made (Deflem 2008: 168; Nobles 
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and Schiff 2013). However, the operational closure of the legal system is not obliterated 
by violations of legal norms. For Luhmann, it is quite the opposite: any disappointment of 
institutionalized expectations of law actually reaffirms the normative expectation through 
prosecution and punishment. For example, in the context of anti-terror law, the legal 
system maintains that one ought to not commit ideologically or politically motivated 
violence regardless of counter-factual examples (i.e., events of ideological or politically 
motivated violence). Any disappointment of such legal norm does not invalidate the 
norm; it confirms it by producing further legal operations (i.e., charges, trials, legal 
decisions etc.). 
As Luhmann’s (2004) theory suggests, the function of the legal system is to 
decide on social conflicts through the distinction legal/illegal. However, what establishes 
the distinction legal/illegal in the first place is the legal system; law establishes what is 
legal and illegal. This paradox, which is unavoidable, must then be deparadoxified with 
law’s programs in order to legally decide on social conflicts (i.e., precedent, legal codes, 
extra-juridical observation, etc.). The system must therefore find justification for its 
decisions in law or elsewhere. This deparadoxification of law is therefore where analyses 
of legal decision-making are most appropriate – the so-called ‘critical’ aspect of his 
theory is derived from deconstructing the ways in which law justifies and maintains its 
decision-making in the face of juridically ambiguous and opaque social phenomena.  
 Luhmann’s theory of law as a society system is useful in analyses of law’s 
contingency. While it is here adopted in terms of its analytic value for exploring inter-
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systemic relationships,19 his sociological approach provides a sound theoretical basis for 
critical explorations of legal decision-making and its effect on individuals and groups. I 
therefore deploy Luhmann’s theory of intersystemic communication with critical 
approaches to law that emphasize law’s tendency to justify and sustain hierarchies based 
on hegemonic social order. Perhaps no work is more influential in this respect than Sarat 
and Kearns’ (1995) influential book Law’s Violence. Since its publication in the mid-
1990s, scholars across the social sciences have adopted questions related to the ways in 
which law remains indifferent while inflicting harm on those under its authority. This 
body of work moves beyond approaches to law that emphasize its normative influence on 
complex societies, and highlights how law and the legal system can be the producer of 
social harm rather than the arbiter of justice.  
 Researchers working within the area of counterterrorism have noted how law 
justifies and maintains forms of violence against cultural and ethnic minorities. Sherene 
Razack (2009), by example, highlights how Muslims have been casted out of Western 
law and politics through the creation of categories of people and perpetuation of myths 
about Islam in the legal system. As Razack (2009) puts it, her work “explores some of the 
places in law and society in the West where these figures animate a story about a family 
of white nations, a civilization, obliged to use force and terror to defend itself against a 
menacing cultural other” (p. 5). Razack argues that law is not immune to the climate of 
fear of Muslims permeating the public sphere and that, in Canada and elsewhere, laws 
                                                
19 As noted in Chapter Three, this dissertation adopts a systems theoretical approach to exploring discursive 
formations of radicalization throughout society’s most fundamental institutions. That is not to suggest that I 
approach each system as an organ, or necessity, for the ‘proper’ functioning of the whole social system. I 
simply utilize a systems analytical perspective to best illustrate inter-systemic relationships as they relate to 
radicalization discourses.  
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have been enacted that suspend rights and create an isolated area for those labelled a 
‘terrorist.’ As noted in Chapter Two, others have highlighted this trend through the 
deployment of notions such as ‘counter-law’ or state of exception, where law is 
suspended in order to deal with issues of terrorism and insecurity (see Ericson 2008 and 
Larsen and Piché 2009).  
Within the theoretical approach of systems theory, researchers have illustrated the 
utility of Luhmann’s legal theory when adopting a critical perspective. As Nicolas Carrier 
(2007) observers, law’s extra-judicial selection of various discourses highlights its 
creativity when dealing with ambiguous, and often contentious, social phenomena. 
Katayoun Baghai (2015), on the other hand, has used this theoretical perspective to 
demonstrate how the US Court was able to deny African Americans equal protection 
under the law by through creative, and inconsistent, application of legal principles. 
Approaching law as a functional system does not posit a functional relationship between 
law and other social systems. Rather, it offers an analytic framework for exploring inter-
systemic communication by highlighting the functional aspects of the social system. It is 
thus important to reflect on the ways in which law creatively selects from possible extra-
legal communication and, perhaps more importantly, how juridical selectivity 
(re)produces forms of inequality that effect already vulnerable individuals and groups.  
As such, this chapter aims to explore the legal construction of radicalization by 
paying particular attention to how law justifies its conceptualization of the concept 
through hetero-reference to external communications regarding terrorism, risk, and 
security. Through engagement with Luhmann’s sociology of law and critical approaches 
to legal violence, this chapter contributes to a more general theory of shifting strategies of 
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governance by highlighting how juridical anxieties over its deployment of radicalization 
discourses are indicative of law’s own biases and discriminatory practices.  
 
“Seeing” Radicalization Through Law: Juridical Anxieties and Legal Constructions of 
Radicalization  
 
As Figure 5.1 illustrates, the legal systems in all three countries have timidly deployed 
the concept of radicalization its decision-making. This is particularly evident in the 
United Kingdom and Canada, where the concept was only used in federal case law 26 
and 19 times respectively (cf. the United States, where the construct was referenced 58 
times). While the construct was used sporadically in federal law from the 1970s to the 
late 1990s, legal usage of the term increased substantially in the mid-2000s. In fact, the 
United Kingdom did not use the construct once until 2001, Canada did not reference 
radicalization until 2000, and the United States used the concept only 10 times prior to 
2002. Since 2002, the concept has been used 91 times (48 in the US, 25 in the UK, and 
18 in Canada), which represents 88% of the total references to radicalization in all federal 
case law since 1970 (95% in Canada and the UK).  
 A deeper analysis of juridical constructions of the concept in federal case law 
suggests that legal systems avoid defining radicalization in legal terms. In fact, most 
references to radicalization throughout the jurisdictions offer no legal definition of the 
concept at all, but rather use extra-juridical observations of the construct to justify legal 
decision-making. These non-legal elements are utilized by juridical decision makers (i.e., 
judges) to provide authoritative legitimization to the courts’ own observation of legally 
ambiguous social phenomena, in this case the radicalization frame. Examples of legal 
observation of extra-legal communication are numerous in the data: 
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In essence, the controversy is over the question of whether the West 
continues to face a grave threat from Al Qaeda or whether the true menace 
comes from loose knit cells of Western born Muslims or Muslim 
immigrants studying and working in the West; what Sageman calls 
disaffected "bunches of guys" who undergo the process of 
radicalization together. (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263) 20 
 
An expert witness, Professor Wark, testified in relation to these 
allegations and informed the Court on HCI, A. Khadr’s involvement 
and his radicalization through time. Mr. Khan, an ex-member of the 
Board of Administration of HCI and old acquaintance of A. Khadr, 
testified as well. (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241)   
 
One of the two academics contacted by the Research Directorate -an 
adjunct professor of political science at Philadelphia’s Temple 
University -- sees the screening process as a kind of pre-emptive strategy, 
one used to discourage Tamils from pursuing “a new wave of Tamil 
radicalization” (Adjunct Professor 13 Jan. 2011), while the other fellow -
- a senior fellow at the New Delhi-based Center for Land Warfare Studies 
--describes it as a means to cleanse the Tamil population of any remaining 
LTTE cadres (Senior Research Fellow 28 Dec. 2010). 
(Sivapathasuntharam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 
489) 
 
In these cases, the Canadian federal legal system selects from extra-juridical 
communications to help define radicalization for use by law. Selecting Marc Sageman’s 
“bunch of guys” hypothesis – that individuals who become radicalize often do so with a 
groupthink mentality, radicalizing together based on similar interests, characteristics, and 
experiences – to define characteristics of radicalization. In addition, through hetero-
reference to security scholars such as Wesley Wark, the legal system presents a relatively 
narrow conceptualization of the so-called radicalization process. By selecting from a 
specific group of academic knowledge claims, the legal system thus adopts a 
conceptualization of radicalization in terms of what Arun Kundnani (2012) calls a 
                                                
20 See Chapter Seven for an in-depth analysis of scholarly discourses related to radicalization and the 
critiques regarding much of the discipline’s methodological and empirical approach. Marc Sageman’s work 
represents only a portion of radicalization discourses available for the legal system to select. 
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“theological-psychological” approach (see Chapter Seven for in depth analysis of this 
approach). For law, radicalization is in part theological and in part a social psychological 
framework for understanding processes towards ideologically motivated violence.  
Interestingly, law also thought it appropriate to employ observations from 
academically questionable sources, including an adjunct professor, rather than seeking 
out more diverse perspectives and expertise widely available (see Chapter Seven).21 The 
legal system thus evidences its selectivity in how it defines the concept. As we shall see 
in Chapter Seven, the legal system has access to other scholarly interpretations of issues 
related to counterradicalization, selecting amongst a particular group of perspectives, 
while ignoring others, highlights law’s own approach to conceptualizing radicalization. 
We can therefore analyze how law gives meaning to radicalization through its hetero-
reference to external definitions.  
 This trend was not solely evident in Canada, but also in the United Kingdom, 
where the legal system almost exclusively referenced external definitions of 
radicalization rather than providing its own. An analysis of the data highlight the 
numerous discursive strategies evoked by the legal system to distance conceptualizations 
of radicalization from law: 
In the Appendix, Dr Seddon dealt with the rise in Islamic 
fundamentalism and its connection with Afghanistan…Dr Seddon 
quoted from a book "Afghan Wars" which described how charitable 
organisations mushroomed and that many were involved in teaching 
radical or fundamentalist versions of Sunni Islam to the displaced Afghan 
population in Pakistan. The author of the book considered that had led to 
the development of the Taliban. Around 1993, the appellant said, the 
Algerian authorities asked the Pakistan Government to return all Algerians 
                                                
21 While I do not here advance the idea that adjunct status is to be conflated with a lack of expertise, I do 
suggest that law’s selection of such communications over research conducted by more established scholars 
is puzzling.  
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who were in that part of Pakistan. He said that one of the main reasons 
was the fear of large-scale radicalisation of those Algerians who 
remained in Pakistan, with the possibility of their involvement with 
emerging fundamentalists like the Taliban and their later return to Algeria 
to join the paramilitary opposition. (Terrorist Suspects, HS Algeria CG 
[2009] UKAIT 00023) 
 
Mr Parker [Governor of a UK prison] said that there were also 
concerns about "maintaining the safety of some high profile 
inhabitants of the unit and to managing issues of radicalisation of 
prisoners". (Bary & Ors. R v Secretary of State for Justice and Anor 
[2010] E WHC 587) 
 
 In a Government Reply to the Report of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC of 
July 2007, the then Secretary of State, Ms Jacqui Smith MP, also referred 
to exit strategies when she stated that: "The Government believes it 
important to consider whether de- radicalisation and rehabilitation 
programmes could be deployed to help individuals subject to a control 
order. Such initiatives would form another potential exit strategy, though 
consideration would need to be given – as part of the Control Order 
Review Group process – to the appropriateness of such action in relation 
to each individual…" (AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2011] EWHC 2486) 
 
Professor Andrew Silke22 and Doctor Catherine Brown prepared detailed 
reports looking generically at the evolution of radicalisation as well as 
how it can most effectively be addressed. (London Borough Tower 
Hamlets v B [2016] EWHC 1707) 
 
As evinced by the above examples, on numerous occasions the legal system was hesitant 
to adopt the concept of radicalization as a legal element. Rather, it evoked non-juridical 
observations of characteristics and features of radicalization, and a so-called 
radicalization process, to adopt the framework in UK law. Most often the extra-juridical 
conceptualizations of radicalization were deployed to reference offenders’ (or offender 
                                                
22 Andrew Silke has published widely on issues of terrorism and counterterrorism. His major titles, 
including The Psychology of Counter-terrorism (2013) and Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical 
Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform can be considered theological-psychological analyses of 
terrorism and radicalization. See Chapter Seven for a discussion of academic discourses related to 
radicalization.  
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groups’) trajectory towards criminality, thus constructing the frame “radicalization” as 
synonymous with more established legal principles related to motive clauses. This 
tendency was evident in several legal cases regarding radicalization, not least of which 
included a “fact finding” exercise in the United Kingdom’s High Court of Justice, where 
a series of security experts from think-tanks and government agencies provided testimony 
and “vulnerability assessments” on case studies to establish radicalization as motive for 
criminal activities (C, D & E (Radicalisation: Welfare) [2016] E WHC 3088). Rather 
than providing its own definition of the legally ambiguous concept, the law evoked 
external definitions of radicalization to establish motives for problematic activities. The 
legal system could thus translate radicalization into more established legal notions related 
to motive.  
The trend of legal avoidance to the concept of radicalization was made explicit in 
UK law:  
Having read this material overnight, I am satisfied that its author 
reveals a radicalised and extreme perspective on the world. Those 
words are sadly now so much a part of contemporary life – 
'extremism' and ' radicalisation' – that they scarcely need definition. 
Nonetheless, to avoid ambiguity I adopt the July 2015 Revised 'Prevent 
Duty' Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for specified authorities 
in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015. There, radicalisation is defined as referring to the process 
by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist 
ideologies associated with terrorist groups. (K (Children), Re 2016) 
 
Despite the explicit observation that radicalization, and discourses therein, are juridically 
vague, the legal system thought it necessary to evoke a governmental definition of the 
term. As highlighted in the previous Chapter, law thus adopts governmental discourses 
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which are problematic in several respects, not least of which relate to the constructs 
disproportionate focus on Islam and Muslim communities.  
The United States federal legal system also reflected similar trends in its 
deployment of radicalization discourses. To a lesser degree than the UK and Canada, US 
federal courts avoided defining the concept in law, but legal focus on cultural and ethnic 
minorities in its communications about radicalization were more explicit. While the 
analysis of case law highlights the legal systems use of the term as a common discursive 
frame, it falls short of legally defining the concept whilst contributing to conceptual 
associations between radicalization and Islam:  
During his employment, Alomari conducted or participated in 
presentations or trainings for different law enforcement-affiliated groups, 
often discussing Arabic/Islamic culture and radicalization. Some of 
Alomari's presentations were met with conflicting, and some 
controversial, information from co-presenters. In fall 2008, Alomari 
spoke about radicalization at a Terrorism Liaison Officer ("TLO") 
training. (Alomari v. Ohio Department of Public Safety 2014) 
 
Subjects and their associates may also be investigated because they are 
suspected of or involved in the recruitment, training, indoctrination, 
or radicalization of individuals for terrorist activities or fundraising 
for terrorist organizations. More directly, individuals subjected to 
counterterrorism investigations may be involved in plotting terrorist 
attacks. In the nearly eleven years that have passed since September 11, 
2001, Islamic extremists have continued to plot and attempt to carry 
out numerous terrorist attacks both on U.S. soil and abroad against 
U.S. targets and allies. (Fagaza v Federal Bureau of Investigation 2012) 
 
The US federal legal system also used quotations in its references to radicalization 
on several occasions, denoting its own apprehension with the concept or its use of extra-
juridical definitions of the term (United States of America v John Doe 2015; Alomari v 
Ohio Department of Public Safety 2015). This, I argue, further demonstrates law’s 
relatively timid approach to using the term as a legal element, and highlights how law 
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uses the construct to connect behaviors associated with terrorism with more established 
legal standards of patterned behaviors and criminal motives.  
 Federal legal systems in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada thus 
presented a selective and relatively narrow conceptualization of radicalization in their 
decisions. Rather than defining the term for use is law, judges deferred to extra-legal 
conceptualizations of radicalization to lend authority to the legal systems’ decision-
making. The extra-juridical communications selected by the legal system were most often 
academic discourses or ‘expert’ analyst discourses representing only a portion of 
available radicalization research. While this development is not new in law – the system 
often references extra-legal expertise to justify its decisions – the juridical selectivity in 
this case has notable implications.  
Firstly, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Seven, academic discourses are not 
always ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ truth claims, but they are often imbued in sociopolitical 
contexts and thus can be reflective of the maintenance and configuration of social 
hierarchies. Academic knowledge productions related to radicalization must therefore be 
examined in terms of their logic, mission, and rationale, as well as their methodological, 
empirical, and theoretical foundations, in order to understand potential biases and 
implications of the work. Juridical construction of legal elements from only a particular 
sample of scholarly discourses related to radicalization is indicative of the legal system’s 
adoption of some biases which, I shall demonstrate later, influence scholarly research in 
the area.  
Secondly, through the creative adoption of governmental conceptualizations of 
radicalization by law, the legal systems were able at once avoid defining the concept 
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while using it to connect problematic activities with established legal elements (i.e., 
motives). The creativity law demonstrates in this respect also highlights some of law’s 
discriminatory power. As I illustrated in Chapter Four, governmental conceptualizations 
of radicalization are disproportionately focused on Muslim communities since the 
apparent “risk” of terrorism in those communities is exaggerated by a corpus of 
governmental ‘experts.’ Through the adoption of those same discourses in the legal 
system, law contributes to the very idea that radicalization is predominantly an issue 
amongst Muslim communities. The idea that law contributes to disproportionate 
problematizations of Islam with respect to its communications about radicalization is 
expanded upon in the next section of this chapter.  
  
“Seeing” Law’s Violence:  Legal Conceptualizations of Radicalization and the Othering 
of Islam 
 
Important trends were evident in the detailed analysis of legal systems’ use of the term 
radicalization in case law. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, federal case law in the United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom overwhelmingly used the concept when referencing 
Islam or Muslim communities. While associations between radicalization and Islam in 
law occurred periodically from the 1970s to the 1990s, the majority of references to both 
Islam and radicalization occurred after 2005 (see Figure 5.1). In some cases, most evident 
in 2013 and 2015, every single reference made to radicalization by law also mentioned 
Islam.   
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Figure 5.1: Federal Case Law References to Islam and Radicalization 
 
A more detailed analysis of the data highlight how each jurisdiction’s legal 
system represented radicalization in relation to specific religious faiths (See Tables 5.1 
and 5.2).  As Table 5.1 illustrates, the majority of federal case law references to 
radicalization were accompanied by references to Islam. This trend was particularly 
relevant in the United Kingdom, where all case law mentioning radicalization also 
referenced Islam. Interestingly, Canadian law did not explicitly reference Islam as often 
as the US or UK federal case law. However, as we shall see, the Canadian legal system 
did often use the concept of radicalization to denote social issues rooted in religious 
conflicts.  
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Table 5.1: Federal Case Law References to Islam and 
Radicalization by Country 
    
 
References to 
Islam Total Cases 
% of References 
to Islam 
United States 38 58 66 
United Kingdom 26 26 100 
Canada 7 19 37 
Data: Federal case law decisions in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada from 1970 to 2016. Data from Westlaw, Google Scholar law, The Public 
Library of Law, and Canlii.  
 
 
Further analysis highlights how Islam was the overwhelming focus of case law 
decisions referencing radicalization (see Table 5.2). References to religious backgrounds 
other than Islam were made only 16% of the time, the overwhelming majority of which 
were made to distinguish activities of radicalization from more conventional behaviors of 
other religion’s patrons. A topographical perspective of federal case law in each 
jurisdiction suggests that the Canadian legal system takes a much more agnostic approach 
to communications about radicalization, whereas the US and UK frame religion as a 
much more central characteristic in its legal case law.  
 
Table 5.2: References to Religions in Federal Case Law 
   
 UK US Canada 
Christian 5 5 1 
Sikh - - - 
Islam 26 38 7 
Judaism 3 2 2 
Protestant - - - 
Catholic 1 1 - 
Other - - - 
Data: Federal case law decisions in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada from 1970 to 2016. Data from Westlaw, Google Scholar law, The 
Public Library of Law, and Canlii. 
Other includes Buddhism, Hinduism, Atheism, Hellenism, Paganism 
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In-depth qualitative analysis of federal case law in the US, UK, and Canada 
highlights some of the discursive strategies employed in legal decision making related to 
radicalization and issues of terrorism and terrorist activities. Case law most often 
referenced Islam as a fundamental cause, or correlate, of a process of radicalization. 
When referencing other religions, the legal systems most often used such notations to 
indicate difference – difference between conventional activities and ‘radical’ Muslim 
ideologies. An example of this can be found in the Canadian Federal Court’s ruling in the 
case of Mohamed Harkat:23 
Abu Zubaydah has a questionable past. He is associated with Khalid 
Sheikh Mohamed (alias Mokhtar), “the one behind 9/11”. He was also 
convicted and sentenced in absentia unsuccessful millennium bomb 
attacks in Jordan in 2000, along with Sakka, an Al-Qaeda member. The 
Jordanian officials tie him to terrorist plots to attack a hotel as well as 
Christian holy sites in their country. He is also considered to be a 
“travel facilitator”, a “fixer” for radical Muslim ideologies, a “travel 
agent” and a “safe house keeper” (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241) 
 
In the United Kingdom, the High Court has made the distinction between Muslim/non-
Muslim vis-à-vis radicalization explicit, highlighting the teachings of Sharia as a 
problematic form of religious activity: 
I have come to the clear conclusions that the remaining findings sought in 
relation to the mother (paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 13) have been made out both 
in relation to her actions and in exposing the children to her radical views 
(whether it be free mixing, alcohol, homosexuality, democracy, 
Judaism and more worryingly how and in what way Sharia and the 
caliphate should be established across the world). M's views about the 
Paris murders are chilling. There is the clearest, strong evidence 
(whether it be from the photographic evidence, all the way to what the 
children have said whilst in foster care) that they have been exposed 
                                                
23 Mohamed Harkat is an Algerian-Canadian who was arrested in 2002 under suspicion of links to terrorist 
organizations and detained under Canada’s security certificate mechanism. Security certificates are a 
controversial mechanism by which the Government of Canada can detain and deport foreign nationals and 
non-citizens living in Canada if suspected of violating human rights, having membership within organized 
crime or terrorist organizations, or pose a threat to national security.  
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to such thoughts and have adopted them. (A Local Authority v M & Ors 
2016)  
 
Mr Bandegani referred also to paragraph 77 of the expert report. Being 
a Yezidi was a risk-increasing factor. The ability to relocate in central 
and southern Iraq was severely inhibited by the general security situation. 
It could be seen from the Operational Guidance Note that there were a 
number of checkpoints both military and illegal and these were real limits 
on freedom of movement. The increase of Islamic radicalisation in Iraq 
point underlined the relevance of the appellant being Yezidi. He did 
not go to the mosque on Fridays and did not pray five times a day and he 
could not be expected to deny his ethnicity and religion and change to 
accommodate this and therefore he would be recognised as being a non-
Muslim. (NS Iraq CG [2007] UKAIT 00046) 
 
The Yazidi religion, one of the oldest minority groups in Iraq, is adopted by the legal 
distinction of Muslim/non-Muslim, with Islam explicitly being problematized in terms of 
radicalization. Being Yezidi is presented by law as a “risk-increasing factor” insofar as 
being victimized by “Islamic radicalization” due to “being non-Muslim.” The UK High 
Court thus constructs a distinction between Muslims/non-Muslims in terms of 
radicalization – and radicalization indicates one side of the distinction. The UK’s use of a 
Muslim/non-Muslim distinction for understanding radicalization was again made clear by 
the UK High Court of Justice in 2016:  
The mother is about forty. She was born and initially brought up here in 
England. When she was aged about nine her parents emigrated to Canada 
where she was to live for about the next eighteen years. She is a British 
citizen. The mother's own parents are clearly committed and active 
Christians of the Presbyterian leaning. It was in that faith that the mother 
was brought up and to which she adhered. However, in her later 
twenties, whilst at college in Canada, she herself was attracted to, and 
later converted to, the Muslim faith. (M (Children), Re [2014] EWHC 
667) 
 
Later in the same case, the High Court of Justice concluded:  
If any child is being indoctrinated or infected with thoughts involving the 
possibility of "terrorism" or, indeed, hatred for their native country, which 
is England, or another religion, such as Christianity…then that is 
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potentially very abusive indeed and of the utmost gravity. (M 
(Children), Re [2014] EWHC 667) 
 
The above example illustrates two important developments. The first is that the UK High 
Court of Justice presented radicalization in terms of religious conflict between Islam and 
other religious faiths. This was a common discursive strategy used in UK law, 
particularly in the High Court, where the distinction Muslim/not-Muslim was often used 
to explicate issues related to radicalization. For the legal system, radicalization, as 
ambiguous as it is as a legal construct, is useful when referencing a certain type of 
problematic activity: transitions in thought and belief towards Islamic extremism. 
Framing radicalization in this way allows the legal system to observe a host of “risk 
factors” that would otherwise be considered non-socially obtuse. In other words, 
deploying radicalization as a proxy for motive, legal systems are able to observe practices 
that are normally considered socially productive – increased participation in religious 
organizations, devotion to religious teachings, community membership – as precursors to 
criminal activity. Rather than break away from the ambiguity of radicalization by 
ignoring the concept, legal systems analyzed here utilize the term to denote risk and 
insecurity amongst Muslim communities. Additionally, when other religious faiths were 
referenced, they were most often positioned on the ‘right’ side of the radicalization 
distinction.  
The second, and perhaps more indicative of the diffusion of radicalization 
discourses throughout the public sphere, is that this case was heard by the Family 
Division of the High Court. The case is therefore not a criminal case, but a domestic 
decision case determining parents’ suitability to supervise their children. As Chapter Four 
illustrated, this is interesting because radicalization discourses have moved beyond the 
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security and law enforcement apparatuses to other dominant institutions, here evinced by 
the family Court’s inclusion of radicalization as a frame of legal decision-making. This 
trend was most evident in the United Kingdom and aligns with much of the literature 
which suggests the UK has the most diffused counterradicalization apparatus in the West. 
However, as I aim to demonstrate in this dissertation, similar developments are taking 
place in Canada and the United States. In Canada, legal radicalization discourses have 
already spread to the areas of immigration, and in the US, the term has been employed in 
legal decision-making in areas of corporate enterprise and Internet technologies (Fields v 
Twitter 2016). These developments, I argue, in part illustrate the diffusion of 
radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I aimed to highlight how Western legal systems conceptualize 
radicalization in their communications. Through an analysis of federal case law 
mentioning the concept in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, I explored 
questions related to how law defines radicalization and what are some of the implications 
of legal definitions of the term. No legal definition of radicalization could be found in 
law. Instead, the legal system deferred to extra-legal communications in the form of 
scientific, political, and industry expertise in terms of how to define the construct. The 
legal systems thus adopted extra-legal definitions of the term to legitimize their decisions 
in cases brought in front of the court. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Seven, many of 
these extra-juridical radicalization discourses are imbued in biases and discriminatory 
approaches to terrorism focused on Muslim communities. I therefore argue that legal 
usage of the term is also reflective of a disproportionate fear of Muslims when 
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considering issues of terrorism. The legal system’s adoption of radicalization as a proxy 
for religious conflict is thus indicative of what Sarat and Kearns (1995) call ‘law’s 
violence’ whereby law discriminates against certain individuals and groups while 
remaining, at the surface at least, aloof to its own paradoxes and biases.  
 In the next Chapter, I extend this analysis beyond law and consider how 
radicalization is conceptualized, framed, and (re)configured in our cultural system. I 
explore mass media representations in the form of major newspaper articles as a sample 
reflective of the broader population of cultural communications. In this way, I continue to 
develop a theory of the diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout the entire social 
system. With the analysis conducted thus far, of politics and law, and the analyses yet to 
come, of culture and science, I aim to paint a broad picture of how radicalization as a 
framework and overall governmental logic has proliferated throughout the public sphere.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCOURSES OF RADICALZIATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
As noted above, radicalization has become a pervasive concept used in political, 
government, and media discourse alike. Generally understood as a process whereby 
individuals and groups transition from conventional political, religious, or ideological 
beliefs to extremist views and activities, radicalization is now a dominant theme for 
understanding contemporary terrorist activity. The concept is increasingly being relied 
upon in official governmental discourses – such as the Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States strategy in the United States, the 
PREVENT strategy in the United Kingdom, and the Building Resilience Against 
Terrorism strategy in Canada – in addition to popular and scientific communications. The 
adoption of radicalization discourse is thus reflective of the generally agreed upon nature 
of the term. While recently scholars have begun to problematize discursive constructions 
of radicalization (Kundnani 2015; Pisoiu 2013; Silva 2017), the development of the 
concept has yet to be fully explored on an empirical level.  
While there is much literature on representations of Muslims in respect to 
terrorism and terrorist activity (see Nurullah 2010; Poole 2002; Saeed 2007; Shaheen 
2003), there remains a dearth of research exploring the emergence of frames which try to 
make sense of why individuals and groups engage in such activities. One such novel 
framework for understanding terrorism is the so-called radicalization process. In light of 
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the considerable attention being paid to radicalization by governments and media in the 
West (see Silva 2017), it is thus important to continue a critique of the very construction 
of the concept of radicalization, and the impact of such constructions on the social 
apparatus. Previous work has started this dialogue and has opened opportunities to further 
develop, both theoretically and conceptually, the social construction of radicalization 
discourse and its implications vis-à-vis governmental policy, law enforcement 
techniques, and security and surveillance, as well as its effect on local communities.  
This chapter thus more deeply explores news media representations of this 
emergent discourse, which has increasingly been referenced in various governmental and 
law enforcement strategies. Relying on theoretical and empirical contributions in the area 
of sociology, governance practices, and the othering paradigm, this chapter is guided by 
the central question: How has ‘radicalization’ come to be understood and represented 
throughout the cultural apparatus? 
Scholars have noted that media has the ability to influence public opinion and 
policy alike (Baum and Potter 2008). It is therefore important to examine the construction 
and configuration of cultural representations of radicalization because of their potentially 
influential effect on popular understandings of terrorism related phenomena and 
government counter-radicalization policies. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to 
examine the proliferation of national news coverage related to ‘radicalization’ in the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom in the past several decades using 
discourse and content analysis to offer insight into how the social system of media 
defines the concept and, equally important to this analysis, how the concept is 
constitutive of, and constructed by, the social world. This chapter aims to understand the 
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discursive strategies used in Western text to construct certain social groups distant 
‘other.’ Drawing on the Orientalism framework developed by Edward Said (1978), in 
addition to contemporary work within the governmentality framework (see O’Toole et al. 
2016), this paper argues that the producers of radicalization discourse employ strategic 
discursive mechanisms to treat the Muslim community as subject of negativised 
radicalization, thereby utilizing the concept to position Islam in opposition to the West. 
Furthermore, I advance the established idea that the cultural apparatus might influence 
the reconfiguration of counterterrorism practices around notions of preemption. In line 
with the logic of radicalization, mass media influences the popular imagination regarding 
radicalization, the subjects of radicalization discourse, and the practices of 
counterradicalization through its representations and discursive frames.  
 
The ‘Othering’ Paradigm, Cultural Representations of Terror, and Media Constructions 
of Radicalization 
 
This chapter is analytically guided by the systems theoretical approach outlined in 
chapter three, in addition Edward Said’s (1978; 1981) Orientalism perspective. 
Theoretically, this chapter adopts the framework of governmentality, developed by 
Michel Foucault and broadened in this area by the work of Therese O’Toole (2016) and 
others (see Croft 2012b; Edmunds 2012; Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009), which posits 
that new forms of governance have emerged which subject cultural and ethnic minorities 
to a series of pervasive scrutiny practices in the name of preemption and security. Added 
to these theoretical approaches, are perspectives on the diffusion of proactive governance 
practices (Anderson 2010; Aradau and van Munster 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2008; de 
Goede 2008a, 2008b), which are here reflected by cultural representations of 
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radicalization which have proliferated throughout Western liberal democracies over the 
past few decades. A brief review of these bodies of work are therefore useful prior to 
engaging in the analysis.  
Media studies in this area often point to Edward Said’s Covering Islam (1981) as 
the first systematic, and one of the most influential, analyses of Western media’s 
coverage and representations of Islam. Written shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the 
book argues that Western media represents Arabs and Muslims predominantly in terms of 
“noteworthy issues,” here conceptualized as oil production or terrorism, and thereby 
obscure representations of Islam (Said 1981). Contributing to the misrepresentation of the 
Muslim community is the fact that these “noteworthy issues” are determined by a select 
few powerful Western groups (i.e., media conglomerates). As such, he argues, that the 
interpretations of Islam provided by Western media “can be attributed to the political 
influence of those people or institutions producing it rather than necessarily to truth or 
accuracy” (Said 1981: 169). The political influence of the media, Said (1981) maintains, 
enables it to form the “cultural apparatus’ through which the Western world derives its 
consciousness. In this way, Western media is able to represent Islam as a distant and 
unrecognizable ‘outsider’, whilst ‘covering up’ its true nature (Said 1981).  
The othering paradigm has been quite influential in media discourse, particularly 
so in the case of representations of Islam and Muslim communities (i.e., Nurullah 2010; 
Said 1981). Scholars working in this tradition tend to argue that one of the most common 
mechanisms for constructing dichotomies between ‘us’ on the one hand, and ‘them’ on 
the other, is to emphasize differences among people in terms religious belief systems 
(Silva 2017). Saeed (2007), for example, suggests that discursive strategies represent 
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British Muslims as ‘alien other’ through continuous reference to ‘un-Britishness’ and 
‘deviant’ behaviors, which place emphasize social distance. In this way, Saeed’s (2007) 
argument aligns with the classic work of Georg Simmel (1921), who introduced the 
notion of ‘the stranger’ as a distinct and emergent social category – one whom is a 
member of the group in which she lives yet remains distant from members of the group.  
Poole (2002), also explores this tendency, and argues British media coverage of global 
Muslim issues (i.e., through themes of terrorism, conflict, and ‘fundamentalism’) 
quantitatively overshadow local accounts of Muslim affairs. Subsequently, she suggests 
these representations construct a public imagination of Muslims ‘out there’ which 
influences lay perceptions of British Muslims (Poole 2002). To borrow again from 
Simmel (1921), just as the stranger comes today and stays tomorrow, Muslims in modern 
liberal democracies have been subject to a variety of social mechanisms, particularly so 
in relation to images of terrorism, which emphasize distance rather than proximity. 
Findings that underscore the ‘othering’ Islam have been found in analyses of news media 
in Finland (Creutz-Kåmppi 2008), Australia (Dunn 2001), and in American motion 
pictures and television programs (Shaheen 2003; Nurullah 2010). 
Othering, or the ‘othering’ process, has indeed become an influential theoretical 
framework in its own right, one that has been applied to research programs in disparate 
academic disciplines, from sociology to nursing and health (see Canales 2000; Grove and 
Zwi 2006) and media studies (Creutz-Kåmppi 2008). Within analyses of mass media 
representations of Islam, the othering perspective is largely indebted Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1978), which transformed the ways that we conceptualize traditional power 
relations between the East and the West. In it Said offers a perspective for understanding 
112 
the cultural (mis)representations that form the basis of West’s, which he calls the 
‘Occident,’ perceptions of the East, referred to as the ‘Orient.’ Said broadly defines 
Orientalism on three levels. The first is that Orientalism is an academic discipline, a set 
of ‘objective’ ideas whose function is to build an edifice of knowledge about the Orient 
(Said 1978). Second, as Said suggests, it is a “style of thought based on an ontological 
and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’” (Said 
1978: 2). In other words, it is a system of thought premised on a dichotomy between East 
and West that forms the basis for accounts of the Orient in the first place. Third level of 
Orientalism is the corporate institution that holds authority over, makes statements about, 
or restructures the Orient (Said 1978: 2). Orientalism is thus a Western style of thought 
used to dominate and hold power over the East. In fact, Said (1978) argues, Western 
orientalist scholarship is a fundamental aspect of the West’s authority of the East as it 
was what constructed the concept of the Orient in the first place. On the basis of these 
three levels, according to Said, the West is able to create distinctions between itself and 
‘others’, namely Islamic cultures in the East. In addition, Said (1978) contends that 
Orientalism produces false perceptions of Islamic cultures, including the assumption that 
that “Islam remained forever the Orientalist’s idea (or type) of cultural effrontery, 
aggravated by the fear that Islamic civilization originally (as well as contemporaneously) 
continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West” (42). 
Before I move on, I must make one important conceptual note. Said’s Orientalism 
is an exploration of Western representations of the East, thereby contributing to 
discourses of the West’s power and authority over the Eastern world. This chapter 
recognizably contributes to this discourse by epistemologically grounding its analysis in 
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Western news media coverage of radicalization. While scholars have proclaimed that 
type of sampling is by nature Eurocentric (Khatib 2006), this study does not assume that 
such a relationship exists. Rather, this research explores the strategies by which Western 
representations ‘other’ the Islamic community. This project does thus not make use of the 
terms Orientalism/Islam or East/West, as mutually exclusive monolithic dichotomies, but 
rather engages with them as conceptual frameworks for understanding of how influential 
discourses are formed in very strategic ways about particular cultural groups. My aim is 
to identify the hegemonic discourses which are constructed, restructured, and transformed 
and which influence popular imaginaries of the Islamic community. 
Added to the perspectives utilizing the Orientalism framework, this chapter 
engages with scholarly literature highlighting shifts in governance practices and 
techniques which increasingly adopt a preemptive, preventative logic. This body of 
scholarship, mostly aligned with Foucault’s notion of governmentality (1977; 1991a), 
focuses on the ways in which actors exercise control over, or govern, the public vis-à-vis 
new logics of preemptive counterterrorism (see Heath-Kelly 2013; Martin 2014; O’Toole 
et al. 2016). Governmentality, famously referred to as “the art of government,” explores 
the emergence of forms and types of governmental rationality which lay the foundation 
for techniques and strategies by which a society is rendered governable (Foucault 1991a; 
Lemke 2002; Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006). As discussed in chapter five, scholars 
working within this tradition have situated preventative logic in terms of a wider shift 
toward what Aradau and van Munster (2008) call a “dispositif of risk,” defined broadly 
as the “heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and material elements for governing 
social problems” (p. 24-25). This “dispositif of risk” in part renders the future 
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‘knowable,’ de Goede and Simon (2013) argue, through the ideal and material 
construction of “anticipatory epistemic objects,” which refers to a set of practices and 
knowledge claims aimed at governing the future in the present (p. 321). This epistemic 
object is mobilized, according to de Goede and Simon (2013), through representations of 
the threat, knowledge practices, and intervention strategies aimed at prevention – in this 
case, the prevention of terrorism. The future is made knowable and, equally important, 
actionable through ideal and material representations and claims to knowledge about the 
anticipatory object. In the case of terrorism, the anticipatory object is the radical; the 
individual or group at risk of transition from problematic political or ideological belief to 
violence. While scholars have indeed highlighted the important development of an 
“anticipatory epistemic object” of radicalization, in the domains of governmental 
discourse and policy, there remains a dearth of empirical research exploring the 
mechanisms by which such representations are constructed. Aside from some notable 
contributions (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2009; Neumann 2013; Silva 2017), 
representations of the radicalization object outside of political and government discourses 
has yet to be adequately explored. I have previously examined cultural representations of 
radicalization in a single newspaper (see Silva 2017), but scholars have yet to widely 
adopt a comparative approach to the analysis of such cultural representations.  
This chapter therefore approaches media as partly reflective of some of these 
discursive and material elements which seek to govern populations through discourses of 
terrorism. Further, this chapter explores how the mass media – here conceptualized as a 
sample of the cultural apparatus – defines and constructs radicalization discourses, in 
order to answer two related, albeit equally important, questions: (1) how is radicalization 
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understood within the cultural system? And (2) how might media influence our cultural 
understandings of governance mechanisms as they relate to counterterrorism and 
counterradicalization? The first question is therefore descriptive by nature, while the 
second is more analytic because it highlights the complex relationships between media, 
public policy, and law enforcement practices which make up the counterradicalization 
apparatus. I argue that media representations of radicalization in the West contribute to 
the discursive and material construction of what de Goede and Simon (2013: 321) call 
“anticipatory epistemic objects,” and are thus complicit in rendering particular 
individuals and groups actionable in anticipation of criminal offences vis-à-vis terrorist 
activities. By overwhelmingly focusing on Muslims as the object of radicalization 
discourses, this chapter argues that the anticipatory logic of preemption is not only 
discriminatory, but perhaps influences how radicalization is understood in the realm of 
social and public policy and law.   
 
Methods 
This chapter offers an empirical analysis of media discourse related to radicalization to 
explicate some of the theoretical contributions of the governmentality framework in 
addition to contemporary work within the othering paradigm. The empirical basis for this 
exploration are newspaper articles related to radicalization, sampled in such a way that 
they are reflective of the broader population of all cultural representations. While I do not 
necessarily make claims regarding causal linkages between sample and population, I do 
here argue that the sample of news media frames regarding radicalization is reflective of 
broader trends in media coverage of radicalization in the United States, United Kingdom, 
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and Canada. The research takes an abductive theoretical approach (see Timmermans and 
Tavory 2012) and was conducted using both inductive (i.e., categories derived from the 
data) and deductive (i.e., categories from previously determined categories) approaches 
to discourse and content analysis. It is based primarily on qualitative textual analysis 
techniques (Fairclough 1992), but also makes extensive use of quantitative techniques 
such as content analysis and theme frequency counts. Since this research makes use of a 
more qualitative strategy, it is oriented towards a hermeneutic understanding of the use of 
radicalization in news media, which allows for a more abductive approach to theorizing, 
rather than testing hypotheses developed in advance of the research (Deflem 2015). I 
therefore develop theoretical claims based in the governmentality and othering literature 
through ongoing reflexive interaction with data. By uncovering themes through the 
analysis of data, and being keenly aware of the emergence of new themes and their 
impact on broader theoretical assumptions, this chapter pays particularly close attention 
to the complexity and fluidity of radicalization discourses in news media, and 
problematize the taken-for-grantedness of the construct (Timmermans and Tavory 2012; 
Walters 2012).   
Following my previous work (see Silva 2017), the sample was drawn from a 
LexisNexis search for the terms “radicalization” and its corresponding U.K. spelling 
“radicalisation” in three newspapers from each of the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom from January 1, 1960 to December 31, 2016.24 Newspapers were 
                                                
24 Throughout this dissertation, I will at times quote directly from primary sources’ communications about 
radicalization to exemplify key arguments. When I cite primary sources (such as news articles, government 
documents, etc.), I will use the appropriate spelling of words to the country of origin. When I am analyzing 
such communications, however, I will use spelling protocol of the American Sociological Association, and 
therefore refer to ‘radicalisation’ as ‘radicalization.’ 
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selected based on three characteristics: (1) their high readership measured by circulation 
rates (Alliance for Audited Media 2013): (2) their centrality in domestic and international 
culture; and (3) their diverse political orientations (i.e., efforts were made to select one 
liberal, one centrist, and one conservative newspaper from each country). The analysis 
included three newspapers from each country, and are as follows: (1) United States: the 
New York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today; (2) Canada: the Toronto Star, 
National Post, and The Globe and Mail;25 and (3) United Kingdom: (1) The Daily 
Telegraph; (2) The Guardian: and (3) The Independent.26 The search resulted in 9,832 
articles about radicalization. The results were then filtered according to the following 
inclusion and exclusion criteria: (i) the article must be reporting on concrete rather than 
fictitious incidents (i.e., a book review, novel, etc.); (ii) must not be a duplicate article. 
This resulted in the inclusion of 8,072 articles in the analysis (See Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1: Number of Sources and Coding References 
   
 Sources References 
   
United Kingdom   
Daily Telegraph 633 2366 
The Guardian 2456 8534 
The Independent 1745 6241 
   
United States   
New York Times 969 7845 
                                                
25 Political orientation of Canadian newspapers derived from political endorsements in the past two federal 
elections (see Globe and Mail 2011; National Post 2011; Toronto Star 2011).  
26 Political orientation of the New York Times (center-left), Washington Post (center), and USA Today 
(center-right), Daily Telegraph (center-right), The Guardian (center), and The Independent (center-left) 
based on the analysis of Papacharissi and Oliviera (2008).  
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Washington Post 686 3209 
USA Today 94 360 
   
Canada   
Globe and Mail 409 1785 
National Post 613 3721 
Toronto Star 467 1985 
   
Total 8072 36046 
 
 
Data were downloaded from LexisNexis in a single Microsoft Word document 
separated by newspaper and inputted to qualitative analysis software NVivo and 
systematically coded on the basis of sixteen themes.27 To make analysis more efficient, 
Python computer programming scripts were run on the single Word documents to 
automatically separate each news article and export as single PDFs (portable document 
format), prior to importing the data into NVivo. Following importation, the articles were 
read in detail to ensure scripts were successful, facilitate engagement with the data, and 
determine appropriate guiding and themes. Themes were derived abductively by 
theorizing important thematic frames before the coding process (i.e., codes regarding how 
radicalization is problematized, solutions to the problem of radicalization) as well as 
reflexively revising theoretical themes throughout the coding process (i.e., codes 
                                                
27 Data were coded based on the following sixteen themes: activities, adjectives used to describe 
radicalization, age of subject, government agencies involved, references to specific events, groups subject 
of radicalization discourse, individual subject of radicalization discourse, geographic locations, 
governmental and public policies, political affiliation, religious problematization, political 
problematization, prospective solutions, target of radicalization/terrorism, nationalism (i.e., references to 
Britishness, Canadianness, patriotism, etc.) 
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regarding groups and political orientation).28  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a systematic analysis of written texts that 
have referenced radicalization in order to identify important themes and examine ways in 
which they construct the concept. As such, the analysis follows the methodological 
strategies of discourse analysis and content analysis. Discourse analysis is widely used in 
studies on news media (e.g., Gough 2007; KhosraviNik 2010; Silva 2017). As a 
methodological approach, discourse analysis highlights how texts draw upon particular 
social contexts in which they are situated and in turn work to produce social realities 
through the organization and structuring of social life (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). In 
this way, discourses, here understood as language used in texts, are a form of ‘social 
practice’ that is dialectically constructs the social world (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). In 
other words, cultural texts such as newspaper articles both reflect and produce the ways 
in which the cultural apparatus gives meaning to common discursive frames.  
This chapter thus seeks to identify broad discourses of radicalization presented 
within news media while being cognizant of the ways in which these discourses shape, 
and are shaped by, social power relations. As Lemke (2002) suggests, from a Foucauldian 
tradition, ‘text’ represents concrete realizations of abstract forms of knowledge (what 
Foucault calls ‘discourse’) that are inextricably connected to various power structures. 
The job of the researcher is thus to explicate the connections between those forms of 
knowledge (discourse) and those power structures. Approaching discourse analysis in 
this, more critical, manner, Lemke (2002) maintains, allows the analyzer to highlight the 
                                                
28 The ‘references’ category in Table 6.1 refers to the number of times articles were coded based on the 
sixteen themes. In total, there were 29,789 coding references in the data.  
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mechanisms by which orders of discourse are constructed, maintained, and reconfigured 
in such ways as to legitimize, maintain, or even resist powerful hegemons (Foucault 
1971). This ‘critical’ element of discourse analysis has evolved into an entire sub-
discipline of its own (e.g. Fairclough 1995; Wodak and Meyer 2009), and focuses on the 
structural relationships of power manifested in language. To this end, I adopt textual 
analysis guidelines provided by Fairclough (1995, 2003; Fairclough and Wodak 1997) 
and critical discursive analysis strategies developed by van Dijk and colleagues (1991; 
Lemke 2002; Krippendorff 2004; van Leeuwen 1996, 2008) to identify how 
radicalization discourses emerge and transform over time whilst paying particular 
attention to how orders of discourse produce and reproduce, constitute, and legitimize 
forms of social hegemony and inequality (Wodak and Meyer 2009).  
The analysis makes use of qualitative and quantitative approaches to discourse 
analysis. Although critics of content analysis techniques have rightly challenged 
proponents for uncritically restricting the approach to practices of quantification (see 
George 1959), recent scholars have highlighted how quantification is not a defining 
criterion for content analyses (Krippendorf 2004). Advocates of this approach highlight 
the necessary, and indispensable, nature of ridding textual analysis of the 
quantitative/qualitative dichotomy (see Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Krippendorf 2004), by 
demonstrating the utility of both hermeneutic and holistic approaches to content analysis. 
This chapter therefore approaches textual analysis in a recursive manner, utilizing both 
quantitative and qualitative measurements of the interpretation of data. I thus argue that 
much can be interpreted from both the holistic analysis of linguistic patterns of text (i.e., 
qualitative discourse analysis) and the hermeneutic numbering of textual themes and 
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patterns (i.e., quantitative content analysis). Aligned with the abductive approach to 
theorizing outlined in chapter two, this mixed methodological technique, I suggest, 
allows for both complex interpretations in addition to rich descriptions of radicalization 
discourse as represented in news media.  
The following pages systematically present the data in three sections. The first, is 
a general topographical view of radicalization discourse in all newspapers, presented by 
country and by newspaper. This section is intended to give the reader an overarching 
visual and textual depiction of radicalization discourses and therefore paints a general, 
and relatively static, picture of how the concept is used throughout the cultural apparatus. 
The second section presents more in-depth analyses of the data. Here I explore temporal 
changes in representations of radicalization in each newspaper and by period. Theme 
counts are presented in three mutually exclusive time periods: 1970-1989, 1990-1999, 
and 2000-2016. These periods were chosen based on the conceptual and theoretical 
approach adopted in my previous work (see Silva 2017), and emphasize different 
temporal periods where shifts in radicalization discourse has been noted. Finally, in the 
third section, I explore the implications of news media representations of radicalization 
on already marginalized Muslims and Islamic communities.  
 
Constructing Radicalization Discourse Throughout the West 
The use of the concept of radicalization has a long history in national news media 
coverage in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. The first references to 
radicalization in national newspaper coverage in the United States were in 1969 (in the 
New York Times), 1984 in the United Kingdom (The Guardian), and in 1978 in Canada 
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(Globe and Mail). In total, radicalization was referenced in 2,063 articles in the United 
States, in 2,670 articles in the United Kingdom, and in 1,789 articles in Canada. As figure 
6.1 illustrates, there was a substantial increase in use of the term radicalization across all 
newspapers and countries from 1970 to 2012. Specific trends in the data indicate that 
radicalization discourses were rarely evoked in the 1990s, but often used in the 1970s and 
1980s prior to considerably increasing post-2000 (See Figure 6.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Number of Articles Referencing ‘Radicalization’ vs. Number of 
Terrorist Attacks, 1970-2016 
 
 
Table 6.2: Top 10 Words Referenced in Canadian Newspapers, 1969-2016 
   
 Count 
Weighted 
Percentage (%) Similar Words 
Globe and Mail    
Government 929 0.40 govern, governance, governed, governing, 
government, governments 
Muslims 907 0.39 muslim, muslims, muslims' 
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Terrorism 782 0.34 terror, terrorism, terrorized 
Islamism 778 0.34 islam, islamic, islamically, islamism, 
islamization, islamizing 
Security 696 0.30 secure, secured, securely, secures, securing, 
securities, security 
Politics 678 0.29 polite, politely, politic, political, 'political, 
politically, politics 
Nations 595 0.26 nation, national, nationalism, nationality, 
nationalization, nationalize, nationalizing, 
nationally,  
Terrorist 520 0.22 terrorist, terrorists, terrorists', 'terrorists 
Terrorism 463 0.20 war, wars 
Police 458 0.20 police, policing 
    
Toronto Star    
Muslims' 1586 0.58 muslim, 'muslim, muslims, muslims' 
Terrorizing 1353 0.49 terror, terrorism, terrorize, terrorized, 
terrorizes, terrorizing 
Islamization 1184 0.43 islam, islamic, 'islamic, islamism, islamization 
Governments 968 0.35 govern, governance, governed, governing, 
government 
Terrorists' 868 0.32 terrorist, terroristic, terrorists 
Security 771 0.28 secure, secured, securing, security, security', 
'security' 
Police 746 0.27 police, policed, polices, policing 
Politics 616 0.22 polite, politely, political, politically, politics 
Wars 545 0.20 war, warring, wars, wars' 
Killing 511 0.19 kill, killed, killing, killings, kills 
    
National Post    
Somalia 1432 1.22 somalia 
Famine 1104 0.94 famine 
Somalis 1046 0.89 somali, somalis 
Warns 1010 0.86 warn, warned, warning, warnings, warns 
Children 600 0.51 children 
Crisis 572 0.49 crisis, 'crisis, 'crisis' 
Food 557 0.48 food 
Starvation 553 0.47 starvation 
Muslims 519 0.44 muslim, 'muslim, muslims, muslims', 'muslims 
Islamist 500 0.43 islamist, islamists, islamists' 
 
General searches for the words most often used in each country’s newspaper 
articles about radicalization indicate few, but important, differences in how the concept 
was deployed in relation to other themes and ideas. In all newspapers, for example, Islam 
and the Muslim community were amongst the ten most often referenced words (See 
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Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4; in terms of coverage area by weighted percentage). In seven out 
of nine newspapers, terrorism and/or terrorist activity and governments or governance 
were amongst the concept most often referenced. Police and/or policing were referenced 
in six out of the nine newspapers, as was war. In the United Kingdom, references to Islam 
were exclusively amongst the top two, whereas references to the Muslim community 
were often in the second half of the most cited words in the United States and Canada. 
Interestingly, newspapers considered most right of center referenced most often 
referenced Islam or Muslims, with the exception of Canada’s National Post. Center and 
center-left newspapers, however, still referenced Islam often.  
 
Table 6.3: Top 10 Words Referenced in UK Newspapers, 1969-2016 
   
 
Count 
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%) 
Similar Words 
The Guardian    
Isis 4367 0.67 isi, isis, isis', 'isis, 'isis' 
Muslims' 3457 0.53 muslim, muslim', 'muslim, muslims, muslims', 'muslims 
Police 2996 0.46 police, police', policed, polices, policing 
Terrorism' 2250 0.35 terror, terror', terrorism, terrorism', 'terrorism', terrorisms 
Governments 2138 0.33 govern, governance, governed, governing, government, 
government', 'government, governments, governments', 
governs 
Supports 2044 0.31 support, supported, supporter, supporters, supporting, 
supportive, supports 
Islamism 1885 0.29 islam, islam', islamic, 'islamic, islamism 
Schools' 1774 0.27 school, school', schooled, schooling, schools, schools' 
Politics' 1756 0.27 political, political', 'political, politically, politics, politics', 
'politics 
Syria' 1381 0.21 syria, syria', 'syria' 
    
The 
Independent    
Muslims' 2936 0.54 muslim, muslim', 'muslim, 'muslim', 'muslimed', muslims, 
muslims', 'muslims 
Britishness 2599 0.47 british, british', 'british, britishness 
Isis' 2557 0.47 isis, isis', 'isis, 'isis' 
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Terrorism' 2462 0.45 terror, terror', 'terror, 'terror', terrorism, terrorism', 
'terrorism', terrorized 
Syria' 1952 0.36 #syria, syria, syria', 'syria 
Islamism 1924 0.35 Islam, Islamic islamically, islamism 
Governments 1761 0.32 govern, governance, governed, governing, government, 
government'', governments 
Kills 1738 0.32 kill, kill', ''kill, killed, killed', 'killed, killing, killings, 
kills, 'kills 
Policing 1594 0.29 police, police', policed, policing 
Wars 1487 0.27 war, war', war'', 'war, warring, wars 
    
The Daily 
Telegraph    
Muslims' 1766 0.69 muslim, muslim', 'muslim, 'muslim', muslims, muslims', 
muslims'' 
Terrorism' 1235 0.48 terror, terror', terror'', 'terror, terrorism, terrorism', 
terrorism'' 
Britishness 1166 0.45 british, british', british'', 'british, 'british', britishness 
Terrorists' 1117 0.43 terrorist, terrorist'', 'terrorist', terrorists, terrorists', 
terrorists'' 
Extremists' 1042 0.41 extremist, 'extremist, 'extremist', extremists, extremists' 
Schools' 1029 0.40 school, school'', schooled, schooling, schools, schools' 
Islamism 1006 0.39 islam, islam', islam'', islamic, 'islamic, islamically, 
islamism 
Governments 942 0.37 govern, governance, governed, governing, government, 
government'', governments 
Police 915 0.36 police, police', police'', policed, polices, policing 
Publicly 898 0.35 public, public', publication, publications, publicity, 
publicly, publics 
 
In terms of intra-country representations of radicalization, several notable 
thematic differences existed, particularly in Canada and the United States. Canada’s 
National Post, for instance, used eight words more often than references to Islam or the 
Muslim community in its coverage of radicalization (see Table 6.2). Instead, the 
newspaper’s representations most often referenced issues related to Somalia, famine, and 
food crises. This is noteworthy because of the National Post’s history of coverage 
relating to government fiscal policy, as well its well-documented history of anti-Islamic 
portrayals in its coverage (Hess 1998; Petricevic 2007). Another interesting difference is 
the way in which newspapers in the United States connected radicalization discourses 
with other concepts. For example, both the Washington Post and USA Today referenced 
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Islam most in stories about radicalization. The Times, on the other hand, focused (by 
coverage area) much more on political issues, most notably economic and political 
conflicts in Central America, which has been illustrated elsewhere (Silva 2017). While a 
notable aberration, this may be indicative of overall changes in news coverage 
techniques, which have shifted to more sensationalist style representations (see Skinner 
2000; Wiltenburg 2004), because the Times did reference radicalization over a decade 
before any other newspaper in the sample. However, as I have argued in other work, this 
is suggestive of shifts in how radicalization is being represented and deployed throughout 
the cultural apparatus, a trend in which I now turn my attention.  
 
Table 6.4: Top 10 Words Referenced in US Newspapers, 1969-2016 
   
 
Count 
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%) 
Similar Words 
New York Times    
Nicaragua 1022 0.47 nicaragua, ''nicaragua 
Sandinistas 9538 0.44 sandinista, sandinistas, sandinistas' 
Governs 7196 0.33 govern, governance, governed, governing, 
government, government'', governments, 
Politics' 6353 0.29 polite, politely, politic, political, ''political, 
''political'', politically, 'politically, ''politically,  
Islamism 5863 0.27 #islamic, islam, islamism 
President 5488 0.25 presidency, presidency'', president, president'', 
'president, ''president, presidents, presiding 
Muslims' 5194 0.24 muslim, muslim', muslim'', 'muslim, ''muslim, 
muslims, muslims', muslims'', ''muslims 
Regimes 4789 0.22 regime, regime'', regimes 
Wars 4482 0.20 war, war'', 'war, ''war, ''war'', warring, wars, wars'' 
Prisons 4403 0.20 prison, ''prison, prisoner, prisoners, prisoners', 
prisons, prisons' 
Washington Post    
Islamism 2486 0.49 Islam, Islamic, islamism, islamization, islamized 
Muslims' 2183 0.43 Muslim, Muslimness 
Radicals' 1878 0.37 radical, 'radical, radicalism, radicalization, 
radicalization', 'radicalization, radicalize, radicalized, 
radicalizer, radicalizers, radicalizes, radicalizing, 
radically, radicals, radicals' 
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Governments 1865 0.37 govern, governance, governed, governing, 
government, governments, governments', governs 
Politics 1325 0.26 polite, politely, politic, political, politically, 
'politically, politics 
War 1293 0.26 war, war', 'war, warred, warring, wars 
Terrorism 1219 0.24 terror, terrorism, terrorism', 'terrorism', terrorize, 
terrorized, terrorizing, terrors 
Security 1184 0.23 secure, secured, secures, securing, securities, 
security 
Terrorist 1112 0.22 terrorist, terrorists, terrorists' 
Support 923 0.18 support, supported, supporter, supporters, 
supporters', supporting, supportive, supports 
USA Today    
Muslims' 329 0.75 Muslim, Muslims 
Terrorism 250 0.57 terror, terrorism, terrorize, 'terrorize', terrorized, 
terrorizing 
Terrorist 245 0.56 terrorist, terrorists, terrorists' 
Radicals 243 0.56 radical, 'radical, radicalism, radicalization, 
radicalizations, radicalize, radicalized, radicalizer, 
radicals 
Islamism 213 0.49 Islam, Islamic, islamism, islamization 
Threats 164 0.38 threat, threats 
Security 145 0.33 secure, securing, security 
Community 125 0.29 communicate, communicated, communication, 
communications, communism, communities, 
community 
Wars 110 0.25 war, wars 
Police 104 0.24 police, policing 
 
From Politics to Religion: News Media Representations of Radicalization 
I have previously highlighted how radicalization discourses in news media have shifted 
from deploying the concept to denote political or economic conflicts towards focusing 
overwhelmingly on religious differences (see Silva 2017). The exploratory study argued 
that the concept of radicalization was deployed by news media in such a way as to 
contribute to our cultural understandings of terrorism focusing primarily on the Islamic 
community. Radicalization, as a construct, therefore increasingly denotes religious 
conflict between the Islamic nations in the East and predominantly Christian nations of 
the West (Silva 2017). The present analysis moves beyond my previous work by adopting 
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a comparative approach (see chapter three) that explores representations of radicalization 
across the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada.  
 One of the most notable discursive mechanisms for linking the concept 
radicalization to individuals, groups, and other concepts, was to use the form 
“radicalization of” to denote the subject of the representation. This chapter therefore 
grounds part of its analysis in the in-depth exploration of how newspapers deployed this 
linguistic form. By combining the analysis of this form with broader content analysis of 
themes and discourse topics, I highlight how radicalization narratives are indeed 
indicative of what I argued elsewhere as the othering of Muslims through references of 
radicalization. In Canadian newspapers, only one reference was made to Islam before the 
year 2000 (see Table 6.5). Prior to 2000, articles using this frame focused on a diverse set 
of subject topics, including leftist groups (such as student and labor unions, socialist 
groups, civil rights organizations, etc.), political opposition groups, right-wing nationalist 
groups, or simply in reference to the public sphere or popular opinion. Although 
Canadian newspapers did often reference the Middle East or Arab populations using the 
“radicalization of” form (18 times total prior to 2000), only once did they use the form to 
subjectify Muslims. This trend was also evident in newspaper articles from the UK and 
US, which made very few mentions of Islam prior to 2000 (6 and 7 mentions, 
respectively; see Table 6.6 and 6.7).  
 
Table 6.5: References Using the "Radicalization of" Strategy in Canadian 
Newspapers 
           
 Globe and Mail Toronto Star National Post  
 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16  
Public sphere/opinion 3 6 5 7 8 3 - - 4  
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Leftist groupsa 12 5 2 1 1 1 - 10 -  
Right-
Winger/Nationalists 1 3 1 - 2 2 - 4 8  
Church/Priests 1 - - 1 - - - - -  
Middle East/Arabs 5 6 7 - 7 2 - - 8  
Political Opposition 9 7 6 2 7 7 - - 4  
Muslims - - 41 - 1 52 - - 118  
Other 3 4 8 5 2 9 - - 10  
Agnostic - - 2 - - 3 - - 4  
Total 34 31 72 16 28 79 0 14 156  
 
 News articles in the pre-2000 period most often represented the ‘radicalization of’ 
form in descriptive terms without referencing particular problematic activities or 
behaviors and often highlighting the positive benefits of so-called radicalization. An 
article that appeared in UK newspaper The Independent on April 5, 1990, highlights 
many of the documented themes in radicalization discourse during this period, 
particularly how the frame had been used to denote social progress in a relatively 
descriptive nature:  
Raphael Samuel, a prominent socialist historian, was one of the first to 
voice concern about political interference. However, he now believes that 
history teachers, politicians and newspaper reporters have fallen victims of 
''hysteria'' and says he finds the idea of a Tory takeover of history 
''absurd''. He points out that there are few Tory historians in Britain and 
says that ''the quiet but serious radicalisation of history over the past 30 
years'' has fostered majority support for social history. 
 
Another example where news media used the ‘radicalization of’ form in a descriptive 
manner can be found in the Times:  
Growing guerrilla activities, indiscriminate official repression and steady 
radicalization of peasants, workers and students are expected if reforms 
are not forthcoming.  Moderate critics have begun openly discussing the 
possibility of a coup d’état that would pave the way for free elections. 
(September 14, 1979) 
 
References such as these were most common when the subjects of the story were part of 
leftist groups, such as communists, members of trade unions, student groups, or civil 
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rights organizations. This trend was reflected in other newspapers, where the frame was 
used to denote general references to the public or popular opinion, for example: “the 
radicalization of Americans” (New York Times, October 6, 1972), “radicalisation of the 
middle classes” (The Independent, September 13, 1989), “we are witnessing the 
radicalization of the public sector” (Globe and Mail, April 6, 1978). These 
representations rarely linked radicalization with problematic activities or behaviors. Most 
notable in this respect is the dearth of connections between ‘radicalization of’ narratives 
and references to terrorism or terrorist activities. As noted elsewhere (see Silva 2017), 
activities most often associated with radicalization during this period included relatively 
minor forms of civil disobedience, protest, and political opposition.  
 
Table 6.6: References using the "radicalization of" strategy in UK Newspapers 
         
 The Independent The Guardian 
The Daily 
Telegraph 
 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
Public 
sphere/opinion - 10 4 7 9 11 - - 3 
Leftist groups - 3 3 3 5 6 - - 4 
Right-
Wing/Nationalist - 1 7 1 - 10 - - - 
Church/Priests - - - - 1 - - - - 
Middle East/Arabs - 2 3 3 1 9 - - - 
Political Opposition - 8 11 15 8 44 - - 9 
Muslims - 3 177 1 3 287 - - 138 
Students/Youth - 1 18   18 - - 4 
Other - 2 13 1 1 5 - - 3 
Agnostic - - 2 - - 7 - - - 
Total 0 30 238 31 28 397 0 0 161 
 
In contrast to the previous period, following the year 2000 radicalization 
narratives were significantly rearticulated around notions of religious conflicts, rather 
than political opposition. In similar fashion to the New York Times (see Silva 2017), 
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newspapers in the US, UK, and Canada focused substantially on Islam in their 
deployment of the ‘radicalization of’ discursive frame. As Tables 6.5-7 illustrate, from 
2000 to 2016, all nine newspapers used the radicalization of [Islam] frame in the 
overwhelming majority of times they made use of the form.  
 
Table 6.7: References using the "radicalization of" strategy in US Newspapers  
         
 
The New York 
Times Washington Post USA Today 
 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
1970-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
16 
Public sphere/opinion 12 4 10 6 1 8 - - 1 
Leftist groups 23 14 4 22 6 8 - - 1 
Right-
Wing/Nationalist - 6 6 1 1 6 - - - 
Church/Priests 4 - 1 1 - - - - - 
Middle East/Arabs 12 4 5 13 1 7 - - 1 
Political Opposition 18 8 32 15 6 16 - 1 3 
Muslims 2 1 153 2 1 66 - 1 25 
Other 11 1 15 4 1 7 - 1 2 
Agnostic - - - - - - - - - 
Total 82 38 226 64 17 118 0 3 33 
 
Despite a notable drop in terrorist attacks in each country from 1970 to 2016, 
representations during this period also increasingly referenced criminal behaviors – most 
notably activities often understood as terrorism, including bombings, hijacking, murders, 
and kidnappings – rather than mundane forms of civil unrest (See Figure 6.1). Examples 
of this strategy are numerous throughout the newspapers, with some articles even 
suggesting that radicalization is a source of violence a priori: “In the past three years, 
sectarian violence associated with the radicalization of Islam has killed at least 10,000 
people” (Washington Post, November 28, 2002).  
With 1.2 billion Muslims on this planet, the radicalization of even one 
in 10,000 is simply unaffordable. The response to international 
terrorist crimes needs to be aggressive, but it also needs to be 
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disaggregated from the discredited "war on terror." (Globe and Mail, 
August 18, 2006) 
 
Other instances highlight the combative nature of so-called radicalization while 
simultaneously demonstrating the conflictual approach to such coverage by the authors. 
In an article appearing in The Daily Telegraph titled “These men are fanatics and must be 
beaten,” directly links radicalization with Islam while illustrating the author’s own, 
potentially extremist, perspective:  
It is surely undeniable that Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to the 
radicalisation of Muslims across the world, adding a new pebble to the 
mountain of grievances that militant fanatics have erected. But those 
conflicts have stimulated an attitude which existed quite independently of 
them… The fanatics must be defeated… Individuals such as Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, who may be coming to the UK next month, must be banned 
summarily. And those who blame Britain for the tragedy of 7/7 must be 
anathematized (July 20, 2005).  
 
In addition, a common discursive strategy employed by newspapers across the 
West is what Theo van Leeuwen (1996) calls ‘backgrounding.’29 In his socio-semantic 
perspective, narratives can include or exclude social actors to align with particular 
interests and goals pertaining to how authors represent information to its audiences (van 
Leeuwen 2008). Through strategic linguistic and textual construction mechanisms, van 
Leeuwen (1996, 2008) maintains, authors of text are able to emphasize, or ignore, the 
presence of social actors in relation to social phenomena. Further, as a discursive 
strategy, the narrative can thus devalue certain individuals or groups, or ignore them 
altogether. These strategies of ‘backgrounding’ can be realized through several 
mechanisms, most notable with respect to representations of radicalization are 
                                                
29 See my previous work highlighting specific backgrounding strategies in the New York Times coverage of 
radicalization (Silva 2017).   
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genericization and collectivization, which treat social actors in narratives as 
homogeneous groups and therefore ignore the presence of individual characteristics (van 
Leeuwen 1996). Each newspaper made use of several important backgrounding 
strategies, not least of which are exemplified in the following examples: 
More broadly, European nations like Britain need to end reflexive 
multiculturalism -- for example, lax language and cultural education 
requirements for naturalization -- that perversely discourages Muslims 
from learning the ways of their new countries, thus isolating them 
from the mainstream and fueling radicalization. (New York Times, 
February 1, 2003) 
 
In the longer term, we must somehow stimulate young Muslims to 
identify with the Calvinist values of the majority. The radicalization 
among small groups of young Muslims, a threat that cannot be fought 
within Holland's borders alone, is a time bomb. (New York Times, July 15, 
2005) 
 
IS [Islamic State], as with al-Qaeda before it, is waiting for them - online 
and sometimes right in their neighbourhood - with narratives connecting 
their local troubles to faraway wars and a clash of civilizations. (Globe 
and Mail, November 21, 2015) 
 
Flights should be laid on to take would-be jihadists to Syria so they are 
not "festering" here, a former counterterrorism chief suggests. 
Bob Quick, the one-time Scotland Yard assistant commissioner, claimed it 
may be safer to help fanatics move to the war-torn country and ban them 
from Britain. (The Daily Telegraph, July 8, 2015) 
 
Interestingly, the United Kingdom was much more explicit than the US or Canadian in 
their usage of backgrounding strategies. Newspapers in the UK were explicit in their use 
of an us/them dichotomy and strategies of collectivization and genericization, often 
employing them in the title of major news stories. Some of which include articles titled 
“The sanest response to teenage numpties who blow themselves up is simply to laugh at 
them” (The Daily Telegraph, August 13, 2005), "PM vows to 'drain the swamp' that 
fosters UK extremism” (The Guardian, June 4, 2013), “NOTHING TO FEAR BUT 
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ISLAM ITSELF” (The Independent, March 9, 2014, emphasis in original), and even 
“After Londonistan” (The New York Times, June 25, 2006). These representations 
highlight discursive strategies stereotypical of the us/them dichotomy, presenting Islam 
and diverse Muslim communities in direct opposition to notions of Britishness and 
national identity. Even more, they dehumanize individual practitioners of Islam with 
references to “teenage numpties,” or “draining the swamp,” as if to devalue those 
individuals and groups.  
Treating diverse Muslim populations as homogeneous collectivities, and 
subsequently mocking those groups, is prototypical of van Leeuwen’s (2008) concept of 
backgrounding, which suggests that such linguistic strategies cannot be detached from 
attempts to maintain dominant social hierarchies. In this case, news media employ the 
radicalization narratives to present diverse groups of believers in Islam as not only 
unanimous in terms of belief systems, but also ideological approaches, which are 
represented in dialectical terms that conflict with the West. As a form of social practice, 
sociolinguistic strategies of backgrounding often work to construct and maintain social 
hierarchies (van Leeuwen 1996, 2008). In this case, backgrounding mechanisms 
represented Islam as incompatible with Western ideals of national identity, and sought to 
undermine and diminish individual practitioners through explicit mocking strategies.  
Some articles internally identified tendencies of news media to focus on religious 
characteristics in its coverage of radicalization, not least of which is exemplified by UK 
newspaper The Independent. The paper’s coverage of political conflicts in Palestine 
observed: “the radicalisation of the conflict is morphing from a political one into a 
religious one” (The Independent, November 30, 2011). Moreover, even when news 
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articles approached the concept of radicalization in a more agnostic, areligious manner, 
they often included representations – by example or by illustration – that link the story 
with Islam in one way or another. For example, in an article published in The 
Independent on March 1, 2015 referencing the “radicalization of young people,” the 
newspaper linked the article to another story regarding so-called Muslim extremism:  
Conservative Party chairman Grant Shapps admitted there was a 
"difference of opinion" over the guidance to be issued as the Government 
tries to prevent the radicalisation of young people. 
Read more: Muslim convert given five-year preaching ban Chief of 
Global Aid Trust 'resigns' over alleged links to extremism [link to another 
article].30 
 
This type of representation strategy was used often in ‘agnostic’ news coverage of issues 
relating to radicalization. While the substance of the article makes no mention of Islam, 
linking the story to one that does – by choice of human actor or computer algorithm – 
reinforces associations between radicalization and Muslim communities.  
As noted above, some articles made mention of the problematic nature of the 
radicalization label used in media narratives, political frames, and governmental 
discourses. While these articles were relatively few, they did posit opportunities for 
different narratives relating to radicalization. For instance, several articles in the United 
States questioned why the radicalization label is not placed on right-wing nationalists 
such as Dylann Roof, the infamous perpetrator of a mass shooting in Charleston, South 
Carolina (USA Today, June 26, 2015; Washington Post, June 26, 2015; The New York 
Times, December 5, 2015). However, not only are these representations quantitatively 
                                                
30 All emphases denoted in the qualitative analysis were added to highlight the most important aspects of 
each illustration. 
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overshadowed, they also make continuous reference to radicalization through a lens of 
Islamic fundamentalism or related concepts:  
The social forces that have assisted in the Islamic State's radicalization of 
dozens of Americans are very similar to what drove Dylann Roof to 
embrace an extreme racist ideology before he allegedly launched an attack 
that left nine dead inside an iconic African-American church… "(It's) very 
similar to Roof," [Attorney General Loretta] Lynch said. "People 
disaffected, people being radicalized online. Roof picked this racial hatred 
theme and that's what fueled him. Others picked the ISIL theme, and that's 
what fuels them." (USA Today, June 25, 2015) 
 
Even in narratives of radicalization that posit the impartiality of the term (i.e., that 
‘anyone’ can be entrenched by radicalization), news media does so through reference to 
Islam or by unintentionally (or, some may argue, intentionally) connecting those stories 
to other representations of Muslim communities. The few times when news media used 
the concept in association with non-Muslims, even if used to problematize the 
narrowness of the label, did not evoke radicalization as a descriptive of non-Muslim 
activities. 
 
A Culture of Preemption? Discursive Formations of Radicalization and the Preemptive 
Shift 
 
The second question this chapter seeks to address is related to exploring how media 
might influence cultural understandings of governance mechanisms as they relate to 
counterterrorism and counterradicalization. To address this question, I analyze each 
country’s media representations of potential, observed, or proposed solutions to the issue 
of radicalization, which the previous section illustrates, is mostly grounded in threats of 
(Islamic) terrorism targeting Western liberal democracies. Data were coded based on a 
number of important themes, including representations regarding how radicalization is 
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problematized (see Rose and Miller 1992), or observed as a problem, and how media 
references possible solutions to those problems. Data were then examined for trends in 
references to the thematic coding as well as coverage area of the themes. Coverage area 
refers to the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted. The coverage area 
is presented as a weighted percentage, which assigns a portion of the coded themes 
relative to all words in the document. With a body of text as large as this data set (over 
6500 articles and hundreds of thousands of words), the weighted percentage will be 
extremely low and even minor changes are indicative of important trends.31 An increase 
in the weighted percentage of coverage area indicates a higher proportion of references to 
a theme in the body of text.  
With respect to how counterradicalization strategies were framed by news media, 
several important trends emerged in all three countries’ post-2000 narratives on 
radicalization (see Table 6.8). Most notable in this respect is the emergence of 
preemptive frames as governance strategies counter to the problem of so-called 
radicalization. Interestingly, the issue of radicalization was increasingly represented as a 
matter of law enforcement (+.04-.11% coverage) and police (+.11-.13% coverage), rather 
than a military (.04-.07% decrease in coverage), concern requiring military intervention 
(.01-.04% decrease in coverage). While other important themes remained stagnant – for 
instance, references to law as a principal solution to the problem – radicalization 
governance was increasingly represented as an issue of proactive, preemptive 
intervention themes. News media progressively focused more on themes of intelligence 
                                                
31 It is also important to note that in this case the theme counts are somewhat misleading because of the 
substantial increase in articles during the post-2000 timeframe. I therefore analyze discursive shifts relative 
to the coverage area of each theme.  
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(+.10-.17% coverage), surveillance (+.03% coverage), risk (+.02%% coverage), 
prevention (+.02-.08% coverage), threat (+.04-.08% coverage), and even education 
(+.01-.05% coverage). These trends highlight the discursive shift in news media 
understandings of counterradicalization governance strategies, from a predominantly 
reactive, military approach to a much more proactive, preventative approach.  
 
Table 6.8: Comparison of Themes Pre- and Post-2000 in Newspapers by 
Country 
      
 United Kingdom United States Canada 
 
1969-1999 
(n=145) 
2000-16 
(n=2525) 
1969-
1999 
(n=391) 
2000-16 
(n=1672) 
1969-
1999 
(n=179) 
2000-16 
(n=1610) 
Law 
Enforcement - 540 (.04%) 2 (.01%) 606 (.12%) - 
172 
(.04%) 
Policing 85 (.06%) 
9682 
(.19%) 2 (.01%) 2154 (.12%) 
63 
(.03%) 
1838 
(.15%) 
Preventiona - 
3090 
(.08%) 3 (.01%) 327 (.03%) 1 (.01%) 
512 
(.06%) 
Surveillance 3 (.01%) 893 (.04%) 4 (.01%) 319 (.04%) 1 (.01%) 
134 
(.03%) 
Intelligence 13 (.01%) 
2637 
(.11%) 
65 
(.03%) 1543 (.20%) 8 (.01%) 
884 
(.15%) 
Military 91 (.09%) 
1810 
(.05%) 
628 
(.17%) 1597 (.10%) 
122 
(.10%) 
655 
(.06%) 
War 204 (.07%) 
3635 
(.03%) 
587 
(.08%) 2038 (.06%) 
116 
(.05%) 
1077 
(.04%) 
Policy 96 (.06%) 
2384 
(.04%) 
403 
(.08%) 786 (.04%) 
70 
(.04%) 
411 
(.05%) 
Risk 11 (.01%) 
1883 
(.03%) 
58 
(.01%) 441 (.03%) 
16 
(.01%) 
378 
(.03%) 
Threat 20 (.01%) 
2943 
(.08%) 
80 
(.02%) 1113 (.10%) 
41 
(.03%) 
896 
(.07%) 
Security 66 (.06%) 
6605 
(.17%) 
259 
(.06%) 2389 (.20%) 
51 
(.03%) 
2099 
(.23%) 
Education 41 (.03%) 
2264 
(.08%) 
81 
(.02%) 428 (.04%) 
21 
(.02%) 
189 
(.03%) 
Law 38 (.02%) 
2562 
(.02%) 
199 
(.03%) 1346 (.03%) 
64 
(.03%) 
767 
(.03%) 
Public 
Safety - 54 (.01%) 1 (.01%) 11 (.01%) - 
231 
(.04%) 
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a References to “prevent” were excluded from the analysis, as they overwhelmingly 
referenced the United Kingdom’s PREVENT strategy. Inclusion of the word “prevent” 
would have resulted in an extreme skew in this theme towards post-2000 articles.   
 
As Table 6.8 illustrates, there are numerous examples in the text reflective of the 
discursive shift towards preemptive counterradicalization governance strategies. Prior to 
2000, references to preemption mostly focused on international and military affairs and 
highlighted desires to prevent international or civil conflicts in a variety of countries. For 
example, in an article on conflicts in communist countries, The Guardian suggested the 
need for preemption to avoid military conflicts:  
Some see the collapse of party unity as a step forward, the vital condition 
for real debate on the various options for Latvia's future. Others fear that 
the party is the only force which can hold society together and prevent 
conflicts exploding into violence, with unpredictable consequences. 
 
Another example can be found in a The Washington Post (February 8, 1977) story on 
civil unrest in Mozambique:  
Establishment of the new party came as a new Revolutionary Party, was 
formed in neighboring Tanzania and as reports reached here that Angola 
intends to create a Marxist-Leninist party this year in what appears to be a 
trend toward the radicalization of southern Africa that former U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was anxious to prevent. 
 
Not only are these two examples reflective of how radicalization was often used to denote 
political and/or economic conflicts between Western democratic capitalism and 
governments aligned with forms of socialism or communism, they are also suggestive of 
the use of the concept to denote the prevention in the form of military intervention or 
diplomatic affairs. Contrast this with more modern examples of news media’s 
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problematization of radicalization and framing of counterradicalization governance 
strategies: 
To prevent the next attack in the United States we need a similar 
coordinated intelligence effort at home. In New York City, the F.B.I. 
and Police Department share this responsibility. And although they do 
not always love each other, they find ways to work together. The Police 
Department brings grit, creativity and street smarts to the investigative 
programs. The F.B.I. connects local efforts with information from national 
and international intelligence databases. (The New York Times, 
September 10, 2006) 
 
The Government is concentrating on trying to prevent young Muslims 
being attracted to extremist groups… The Home Office's five-year plan 
will emphasise that people need to feel safe before they can go out and 
enjoy their lives. "Safety is the foundation," says Miss Blears, who is 
also responsible for the police and tackling anti-social behaviour. (The 
Daily Telegraph, July 19, 2004)  
 
The emphasis will be on funding existing programs at the 
neighbourhood and school levels for what the government sees as a 
"growing problem" of the radicalization of Dutch youth. (Toronto 
Star, August 28, 2007) 
 
These examples illustrate some of the important discursive shifts outlined in 
Table 6.8. The drastic differences in language used to describe counterradicalization 
governance strategies, and the policing practices therein, based on notions of risk, public 
safety, and preventative community policing are indicative of the cultural trend towards 
treating radicalization as an inherently preventable governing logic. The above 
illustrations also highlight the ways in which news media follow governmental discourses 
of prevention, with each focusing on particular government policy changes. Such 
counterradicalization narratives thus uphold and legitimize those governmental strategies, 
rather than challenging or critiquing them. While certainly news media at times 
challenged the discriminatory logic of counterradicalization governance throughout the 
West, those critiques were vastly outnumbered by representations such as those 
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highlighted above. News media thus contributes to public(s) understandings of accepted 
and effective counterradicalization strategies based on notions of preemptive 
intervention, regardless of the consequences of such policies.  
 
The Emergence of ‘Othering Frames’: National Identities and Cultural Conflicts 
The final theme I will discuss in this chapter is the emergence of what I call ‘othering 
frames.’ Othering frames are here conceptualized as discursive frames which denote 
distinctions between us on the one hand, and them on the other. As Georg Simmel (1921) 
aptly put it many years ago, societies have a history of placing social distance between 
the ‘native’ and the ‘stranger,’ to the extent that new social groups emerge. These 
extraneous social groups, referred to as ‘strangers,’ are often represented in terms of their 
social distance rather than proximity (Simmel 1921). It is with this theoretical perspective 
that the analysis of ‘othering frames’ employed by news media is based. The following 
represents an exploratory analysis of some sociolinguistic strategies in place that work to 
construct social distance between the ‘natives’ and the ‘strangers.’ I present a quantitative 
content analysis of some dominant themes by which news media references social 
distance between groups in its radicalization narratives. Further, I highlight some of the 
sociolinguistic strategies put in place by news media to further distinguish value systems 
“out there” as dialectically incongruent with Western values and culture.   
 
Table 6.9: Comparison of 'Othering Frames' Pre- and Post-2000 in 
Newspapers by Country 
       
 United Kingdom United States Canada  
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1969-
1999 
(n=145) 
2000-16 
(n=2525) 
1969-
1999 
(n=391) 
2000-16 
(n=1672) 
1969-
1999 
(n=179) 
2000-16 
(n=1610)  
Britishness - 43 (.01%) - 2 (.01%) - 2 (.01%)  
Canadianness - - - - - 1 (.01%)  
National 
Identity 1 (.01%) 48 (.02%) 5 (.01%) 36 (.01%) 1 (.01%) 24 (.02%)  
Patriotism 3 (.01%) 21 (.01%) 3 (.01%) 19 (.01%) - 14 (.01%)  
Nationalism 
18 
(.02%) 75 (.02%) 
28 
(.01%) 34 (.01%) 
42 
(.05%) 36 (.01%)  
National Values 
11 
(.01%) 
1431 
(.05%) 
34 
(.01%) 
208 
(.02%) 
17 
(.01%) 295 (.03%)  
Western Values 1 (.01%) 24 (.01%) 3 (.01%) 6 (.01%) - 15 (.01)  
        
 
 
Results from the content analysis of ‘othering frames’ are included in Table 6.9. 
While references to patriotism, nationalism, and Western values in general remained 
relatively stagnant over time, there is some evidence to suggest that each country’s news 
media utilized discursive ‘othering frames’ to illustrate social distance between those 
aligned with cultural values of the country and those viewed as outsiders (most often of 
which was associated with Islam). Several examples from the test illustrate these trends: 
Muslims, so it went, must accept those British values (liberty, 
tolerance, democracy, etc.) that make up the essence of "Britishness". 
(The Guardian, June 4, 2007) 
Young Muslim children attending after-school madrasas should be taught 
about Britishness as well as the principles of their faith, the 
Government said as it launched a fresh attempt to counter violent 
extremism. (The Independent, April 6, 2007) 
Local councils are to be encouraged to promote ''citizens' days'' to 
emphasise the country's heritage and the importance of civic pride. The 
measures follow Gordon Brown's focus in his Labour conference speech 
on Britishness and the importance of integration. (The Daily 
Telegraph, October 6, 2007) 
I'm not a politician so won't make any assertion that work and economic 
security make for better buy-in to Britishness. I am a citizen though: a 
concerned citizen seeing a few million people being demonised by the 
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actions of a few - albeit seemingly more by the day. (The Independent, 
March 17, 2015) 
For too long we have allowed communities to go their own ways and live 
separate lives. Building "Britishness" and a multicultural cohesive 
identity has to be done in practice, developing common values around a 
common agenda. (The Guardian, June 15, 2011) 
 
It is important to note that some news stories explicitly challenged the 
problematic nature of the social distance implied by concepts like ‘Britishness’: “critics 
complain that Islam is being presented as separate from Britishness and needs to 
constantly prove its compatibility - a demand not made of other faiths” (The Independent, 
January 20, 2015). Yet even when those frames highlight the “absurdity” of the notion of 
“Britishness” (The Guardian, January 16, 2016), they do so through using Islam as the 
reference point. Media thus constructs the dichotomy of Britishness/Islam even when it 
challenges the very notion of Britishness. While such critiques of the notion, which 
became more common following 2013, go some length in challenging the problematic 
nature of concepts like “Britishness,” they also highlight the embeddedness of othering 
frames in public discourse. 
         The data analyzed here provide support for the work of Elizabeth Poole (2002) and 
colleagues (Saeed 2007), who suggest that media utilizes terms such as ‘Britishness’ to 
indicate social distance between Muslim communities and the rest of the British 
populous. These distancing frames have become so entrenched in public discourse that 
we employ them in reference to entire groups of people. While this is not the only context 
whereby national identities are constructed, it is an important one, as radicalization has 
become such a dominant governmental framework for understanding issues of security, 
risk, and terrorism.  
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Similar, albeit less explicit, concepts were deployed within Canadian and US 
media coverage of radicalization. For example, the similar concept of “Canadianness,” 
was used to explain the difficulty faced by the Canadian intelligence community in 
identifying those who might pose a threat of terrorist activities: "Increasingly, we are 
learning of more and more extremists that are homegrown," says the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service document, adding that the "Canadianness" of the new generation 
makes them more difficult to detect” (National Post, November 19, 2005). In news media 
coverage of radicalization in the United States and Canada, othering frames often 
reflected concepts related to national values, such as the form “American values” or 
“Canadian values.” These concepts were mostly absent from news articles related to 
radicalization pre-2000, notably before the substantial increase in references to Islam and 
Muslim communities.  
We will win it [war on terror] by working with the Muslim community to 
combat radicalization. And we will also win it by asserting the 
importance of Canadian values, including the equality of men and 
women, freedom of speech, and yes, the right to one's religious beliefs. 
(National Post, January 22, 2015) 
Our military power remains extraordinary. But winning this fight 
requires projecting a narrative about American values and interests. 
And we have failed to do that. (Washington Post, September 11, 2016) 
 
Following 2000, however, news media increasingly focused on differences in 
“values” between the West and Islam, representing each in dichotomous and 
incompatible terms. As Edward Said (1978) reminds us, the news media is part of the 
corporate entity which makes authoritative statements about the East. The Orientalism 
framework is thus illustrated by Western news media focus on cultural conflict between 
Western liberal democracies, based on notions of democracy and neoliberalism, and the 
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Islamic East, presented as culturally dialectic to the West. Moreover, news media 
deployed linguistic frames and ideas which emphasize the social distance between the 
‘native’ and the ‘stranger,’ increasingly highlighting the conflictual foundations of the 
liberal democratic West and the Islamic East. In this case, the ‘natives’ are those 
embedded in the cultural value systems of the West. The ‘strangers,’ on the other hand, 
are those isolated, disconnected, and culturally distinct from normative value systems of 
the West. The stranger, in the case of radicalization discourse, is represented as obtuse to 
the native way of life; isolated from modern society and from the value systems in which 
those societies exist. What was true for Simmel (1921) in his analysis of the stranger, and 
still true for scholars working in the othering paradigm, is here reflected by cultural 
representations of Islam as distinct social category – one that is characterized as 
analogous to radicalization.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on news media representations of radicalization in the aim of 
explicating how the concept is constructed, maintained, and deployed as representative of 
the cultural system. Approaching news media as a sample of all possible cultural 
representations of radicalization, this chapter sought to examine two important questions: 
(1) the first is how is radicalization represented in news media across three Western 
liberal democracies; (2) and the second has to do with how those discourses might 
influence, or be influenced by, shifts in discourses regarding radicalization and the 
governance strategies which work to counter it. This chapter highlighted how 
radicalization narratives increasingly focus on Muslim communities and Islam more 
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generally. Over the course of past 40 years, radicalization has shifted from a concept 
denoting mostly political or economic conflicts between overarching government 
approaches to a symbol of religious differences rooted in a dichotomy of the Christian 
West and the Islamic East.  
Building on my previous work (see Silva 2017), this chapter illustrates the 
diffusion of this trend throughout Western liberal democracies and suggests that the use 
of othering mechanisms by news media is not solely an issue in the United States, but of 
equal or greater concern in the United Kingdom and Canada. Furthermore, through in-
depth content and discourse analysis, this chapter investigated how governance strategies 
seeking to counter radicalization were represented in news media and how those 
representations are reflective of broader shifts towards understanding radicalization in 
terms of proactive, preemptive governing. I argued that media narratives of radicalization 
present the issue as one of risk, security, intelligence, and preventative intervention, and 
emphasize how discourses of radicalization are most often problematizing it as an issue 
of proactive policing rather than reactive military concern. In the next chapter, I continue 
to explore the proliferation of radicalization discourses throughout the social system 
through analysis of scientific knowledge claims related to counterterrorism and 
counterradicalization. I aim to examine and explicate some of the justifications provided 
by science for approaching, and intervening in, the so-called radicalization process.
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CHAPTER 7 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSES AND RADICALIZATION
The preceding chapters have highlighted the lack of empirical research on the construct 
of radicalization. One notable exception to this gap is in the area of scholarly 
constructions of radicalization and their impact on certain communities and groups. Arun 
Kundnani (2012) has highlighted how the diffusion of discourses related to radicalization 
within and amongst government industry scholarship has led to the construction of 
Muslim populations as “suspect communities” (p. 3). Since the release of his influential 
Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (2009), Kundnani has been at the 
forefront of explorations into how discourses of violent extremism, terrorism, and 
radicalization are constructed by scholars, ‘expert’ analysts, and industry professionals. 
He has illustrated how radicalization discourses have produced a relatively narrow 
conceptualization of the term and how those discourses have been quite influential in 
terms of impact on public and social policy. Since scholarly research is often employed in 
the political and mass media realms to justify a host of public policy decisions, it is 
important to empirically investigate how academic knowledge claims related to 
radicalization are produced and, equally important, how those are adopted in other social 
contexts. 
Missing from Kundnani’s (2012, 2013) analysis, I argue below, is an emergent 
typology of scholarly counterradicalization discourses associated with critical analyses of 
radicalization as a governmental framework. In this way, I revisit and build upon his 
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typology to highlight some of the more contemporary trends in academic discourses 
related to the concept. Moreover, Kundnani’s (2012, 2013) work highlights the discursive 
construction of radicalization by scholars and industry ‘experts.’ Much less addressed in 
his work, at least empirically, is how those discourses are adopted by influential 
individuals and groups in other social systems. Not least of which are how ‘academic’ 
discourses of radicalization are adopted, taken up, and communicated by governmental 
officials, politicians, and by media. In the final section of this chapter, I will explore the 
diffusion, uptake, and configuration of claims to knowledge about radicalization in the 
political, governmental, and mass media systems. Through an in-depth analysis of 
governmental counterterrorism strategies, I will explore the network of scholarship 
employed by governments to justify their selected counterradicalization initiatives and 
practices therein. I argue that government officials are relatively selective in their 
adoption of scholarly knowledge claims related to radicalization, thereby ignoring 
emergent, and important, scholarly developments in the area.  
In total, this chapter analyzes 503 academic titles and abstracts representing a 
range of scholarly disciplines. Data were gathered from academic search engines JSTOR 
and Sociological Abstracts, and includes all references to “radicalization” or 
“radicalisation” made in the title or the abstract of books, peer-reviewed journal articles, 
and doctoral dissertations. Data were then coded line-by-line on the basis of similar 
emergent themes outlined in Chapters Four and Six. Figure 7.1 illustrates the number of 
academic sources included by year and highlights the number of sources that also 
reference Islam or Muslim communities. 
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Figure 7.1: References to Radicalization and Islam in Academic Publications32 
 
Towards a Typology of (Pseudo)Scientific Radicalization Discourses 
As noted above, Arun Kundnani has been at the forefront of exploring how radicalization 
discourses are represented in the scientific system. Through an in-depth analysis of 
leading academic and industry scholar’s use of the term radicalization, Kundnani (2012) 
offers a typology of how radicalization has been deployed throughout the scientific 
apparatus. With the proliferation of radicalization and counterradicalization discourses 
since 2004, Kundnani (2012) notes, emergent scholarship tends to conceptualize 
                                                
32 Following Kundnani (2012), this Figure was generated using searches of peer-reviewed journals, 
doctoral dissertations, and academic books for the terms “radicalization” or “radicalization” and any 
combination of references to Islam, including “Islam,” “Islamic,” “Islamist(s),” “Muslim(s),” and others. I 
used the databases JSTOR and Sociological Abstracts as search engines due to their ability to output 
spreadsheets of search results and their inclusion of many journals not explored in Kundnani’s study. I also 
only searched the abstracts, as Kundnani (2012) has already explored similar trends in full-text format. The 
search resulted in 503 articles and abstracts included in the analysis.  
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radicalization in one of four sometimes overlapping ways: (1) a cultural-psychological 
disposition; (2) a theological process; (3) a theological-psychological process; and (4) 
radicalization models as policing tools.  
The first type, radicalization as a cultural-psychological disposition, can in many 
ways be traced back to the work of Walter Laqueur (2004), whose arguments centered on 
moving away from traditional approaches to terrorism that focus on political and 
structural conditions leading to violence and rather descend to analyses of the micro-level 
characteristics of terrorism. In doing so, Laqueur (2004) maintains, one can identify the 
“cultural-psychological disposition” of those engaged in terrorist activities and search for 
root causes of such dispositions (p. 53). Framing this type of ‘root cause’ approach to 
identifying dispositions, Kundnani (2012) argues, can then be used by the intelligence 
community and law enforcement as a “proxy for terrorist risk and to structure their 
surveillance efforts accordingly” (p. 8). Since the work of Laqueur, he and other scholars 
have attempted to apply his ideas in a more systematic way as the basis of law 
enforcement and intelligence screening initiatives (see Horgan 1999, 2003, and 2009). 
Especially relevant in this respect is subsequent work which aims to identify sets of 
religious beliefs and activities that can be identified as ‘indicators’ of radicalization and, 
ultimately, of terrorism.  
 The second type of scientific discourse conceptualizes radicalization as a 
theological process. These studies try to highlight the significant role of theology in the 
radicalization process (Kundnani 2012). This type of research is most exemplified by the 
work of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman (2009), whose influential 
Homegrown Terrorists in the US and UK: An Empirical Examination of the 
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Radicalization Process, aims to identify how individuals are “indoctrinated” into so-
called jihadist ideologies (p. 26). Approaching radicalization as a predominantly 
theological process whereby an individual’s self-identity is viewed as a causal 
mechanism toward political violence, these studies aim to highlight ‘indicators,’ or 
“specific behavioral changes that homegrown terrorists went through as they radicalized” 
(Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009: 29). Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) 
argue that those behavioral changes include: the adoption of a “legalistic” interpretation 
of Islam, trusting only a “select and ideologically rigid” group of authorities, viewing the 
West and Islam as irreconcilable different, possessing a low tolerance for religious 
transgressions, attempting to impose religious beliefs on others, and expressing radical 
political views (p. 29). Similar to conceptualizations of radicalization as a cultural-
psychological disposition, studies of this type focus more specifically on the religious 
dispositions of those who engage in terrorist activities. This body of work, therefore, is 
often used as the basis for indicator models of ‘extremist’ religious views and behaviors. 
Despite well documented criticisms of this type of scholarship, the work of 
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman and others working in this tradition (see Jenkins 2002, 
2006, 2010, 2011), attempt to assert that their research is premised in an empirically 
rigorous method, and as such has been readily adopted by policy makers in a variety of 
contexts. But as Kundnani (2012) illustrates, these studies tend to suffer from numerous 
empirical and methodological weaknesses – not least of which include the lack of control 
groups, failure to establish a causal link between religiosity and terrorism despite 
claiming so, the ignorance of possible alternative explanations, confirmation biases with 
claimed causal mechanisms, and even serious concerns over the validity of the criteria to 
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determine cases’ status as ‘terrorists.’ Nonetheless, scholarship of this type continues to 
be adopted by governments who seek indicator models of risk to frame 
counterradicalization strategies and initiatives.  
The third archetype of scholarly radicalization discourse attempts to connect 
theology with psychological processes in order to develop theories of radicalization. This 
type of research has gained influence in part due to its acceptance of the complexity 
involved with any process whereby one moves from ideological extremism to political 
violence (Kundnani 2012). These studies attempt to move beyond simplistic causal 
linkages between theology or disposition and radicalization in favor of a more interactive 
relationships between theological and social-psychological processes (Kundnani 2012).  
Rather than religious ideologies alone causing individuals to adopt violence, 
radicalization is related to extreme responses to ‘identity crises’ or sudden and 
unexpected changes in group bonding processes (Sageman 2004). As such, studies in this 
typology reflect the acceptance of a more complex approach to radicalization that 
addresses some of the interdependencies between theology, social psychology, and 
structural group dynamics.  
While efforts to express the complexity involved in theorizing about the 
radicalization process break with some of the empirical and methodological issues of 
previous explanation attempts, they still problematically conflate religion and terrorism. 
As Kundnani rightly points out regarding Marc Sageman’s (2008) highlight influential 
Leaderless Jihad:  
[T]he object of his study lacks any definition. The closest we get to a 
description of the category of activities he is analyzing is the statement 
that he is interested in “the men responsible for the September 11, 2001, 
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attacks and all those who, like them, threaten the United States” 
(Kundnani 2012: 14; Sageman 2008:15 as cited in Kundnani 2012: 14) 
 
In addition to Kundnani’s critique, Sageman’s work aligns with other theories of 
radicalization with respect to its failure to adequately, and empirically, demonstrate the 
causal link between theology and violence which lies at the heart of its model. In this 
way, despite claims to the contrary, theological-psychological theories of radicalization, 
as with the other typologies of radicalization adopted in the scientific system, fail to 
adequately justify their assumptions within the traditional framework of the scientific 
method; claims which Kundnani (2012) and others (Neumann 2013; Neumann and 
Kleinmann 2013) have argued are pseudoscientific in orientation.  
However empirically invalid these studies might be, they have been highly 
influential in in terms of their impact on governmental policy. Studies such as Sageman’s 
Leaderless Jihad attempt to explore the interconnectivity of theological extremist 
ideologies with social networks and therefore aim to identify how a breakdown in group 
dynamics increases the likelihood of radicalization amongst individuals and groups. In 
this way, Sageman’s work, and the work of others in this area (see Wiktorowicz 2005), 
has been highly influential for law enforcement who continue to try to understand 
radicalization networks in order to create strategies and initiatives to combat it.  
The final cluster of Kundnani’s typology of scientific discourse are approaches to 
radicalization as a tool for law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies and 
governmental offices have commissioned several notable studies that adopt a mostly 
theological-psychological approach to radicalization, but differ in terms of their intended 
audience and applications (Kundnani 2012). Most notable in this respect is the highly 
influential NYPD Intelligence Division’s Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown 
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Threat, prepared by intelligence analysts Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt and published 
in 2007. The report offers a relatively simplistic model theorizing radicalization whilst 
claiming scholarly and methodological thoroughness.33 Silber and Bhatt (2007) argue that 
there are four “stages” of a generalized radicalization process: (1) pre-radicalization, 
denoting an individual’s life situation before they are exposed to “jihadist-Salafi Islam as 
their ideology”; (2) self-identification, the phase where individuals begin to explore 
“Salafi Islam”; (3) indoctrination, a period in which an individual “intensifies his beliefs, 
wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions 
and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause”; and 
(4) jihadization, in which members of the group “self-designate themselves as holy 
warriors or mujahedeen” (p. 6-7). Following the work of Sageman, Silber and Bhatt’s 
(2007) analysis highlights the intergroup dynamics whereby radicalization is supposedly 
cultivated, referring to the identification of “radicalization incubators” which can be 
infiltrated and subjected to various intervention strategies (p. 20) 
Such policing-oriented analyses of radicalization also suffer from similar 
methodological and empirical deficiencies as other theories outlined above. In their 
overgeneralizations of radicalization, which narrowly focus on men from Islamic 
communities, studies such as Silber and Bhatt’s simply offer a less complex version of 
the theoretical model adopted by Sageman. Relying on less data and relatively absent of 
any methodological or empirical transparency, Silber and Bhatt (2007) maintain that “the 
four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct set of indicators and 
                                                
33 It is of note that the report included an “Outside Expert’s” evaluation in an effort to imbue the report with 
an aura of analytical and methodological legitimacy. The ‘outside expert’ was Brian Michael Jenkins.  
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signatures, are clearly evident in each of the nearly one dozen terrorist-related case 
studies reviewed in this report” (p. 9). Despite the lack of methodological rigor, studies 
by Silber and Bhatt, Sageman, and Wiktorowicsz have been highly influential in the 
formulation of counterradicalization policing strategies adopted by the NYPD and other 
law enforcement agencies (Kundnani 2012). By focusing on group dynamics and the 
“radicalization incubator” approach outlined by Silber and Bhatt, law enforcement 
agencies and government officials have reconfigured their policing intervention strategies 
around the theological-psychological approach to issues of radicalization.34  
However, following this approach is potentially problematic for specific 
communities of groups, particularly cultural and ethnic minorities already targeted by 
post-9/11 counterterrorism practices of surveillance. As Kundnani (2012) concludes, “in 
the hands of the NYPD, Sageman and Wiktorowicz’s radicalization scholarship becomes 
a prospectus for mass surveillance of Muslim populations” (p. 19). I will return to the 
development and application of counterradicalization policing strategies in the next two 
chapters. The goal of this chapter, however, is to explore the evolution and diffusion of 
these and other claims to knowledge about radicalization to highlight how discourses 
spread throughout the public sphere. The following section builds on the work of Arun 
Kundnani and traces some of the more recent developments in radicalization scholarship. 
The final part of the chapter then moves to an empirical analysis of the proliferation of 
scholarly radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere. 
 
                                                
34 As Kundnani (2012) points out, the theological-psychological process outlined by Silber and Bhatt, and 
the intervention strategies named in their report, appear very similar to the strategies outlined in the White 
House’s Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism guidelines.  
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The ‘Critical Turn:’ Radicalization as Governmental Framework and Governmental 
Ignorance 
 
In 2004, Walter Laqueur proclaimed the presence of a “new terrorism,” distinguishing 
between traditional forms of political violence associated with older terrorism and a 
“new” form of “Islamic fundamentalist violence rooted in fanaticism” (p. 51). As I noted 
in the previous section, this led to important shifts in how issues of terrorism are 
approached and understood amongst scholars, industry researchers, and a host of ‘expert’ 
analysts. Laqueur’s influential work reconfigured notions of counterterrorism around the 
concept of radicalization, and prompted academic research, government initiatives, and 
public policy to focus on the identification of, and intervention in, the so-called 
radicalization process. While other observers have questioned the scholarly validity of 
‘research’ into these phenomena, studies suggesting that we can observe a generalized 
trajectory from political or religious ideology to extremist forms of violence have 
remained influential in the cultural and political apparatuses, evinced by the substantial 
increase in use of the term radicalization in mass media (Chapter Six) and in 
governmental discourses (Chapter Four).  
A similar, albeit antithetical, trend is evident in recent scholarly discourses related 
to radicalization, which are increasingly focusing on critical explorations into 
radicalization as an overarching logic of governance.35 Since 2012, there has been an 
increase in academic studies published which aim to provide analyses of both the 
historical development of scientific claims regarding radicalization as well as critical 
investigations into how those discourses influence shifts in strategies of governing 
                                                
35 This dissertation itself thus contributes to this shift in academic discourses of radicalization.  
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terrorism (see Table 7.1). It is therefore important to revisit Kundnani’s (2012) typology 
of radicalization discourses in light of recent developments which have taken place 
within the scientific system. This section of the chapter offers an in-depth analysis of 
emergent frames of academic research related to radicalization and counterradicalization 
in hopes of highlighting how an emergent body of work has surfaced explicitly 
challenging some of the dominant tropes in scholarly research on radicalization. I argue 
that we must reconsidered and build upon Kundnani’s typology in order to paint a more 
complete picture of the state of academic radicalization discourses.  
Table 7.1: Typology of Scientific Radicalization Discourses Pre- and Post-2012 
   
 Pre-2012 Post-2012 
Cultural-psychological 248 90 
Theological 27 6 
Theological-psychological 32 55 
Policing tools 7 13 
Critical studies 2 23 
Data gathered from academic search engines JSTOR and Sociological Abstracts. In total, 503 
academic texts (books, peer-reviewed journal articles, dissertations) were examined from 1970-
present. Book, peer-reviewed journal article, and dissertation abstracts were search for use of the 
terms "radicalization" or "radicalisation."  
 
A search for academic publications referencing radicalization highlights some of 
the pre- and post-2012 trends in scientific knowledge claims related to radicalization and 
counterradicalization. As Table 7.1 illustrates, most academic publications prior to 2012 
employed understandings of radicalization as a cultural-psychological disposition, 
highlighting scholarly approaches to the concept with reference to mostly political, and 
sometimes psychological, transformations at the level of the individual. The 
overwhelming scholarly focus on radicalization as cultural-psychological phenomenon 
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aligns with much of this study’s findings highlighting more traditional approaches to the 
construct; pre-2000 radicalization constructions in other public spheres most often 
denoted a specific politically oriented transition from conventional political beliefs to 
extreme ideologies. Additionally, scholarly publications focusing on radicalization as a 
theological process, or as a more complex relationship between theology and social 
psychological characteristics, were central in academic discourse. These trends align well 
with Kundnani’s (2012) typology of academic discourses related to radicalization.  
However, the analysis suggests that Kundnani’s fourth type, radicalization as 
policing tool, was not often applied in academic publications. While the lack of focus on 
this type is relatively unsurprising given Kundnani’s focus on non-peer-reviewed 
research claiming to be methodologically rigorous and scientific, it is indeed indicative of 
the scientific system’s dedication to uncovering some of the structural, social 
psychological, and theological ‘root causes’ of radicalization, rather than providing 
concrete tools for law enforcement.  
Following 2012, there were notable changes in scholarly discourses related to 
radicalization. While most academic publications remained focused on generalized 
cultural and psychological transitions towards extremist violence, there was a substantial 
increase in attempts to offer analyses of more complex interconnections between 
theology and social psychological characteristics and resources (see Table 7.1). 
Meanwhile, relatively simplistic publications representing radicalization as a 
predominantly theological process decreased considerably. These trends are indicative of 
academics’ preoccupation with offering models of a radicalization process based 
primarily in religious, psychological, and group dynamic forces. Several studies are 
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emblematic of this preoccupation, not least of which include analyses of the 
“psychological factors associated with support for suicide bombing in the Muslim 
diaspora” (Victoroff, Adelman and Matthews 2012), “what moves an individual from 
radical opinion to radical action” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), and “social 
interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement and extremism” 
(Thomas, McGarty and Louis 2014).36  
These studies, and similar work in the area of social network analysis (see 
Klausen 2015; Medina 2014; Perlinger and Pedahur 2011), tend to begin their analysis 
with a problematic group or social location (i.e., Muslim communities or attacks 
perpetrated by Muslims), and extend their findings to broader populations. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of so-called radicalization. As the chapters of this 
dissertation have demonstrated, radicalization is a concept most often evoked with 
reference to terrorism and terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals associated with 
Islam. Scholarship adopting this perspective in advance of the research, by using network 
analysis tools of case study approaches, may provide partial or inadequate theoretical 
explanations due to their ignorance of alternative explanations and control groups. 
Despite often using similar methodological techniques and approaches that Kundnani 
(2012) appropriately critiques,37 the data here suggest that academic publishers continue 
                                                
36 Each of these articles represent a different methodology for exploring the social psychological and 
theological underpinnings of a generalized radicalization process. Victoroff, Adelman, and Matthews 
(2012) use survey data to highlight some of the psychological factors associated with support for suicide 
bombing among only self-identified Muslims. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) explore three case studies 
“lone-wolf” terrorism perpetrated by self-identified Muslims. Finally, Thomas, McGarty and Louis’ (2014) 
study offered an experimental analysis of social psychological pathways to extremism amongst a sample of 
psychology university students.  
37 Of note here is that, even in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, methodological concerns are present and 
sometimes must be addressed. An example of a theological-psychological approach to radicalization 
claiming scientific authority through questionable methods is a 2014 study entitled “A Cognitive-
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to disseminate research attempting to find the social psychological and theological causes 
associated with radicalization.  
The analysis also indicates a notable increase scholarly publications related to the 
use of radicalization theories as tools for police and law enforcement agencies (see Table 
7.1). Studies in this area focused on law enforcement perspectives of factors leading to 
so-called radicalization (Selim 2016), ‘best practice’ approaches to policing and 
surveillance (Caldwell 2012), and comparative studies of public policy and policing 
initiatives (Lindekilde 2012b; Smith 2014; Southers 2014). These mostly program-
oriented studies aimed to highlight the most, and least, efficient policing and surveillance 
strategies that have been deployed throughout (mostly) the United States and United 
Kingdom. Rather than critiquing the problematic application of policing and policy 
initiatives on specific cultural and ethnic minority communities, these studies approach 
radicalization as a problem a priori amongst Muslim populations and seek to highlight the 
most efficient means given the goal of countering radicalization. While such academic 
discourses did indeed increase post-2012, they remained relatively rare in broader 
discourses of radicalization.  
The most notable development in scholarly publications related to radicalization 
was the emergence of a discourses critical of the current academic tropes being engaged 
in broad bodies of counterradicalization research. This collection of work aims to 
highlight the illogicality, paradoxes, deficiencies, and problematic state of current 
scholarly work related to the conceptual and theoretical framing of radicalization. 
                                                
Behavioral Approach to Violent Radicalization, Based on a Real Case.” In this article, the author attempts 
to trace a “feasible, coherent pathway” through which some people engage in violent extremism through 
the analysis of a particular case study, with no comparative or control group present.  
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Scholars working in this area highlight the problematic nature of academic radicalization 
discourses in a variety of contexts, not least of which includes security and surveillance 
(Harbisher 2015; Monaghan 2015), governmental policy and programs (Akbarzadeh 
2013; Lemons and Chambers-Letson 2014), mass media (Silva 2017), and even academic 
discourses themselves (Kundnani 2012; Neumann 2013; Neumann and Kleinmann 2013).  
Scholars have challenged the traditional tropes imbued in scholarly radicalization 
discourses for not only their methodological and theoretical deficiencies, but also their 
predetermined set of assumptions which often disproportionally focus on a perceived 
threat of Islamic terrorism (a detailed analysis of this paradoxical “threat” is provided in 
chapter four). For instance, Jeffrey Monaghan and colleagues (2015; Molnar and 
Monaghan 2016),38 demonstrate how law enforcement counterradicalization strategies in 
Canada have adopted international academic and policy discourses while reaffirming pre-
emptive and discriminatory security practices. Peter Neumann (2013), on the other hand, 
illustrates the how academic and policy-makers’ conceptualizations of radicalization lack 
logical clarity and thus calls for a more systematic and coordinated effort amongst 
researchers to resolve ambiguity. Academic discourses such as these and others turn the 
focus away from creating models of radicalization toward providing deeper analyses and 
understanding of how the concept of radicalization and the practices of 
                                                
38 While I do maintain that Molnar and Monaghan’s (2016) work is exemplary of what I have called the 
‘critical turn’ in academic radicalization discourses, I must note that the work is not exemplary in terms of 
theoretical and methodological rigor. The authors’ use of Freedom of Information data is well outlined and 
grounded in the emergent body of literature employing such methods. That being said, the article makes 
sweeping claims regarding law enforcement focus on Islam which are not effectively demonstrated 
empirically (aside from highlighting few examples to back up their claims).   
162 
counterradicalization are constructed and how those discourses have implications for a 
variety of organizations and communities.  
This body of work thus challenges dominant academic attempts to identify 
generalized radicalization trajectories that have been the basis for numerous 
governmental initiatives. Rather than investigating case studies or other empirical data on 
‘terrorists’ which otherwise might be considered problematic, critical scholarship has 
emerged which focuses on the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues with their unit 
of analysis; critiquing the very academic discourses which have influenced the creation of 
a myriad of counterradicalization intervention practices. Researchers have thus illustrated 
some of the inconsistencies and problematic practices involved in governmental 
strategies constructed in the name of counterradicalization. For instance, as I have noted 
in previous chapters, O’Toole and colleagues (O’Toole, DeHanas and Modood 2012; 
O’Toole et al. 2016) have documented some potential blind spots in the Prevent strategy 
(UK) where governmental policy might be further developed – for example, beyond a 
solely critical analysis of the strategy, the authors point out ways in which Prevent can 
better align with the realities of Muslim-state engagement. Academics in this area tend to 
call for the abolition of (at least some) governmental counterradicalization strategies and 
initiatives (Birt 2009; Molnar and Monaghan 2016; O’Toole et al. 2016), however, they 
also provide useful insights for governmental officials to create social and public policy 
that is more conscious of the experiences and characteristics of communities for which 
they aim to intervene.  
In this respect, critical academic dialogues regarding radicalization may be of 
great use to governments as they continue to reflect on their counterradicalization 
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programs. The Home Office in the UK, for instance, published a follow-up Prevent 
strategy in 2015 which highlighted some concerns raised by the public and ways in which 
the Government are attempting to address community issues. Notably missing from The 
Home Office’s report is any citation from scholarly research here identified as critical of 
government policy. While this is unsurprising, it is suggestive of the UK Government’s 
aversion to some forms of academic research on issues of radicalization. The important 
question thus emerges: what scholarly discourses related to radicalization and 
counterradicalization are being adopted by governments? And, equally important, how do 
those scientific discourses influence the configuration of governmental 
counterradicalization strategies and the set of practices therein? The final section of this 
chapter aims to address these important questions.  
 
The Inter-Systemic Adoption of Academic Radicalization Discourses 
To explore the inter-systemic adoption of academic radicalization discourses, I used a 
variety of data sources and collection methods. First, counterradicalization strategies in 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom were analyzed on the basis of 
references to scholarly research. Each reference was categorized based on the typology 
outlined in the previous section and any reference made to funding initiatives for research 
or ‘evidence-based’ analyses. With the results of this search, I was able to uncover the 
most important bodies of empirical research and funding programs used by government 
officials in the creation of counterradicalization initiatives. I then searched pertinent 
governmental and federal research granting websites for information on the research 
projects funded as part of official counterradicalization strategies. Each funded proposal 
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was then analyzed in detail to identify how the authors understand radicalization and 
issues of counterradicalization. Following the analysis, I then categorized each proposal 
in the same typology as I have used throughout this chapter.  
The importance of government funding with respect to knowledge claims about 
radicalization is twofold: (1) there has been well-documented structural transformations 
within the scientific system that illustrates the importance of government funding in the 
pursuit of research outcomes (see Deflem 2013; Geuna 2001; Sageman 2014); and (2) 
governmental counterradicalization strategies, as I have noted, increasingly focus on 
knowledge production and “evidence-based” research to advise authorities on best 
practices, to whit explicitly mentioning funding programs in those official strategies. 
Since academic research is often in need of governmental funding, and governments 
explicitly request scholarly work from the scientific system in their counterradicalization 
initiatives, identifying the output of those funding programs is central to an analysis of 
how academic discourses are adopted by governments and government officials. Unlike 
the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy, Canadian and United States’ 
counterradicalization guidelines did not explicitly cite academic research. The analysis 
therefore includes only government funded research projects in Canada and the US. This 
analysis is also exploratory in nature, and further investigations into how academic 
discourses of radicalization are adopted by governments is still necessary and 
welcomed.39  
                                                
39 The next logical step in this analysis is to explore the adoption of academic research in Parliamentary and 
Congressional debates. Due to the already broad scope of this dissertation, and the resources required for 
such an endeavor, I use this chapter to build an empirical basis for further research into political usage of 
academic radicalization discourses.  
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Findings from the analysis are presented in Table 7.2. The data indicate that most 
government adoptions of radicalization research are focused on identifying theological, 
psychological, or group dynamics amenable to a radicalization process. This is 
particularly evident in the United Kingdom, where both the Prevent strategy and the 
governmental funding apparatus continue to seek out studies detecting indicators of a 
generalized radicalization process. In the United States and Canada, however, much more 
attention is paid to the identification of best practices for the law enforcement, 
intelligence and security communities. This area of radicalization research has received 
the most government funding through Canada’s Kanishka Project and Canadian Network 
for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS)40 and the US National Institute 
of Justice’s Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism Program and Researching Solutions 
to Violent Extremism Network (RESOLVE). Of note is the lack of reference to, or 
funding of, research projects critical of current or former counterradicalization practices.  
None of the projects analyzed in Canada or the US provided critical analyses of 
radicalization and only five projects were funded in the UK. However, a deeper analysis 
of the UK’s governmental response to radicalization illustrates its own aversion to critical 
radicalization scholarship. Of the 46 scholarly citations in the UK’s Prevent strategy, 28 
sought to identify causes or explain pathways toward radicalization and three of them 
focused on best practices for countering radicalization. Notably missing from the UK’s 
Prevent Strategy is any reference to critical analysis of governmental strategies, despite 
                                                
40 It is important to note that the Kanishka Project funded the establishment of TSAS, but the Network has 
since established its own internal fund-granting projects.  
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the inclusion of numerous “community concerns” regarding law enforcement and 
security measures (The Home Office 2011a, 2011b).  
Table 7.2: Funded Government Research Projects and Citations in 
Governmental Counterradicalization Strategies since 2007 
    
 United States United Kingdom Canada 
Cultural-psychological 6 11 3 
Theological 2 8 1 
Theological-psychological 14 71 9 
Policing tools 18 15 12 
Critical studies - 5 - 
UK Sources: CONTEST and Prevent Strategies, research funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council through the "Radicalization Research" (74 projects); Canada Sources: 
funded research projects from the Kanishka Project Contribution Program (37 projects; five 
rounds of funding) and the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and 
Society ([TSAS] four major projects and 18 working papers); US Sources: Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States, all research projects funded as part of the National Institute of Justice's 
"Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism Program" from 2012 to 2016 (25 projects) and the 
Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism Network (RESOLVE) from 2007 to 2017 (19 
publications) 
 
And while counterradicalization strategies continue to call for ‘evidence-based’ 
research as a fundamental requirement for governmental initiatives, the evidentiary 
standards of the research they seek out remains questionable (Neumann and Kleinmann 
2013). In addition, as the data here suggest, governments ignore research critical of status 
quo surveillance, intelligence, and policing strategies in favor of such questionable 
‘indicator’ and ‘evidence-based’ studies attempting to identify the cultural, theological, 
psychological, or even social characteristics of those immersed by the so-called 
radicalization process. The overwhelming focus of governments and funding 
organizations on identifying ‘root causes’ of radicalization and ‘best practices’ of law 
enforcement vis-à-vis counterradicalization thus legitimizes a body of empirically 
questionable research while simultaneously justifying its own counterradicalization 
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interventions. This mutually beneficial relationship between government and academic 
researchers has been explored by numerous scholars (see Galliher 1973; Manski 2013), 
and is here accompanied by the exclusion of an entire emergent body of work that may be 
of use for governments as they aim to create just and equitable security and policing 
measures.  
Outside of the governmental apparatus, academic discourses related to 
radicalization have been adopted by news media to lend legitimacy to stories related to 
terrorism. Mass media has a long history of including interviews and comments from 
scientists and researchers to provide authoritative discourses to media accounts of diverse 
social phenomena, particularly issues related to crime and security (Greek 1995; Barak 
2007). In a similar way, academic knowledge claims have been employed my news 
media to legitimize journalistic accounts of issues related to radicalization. Media most 
often represent academics as ‘expert analysts’ or scholars whom have deeper knowledge 
of the so-called radicalization process. Since media uses scholars and academic research 
to lend authority to its news reporting, it is noteworthy which academic discourses are 
being included in media accounts of radicalization. The final section of this chapter thus 
seeks to explore the uptake of scholarly research related to radicalization by news media. 
Employing the typology developed by Kundnani (2012), and built upon in this Chapter, I 
explore the adoption of various types of academic radicalization discourse in major news 
coverage of radicalization in the UK, US, and Canada.  
Table 7.3: References to Academic Scholarship in News Media  
    
 United States United Kingdom Canada 
Cultural-psychological 56 7 22 
Theological 14 3 32 
Theological-psychological 193 82 56 
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Policing tools 13 12 20 
Critical studies - 6 1 
Data: Newspaper articles from the New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Globe and 
Mail, Toronto Star, National Post, The Guardian, The Independent, The Daily Telegraph from 
1969 to 2016 (n=8072).  
 
 Media most often sought out analysis from scholars working to understand the 
theological and social psychological precursors to radicalization. News articles in the 
United States overwhelmingly focused on the work of a very select few academic 
researchers, not least of which included the work of Marc Sageman (85 references), 
Bruce Hoffman (91 references), and Peter Neumann (208 references). In the United 
Kingdom, news media mostly relied on Peter Neumann’s analysis (72 references), while 
also employing research from Hoffman (15 references), and UK scholars Bartlett, 
Birdwell, and King (8 references), who notably authored research referenced by the 
Prevent strategy. In Canadian news coverage of radicalization, the work of Gartenstein-
Ross and Grossman (20 references), Sageman (22 references), Hoffman (25 references), 
Neumann (20 references) and Canadian scholars Wesley Wark (17 references) and Lorne 
Dawson (10 references) were among the most cited. News media thus referenced the 
work of (mostly) scholars working to explore the theological and psychological 
underpinnings of a generalized radicalization process, with but notable focus on law 
enforcement tools used to counter radicalization.  
 Few critical scholars were relied upon in news media coverage of radicalization. 
Despite publishing newsworthy, attention grabbing titles such as The Muslims are 
Coming!, the work of Arun Kundnani, focused on advancing critical approaches to the 
construct of radicalization, was only referenced five times in news media (four of which 
were related to the release of the book rather than Kundnani’s expertise in radicalization 
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studies). In addition, the release of Christopher Baker-Beall, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, and 
Lee Jarvis’ Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives received only one mention by 
news media; none of the authors were referenced as ‘experts’ in the news articles. 
Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad, meanwhile, was referenced fifteen times. It is important to 
note that the Prevent strategy (UK) did point to one meta-analysis that reflects on some of 
the empirical issues raised in academic studies on radicalization, however the citation 
was not made in reference to such a critique, but rather to the author’s finding that many 
scholars focus individuals’ search for community when involved in radicalization 
processes.41  
 While the adoption of scholarly discourses related to radicalization in news media 
warrants further attention in its own right – as there are many complex reasons for the 
adoption of particular discursive formations over others – the exploratory analysis here 
suggests that mass media, like government, is preoccupied with the pursuit of indicator-
based models of radicalization. By seeking out scholars who advocate for this type of 
radicalization research, media contributes to popular understandings of a particular style 
of radicalization; one rooted in theology and social psychological processes. While there 
is nothing inherently problematic with such a development, it does simultaneously point 
to a blind spot amongst media coverage of academic discourses. By highlighting the 
‘expertise’ of only a portion of scholars whom work on diverse issues within 
                                                
41 The meta-analysis referenced by Prevent (UK) was Dalgaard-Nielsen’s (2010) exploration of “what we 
know and what we do not know” about violent radicalization in Europe (p. 797). In it the author highlights 
several empirical and methodological concerns besetting scholarly research on radicalization, however The 
Home Office (2011a) cited the work to justify its claim that: “some recent academic work suggests that 
radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community. It has been argued in particular 
that some second or third generation Muslims in Europe, facing apparent or real discrimination and socio-
economic disadvantage, can find in terrorism a ‘value system,’ a community and an apparently just cause” 
(p. 17). 
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radicalization research, media lends both legitimacy to the work while also delegitimizing 
other, excluded work.  
These trends are not new in media representations of counterterrorism. As Edward 
Said (1981) noted long ago, media and ‘experts’ influence the ways in which we 
understand the world, global conflicts, and even how the West understands Islamic 
cultures of the East (see Chapter Six). Part of Said’s now classic analysis is that Western 
media evokes discourses from an ‘expert’ class whom offer prepackaged, and sometimes 
false, claims about Islam and Muslim communities in order to influence public ideas 
about Islamic cultures.  
As previously noted by David Garland (1992) and Pasquino (1991), Foucault 
himself saw criminological knowledge claims, particularly modern twentieth-century 
criminology, as instrumental insofar as they cannot be disconnected from relations of 
power that permeate governmental decision-making. The results here provide some 
evidence for these arguments and what others have called the state of “politicized 
scholarship,” where scientific knowledge claims are taken up in rather selective ways to 
justify social policy decisions (Savelsberg, King and Cleveland 2002). While I do not 
here suggest that academic discourses of radicalization are entirely false, I do build on 
well-established critiques of the current state of the discipline based on methodological 
and empirical inadequacies and weaknesses. I therefore maintain that the adoption of 
such scientifically questionable research in media and in governmental discourse alike is 
reflective of some of the trends I have illustrated in politics (Chapter Four), law (Chapter 
Five), and media (Chapter Six). Furthermore, I argue that the cyclical relationships 
between government-counterradicalization research-media reflect a broader 
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preoccupation with problematizing radicalization as a predominantly religious issue, one 
that affects (mostly) Muslim communities. 
 
Conclusion 
Charles Manski (2013) has illustrated how public policy decisions made based on 
incredulous ‘expert’ analysis feigning methodological and scholarly rigor have effected 
issues ranging from security to FDA drug approvals, and how those analyses are often 
based on strong assumptions rather than empirical evidence. The development and 
adoption of expert analyses in the area of radicalization studies seems to have followed a 
similar trajectory. Scholars studying a wide array of issues related to radicalization have 
largely advocated for government to seriously consider theories of theological and 
psychological radicalization processes often based in questionable research methods and 
inadequate empirical sites. Governments, in turn, have rewarded those academic 
discourses with funding and exposure in national counterradicalization strategies. By 
funding and adopting only a certain kind of scholarship, government (and media) send 
messages to the academic system with respect to the types of research that are valued and 
valuable.  
Perhaps most exemplary of this trend is that despite the emergence of numerous 
critical analyses of some counterradicalization practices in the UK, the Home Office’s 
Prevent strategy chose to cite from a for-profit magazine rather than seek out peer-
reviewed, methodologically rigorous scholarship to legitimize its claims regarding the 
structure of ideological violence (The Home Office 2011a: 35). The governments’ refusal 
to adequately screen its sources for scholarly legitimacy based on systematic and 
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historical methodological standards is indeed suggestive of governmental selectivity in 
the academic discourses for which it uses to justify and legitimize counterradicalization 
practices. Governments thus, through its exclusion of emergent bodies of research, 
encourage the advancement and provide legitimacy for certain academic discourses on 
radicalization, while simultaneously delegitimizing others. In this way, academic 
discourses of radicalization can be approached as instrumental for government decision-
making related to counterterrorism. From an academic perspective, this trend is 
problematic for numerous reasons, not least of which relate to the future of radicalization 
research and the relative dearth of critical empirical research receiving financial and 
institutional recognition. From a governance perspective, this trend highlights a 
preoccupation with an indicator- and evidence-based approach to counterradicalization 
that suffers from not only empirical inadequacies, but fails to account for the complexity 
of radicalization as social phenomena. 
As I have demonstrated, academic knowledge claims related radicalization, and 
appropriate counterradicalization strategies therein, continue to advocate for community-
level policing initiatives grounded in ideals of community-engagement and theological 
surveillance, monitoring, and intervention. Governments, meanwhile, continue to adopt 
these scholarly discourses in the formation of innovative counterradicalization policing 
strategies throughout the West. But what are the actual practices being developed in 
different countries for dealing with problems of radicalization? What new community-
level law enforcement initiatives are being deployed in various contexts and 
jurisdictions? How do these policing initiatives configure notions of radicalization and 
the material practices of risk, security, and surveillance upon which they are founded? 
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Following the in-depth analyses of how radicalization is constructed in the political, 
legal, media, and scientific systems, this study now turns to an analysis of actual law 
enforcement practices seeking to counter radicalization. The final chapter of this work 
thus connects the discursive with the physical and the ideal with the material while 
exploring questions to how radicalization discourses influence the myriad of law 
enforcement practices deployed in the name of counterradicalization. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE POLICING OF RADICALIZATION
The body of this study has thus far focused primarily on the construction and 
proliferation of discourses related to counterradicalization in the public sphere. Through 
the analysis of the development and adoption of discourses of radicalization by law, 
politics, media and science, the present work has illustrated how the construct of 
radicalization has been deployed as a symbolic marker of difference between the mostly 
Christian West and Islamic East. Relying on work within the governmentality and 
othering literatures, the preceded chapters sought to investigate the ideal and material 
elements involved in the construction and maintenance of radicalization discourses as a 
frame of both modern preemption governance and as a technique of othering Islamic 
communities.  
The project thus attempts to trace the historical, social, and political diffusion of 
radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere to help understand how we, as 
social beings, conceptualize radicalization and practices of counterradicalization and how 
those conceptualizations reflect the emergence of some material practices of 
counterterrorism. The present chapter seeks to build on this project by investigating the 
interconnectivity between radicalization discourses in society’s dominant social 
institutions and material policing practices which emerge in the construct’s name. This 
discussion is therefore guided by three important research questions:  
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(1) How do official counterradicalization policing initiatives emerge in specific 
Western liberal democracies? 
(2) How do these policing programs develop in similar, or different, ways in terms of 
their logic, rationale of remedy, and concrete practices? 
(3) What structural and institutional conditions are amenable to the emergence of 
official policing programs oriented around countering terrorism through 
preemption? 
This chapter is broken down into three sections. In the first I provide some sociohistorical 
antecedents related to the emergence of official counterradicalization policing programs 
in the US, UK, and Canada and further explore some of the ideal and material practices 
involved in such initiatives. Secondly, through the analysis of the data, I provide evidence 
for the overarching argument of this chapter, that specific structural and institutional 
conditions as well as operational motives make the emergence of counterradicalization 
policing more or less likely, and highlight those conditions. Finally, I focus my attention 
on the rationale of preemptive policing in relation to terrorism to illustrate how it is 
imbued in a discriminatory logic that disproportionately focuses on cultural and ethnic 
minorities. Counterradicalization policing, therefore, cannot be disconnected from such 
discriminatory logics even when it adopts agnostic notions of terrorism, security, and 
radicalization.  
 The following pages seek to build off of the other chapters of this present work by 
grounding the empirical findings in regard to discursive formations of radicalization in 
analyses of material counterradicalization policing initiatives. The discussion presented 
here is intended to highlight the interconnectivity of radicalization discourses with 
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governmental practices of law enforcement. Through demonstrating the connections 
between constructions of radicalization discourse and governance practices, the present 
chapter argues that the very foundation of counterradicalization policing is premised on a 
discriminatory logic that frames Islamic communities as the central foci of danger. 
Therese O’Toole and colleagues (2016) have highlighted how the UKs Prevent strategy, 
and the policing practices associated with it, results the emergence of “risky subjects” 
within Muslim communities. In this dissertation, I advance the less agnostic argument 
that Western cultural, political, legal, and scientific systems have contributed to the 
creation of “Muslim Strangers” – to the configuration of a social category of religious 
difference that creates social distance between Islamic communities and the broader 
population. This figure masks and legitimizes new forms of surveillance, policing, and 
intelligence gathering that spread throughout the social apparatus. One such area is law 
enforcement, where policing strategies have been erected on a logic of Muslim 
radicalization and can therefore not be distinguished as agnostic or equally distributed. 
Prior to engagement with the data and the illustration of evidence which supports these 
claims, I will outline my adoption of a comparative case study approach and illustrate its 
utility with respect to explorations of innovating policing programs.   
To explore representational and material strategies and practices deployed by 
governments to prevent transitions towards political violence, I examine the policing 
initiatives developed in the name of counterradicalization and counterterrorism from each 
of the US, UK, and Canada. The policing programs analyzed in this chapter are as 
follows: Montréal’s Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence 
(CPRLV), Calgary’s ReDirect and Extreme Dialogue programs, London Metropolitan 
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Police Service’s (MPS) Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and Community Engagement 
Team, and the New York City Policy Department’s (NYPD) Community Affairs Bureau 
(CAB) and Demographics Unit. My rationale for comparing these cases is threefold. 
First, all programs are under the purview of, or involve, local law enforcement agencies 
and therefore connect governmental logics of counterradicalization with material 
practices of governance. Second, they each represent a relatively new and emergent form 
of policing aimed to some degree at countering trajectories towards terrorism through 
preemption. Lastly, all programs here analyzed focus on community engagement and 
information sharing between police and local communities. The purpose of comparing 
law enforcement strategies is therefore to highlight the (in)consistencies between 
jurisdictions in relation to the policing of radicalization.  
 
Historical Development of Counterradicalization Initiatives 
 United Kingdom 
The UK is most often said to be a global leader in counterradicalization strategies and 
initiatives (Monaghan and Molnar 2016; Rascoff 2012). Indeed, many of the current 
developments in countering radicalization in the West seem to be at least in part 
influenced by British approaches, not least of which is highlighted by Canada’s adoption 
of the same name for its counterradicalization strategy (i.e., Prevent). The rearticulation 
of counterterrorism practices around notions of preemption in the UK can officially be 
traced back to the country’s development of the overarching counterterrorism strategy 
178 
called Contest in early 2003.42 Contest represented one of the first holistic governmental 
initiative for countering terrorism following the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Its 
stated goal is to provide disparate governmental agencies with an organized strategy to 
counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom. Its practices include aggressive law 
enforcement and prosecution campaigns, preventative monitoring and arrest, protecting 
critical infrastructure, and organizing response strategies in case of terrorist attacks.  
The UK’s Prevent leg of its overarching counterterrorism strategy Contest is the 
country’s guiding framework in all matters of counterradicalization. It brings together 
disparate agencies, governmental offices, and private sector stakeholders under one 
umbrella to officially: (1) challenge the ideology that supports terrorism and those who 
promote it; (2) protect citizens and other vulnerable people; and (3) support sectors and 
institutions where there are risks of radicalization. To meet these objectives, Prevent 
outlines numerous strategies for schools and universities, internet service providers, 
healthcare providers, private sector stakeholders, religious organization, and the criminal 
justice system, to assist in the counter radicalization process.  
Contest offered a dramatic new approach to counterterrorism based 
predominantly in combatting the risk of future terrorism rather than traditional reactive 
approaches founded in military and law. The UK’s reconfiguration of its counterterrorism 
strategy around such notions of risk provided a governmental framework for the 
emergence of new law enforcement initiatives structured by a similar guiding logic. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, then, that London’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has 
                                                
42 For a discussion of the historical antecedents of Contest see Chapter Four of the present work.  
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developed some of the most innovative policing strategies aimed at countering 
radicalization.   
In 2002, London’s MPS’s Anti-Terrorism Branch, which had been dealing with 
issues of terrorism since the 1970s campaigns against the IRA, established a pilot unit to 
work closely with Muslim communities to identify, intervene, and disrupt ‘jihadi’ 
extremists from recruiting in Mosques in the Finsbury Park and Brixton areas of London 
(Lambert 2011). This unit, called the Muslim Contact Unit, was set up by former 
undercover officer and head of the MPS Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) – a Special 
Branch Unit used famously in the 1960s to infiltrate the New Left through undercover 
police work – Bob Lambert to focus on building trust with Muslim communities. The 
founder of the MCU has written extensively on its creation, highlighting that a key remit 
of the MCU was to open lines of communication and information sharing between the 
law enforcement and Muslim communities in London (Lambert 2011).  
In the aftermath of 9/11, Lambert immediately began discussing how to prevent 
similar attacks in the UK with other members of the Special Branch. Together with other 
members of the Special Branch, Lambert established the MCU in January of 2002 as a 
small unit within the MPS Special Branch. The MCU’s model was germane to the 
Special Branch’s ‘E Squad,’ which focused on foreign international terrorist threats and 
for which Lambert was a member, which attempted to counter threats of terrorism in 
Britain throughout the 1980s through practices of engagement with Sikh’s in Southall. In 
his reflections on the MCU, Bob Lambert (2011) stated that the Unit’s primary mission 
was “establishing partnerships with Muslim community leaders both equipped and 
located to help tackle the spread of al-Qaida propaganda in London” (p. 35). Contrary to 
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prevailing counter-terrorism policing of the early 2000s, the MCU’s mandate called for 
engagement with all Muslim community leaders, not just “moderate” leaders aligned with 
governmental directives.  
As the Labour administration of the late 2000s developed and implemented the 
Prevent strategy to deal with threats of radicalization, the Special Branch was merged 
with the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the MPS in October of 2008. Meanwhile, with the 
establishment of Prevent came a cut to funding and resources available to the MCU, 
whose activities were being undercut by Prevent’s Communities Together Strategic 
Engagement Team (CTSET) and Prevent’s own officers (Quick 2009). The operational 
space for the MCU was thus reduced with the advent of Prevent, which aimed to foster a 
broader strategy of community engagement not explicitly focused on Muslim 
communities. Under a conservative-led coalition government, the Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) took over many of the autonomous activities of the MCU and 
reinforced a version of Prevent (revised in 2011) that streamlined and organized 
community policing initiatives under its banner and the MCU became nonoperational 
sometime after 2011.    
Prevent has established what it calls Prevent Engagement Officers within local 
police forces that work to “develop community connections, understand communities, 
identify risks and share information with partners to support prevent objectives” (The 
Home Office 2011a). This structure of nationally coordinated policing initiatives has 
replaced the locally-autonomous MCU structure and aligns with the coordinated, 
centralized, and layered approach to governing terrorism through preemption highlighted 
in Prevent. The emergence of this policing system is thus also reflective of a 
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rearticulation of policing around less explicit notions of vulnerable communities. As 
highlighted in Figure 8.1, the 2011 revision of Prevent distributes more 99% of its 
policing funding to policing initiatives which make no explicit mention of Islam.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Percentage Distribution of Funding for Prevent Policing Initiatives43 
 
 
United States 
As noted in previous chapters, the United States does not currently have, nor has 
it attempted to create, a unified governmental counterradicalization framework. However, 
that is not to suggest that counterterrorism in the US has not been significant rearticulated 
                                                
43 Source: The UK Home Office’s 2011 Prevent Strategy available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-
review.pdf. 
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around notions of preemption over the past decade. Reforms made to governmental 
structure, particularly in the areas of intelligence and law enforcement, following 9/11 
have made the prevention of terrorist attacks a central concern. Part of the justification 
for the 2003 reorganization of security agencies and the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) was to increase attention paid on the prevention and disruption 
of terrorist attacks against the US before they occur.  
In the United States, two key intelligence projects provided much of the impetus 
for the reorientation of local policing terrorism around notions of preemption. In 2006, 
the FBI’s The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad44 and the 2007 NYPD 
report Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. These ‘research’ projects 
advocated for and informed the development of an intelligence gathering-led approach to 
policing that would seek out patterns of so-called radicalization that might lead to violent 
terrorism. The FBI report identified a fourfold generalized typology of ‘stages of 
radicalization’ that could form the basis of policing initiatives in a variety of contexts. 
These stages included “preradicalization,” “identification,” “indoctrination” and “action” 
and therefore offered a generalized and predictable process by which Muslims move 
towards terrorism. While the merits of this type of work are investigated in the previous 
Chapter, it is important to note that this project – an immense 12 pages with five citations 
and no apparent methodology – helped aligned law enforcement practices across the 
United States around notions of preemption and intervention in such generalized 
processes (Akbar 2013; Huq 2010).  
                                                
44 Although this report was not originally made public, the document was leaked and subsequently 
declassified by the FBI in 2010.  
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Another pivotal moment for the reconfiguration of counterterrorism practices was 
the 2007 release of the NYPD Intelligence Division’s near 100-page report, 
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. Similar to the FBI report, Silber and 
Bhatt (2007) theorize a processual trajectory whereby Muslims move from conventional 
religious beliefs to terrorist violence. This report adapted the FBI’s fourfold model to 
suggest that Muslims move through processes of “pre-radicalization,” “self-
identification,” “indoctrination” and “jihadization” (Silber and Bhatt 2007). Even more, 
the authors highlight that each stage has “specific signatures associated with it” thus 
highlighting the presence of risk markers for radicalization (Silber and Bhatt 2007: 19). 
These reports helped engrain in political discourse an approach to radicalization as not 
only a predictable process, but also one that is predominantly associated with Islamic 
communities. For example, as Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 
Peter King cited the FBI’s report in his comments made during a series of hearings on 
‘Islamic radicalization’ in 2012. Furthermore, during the same hearings, Mitchell Silber, 
one of the authors of the NYPD report was called as an expert witness to testify about the 
presence of an identifiable and comprehensive radicalization process coming from 
Muslim communities.  
In the case of the NYPD, the rearticulation of its counterterrorism strategy has 
resulted in three groups overseeing new initiatives: The Counterterrorism Division, the 
Intelligence Division, and the Community Affairs Bureau (CAB). The first two handle 
traditional policing and intelligence policing programs to identify and intervene upon 
threats of terrorism. The third, the CAB, handles community outreach initiatives which 
are most similar to other counterradicalization policing programs investigated here, yet 
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does not explicitly label itself as such. Since this chapter focuses on the emergence and 
genesis of counterradicalization policing programs, I will focus primarily on the CAB.45  
 Canada 
Similar to the UK and unlike the US, Canada does have an official counterradicalization 
strategy. Through the establishment of a framework that uses UK’s Prevent as its 
namesake, Canada is often viewed as a ‘norm-taker’ with respect to post-2001 
counterterrorism policy and legislative frameworks, particularly with respect to the 
country’s counterradicalization strategy (Monaghan 2015). While Canada’s national 
counterradicalization program adopts the same name as its UK counterpart, the 
development of the country’s initiatives aimed at countering transitions towards terrorism 
have a complex history of their own. As Kent Roach (2011) demonstrates, Canadian 
responses to terrorism are much more complex than theorizations of input-output models 
of policy transfer. In this context, Canada has also had its own distinct experiences with 
terrorism which cannot be approached as a mirror of the history of political violence in 
the UK or US. While, as Chapter Four of the present work illustrates, Canada has, for the 
most part, experienced relatively few incidents of terrorism since the 1970s, there are 
definite differences between political violence in Canada and other countries.  
As Leman-Langlois and Brodeur (2005) illustrate, Canada experienced a period 
of extreme political violence in the 1960s and 1970s, where numerous high-profile 
incidents occurred mainly in the province of Québec. A separatist group that called itself 
                                                
45 It is noted that the CAB is not explicitly focused on counterradicalization as its modus operandi, 
however, for the purposes of comparison, the Bureau is relatively similar in terms of objectives, scope, and 
practices. I therefore argue that it is germane to policing initiatives in other counties which focus on 
community engagement and cooperation to combat terrorism.  
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the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) engaged in demand-based terrorism to achieve 
a dyadic goal of Québec independence from Canada and the emancipation of the working 
class. Following the abduction of the vice-premier of Québec, Pierre Laporte, during the 
1970 ‘October Crisis,’ the Canadian government employed measures rarely ever used in 
the West – the country evoked the War Measures Act, which is a form of emergency 
power that suspends habeas corpus and provides sweeping powers of arrest and detention 
to law enforcement. To deal with problems of political violence, then, Canada has 
historically relied upon more traditional strategies of interference, target-hardening, 
infiltration, and arrest (Leman-Langlois and Brodeur 2005). Experiences of 
counterterrorism in Canada, like the US and UK, have thus been significantly 
reconfigured around new response strategies based on surveillance, insecurity, and 
actionable futures.  
In the years following 9/11, the Canadian government developed an approach to 
counterterrorism that shifted from the national space to the global. This move from 
counterterrorism as national issue to international concern was reflected in both 
governmental communications about countering terrorism as well as international 
cooperation on matters of public policy. For instance, in the latter years of the decade, 
Canadian politicians overwhelmingly adopted the notion of a ‘global fight against 
terrorism,’ whilst establishing international cooperation networks and adopting similar 
policies to combat terrorism (i.e., omnibus antiterrorism legislation passed immediately 
following the September 11th attacks). One of the most well documents instances of the 
adoption and implementation of germane counterterrorism policy is the establishment of 
a national counterradicalization framework. In 2012, following the release of the Air 
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India Flight 182 commission report and at least influenced by a 2006 foiled terrorist plot 
against a variety of targets in Southwestern Ontario (known as “Toronto 18”), then 
Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews, released the Government’s strategic plan entitled 
Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy. The 
Strategy, in some ways explicitly similar and in other ways clearly influenced by the 
UK’s Contest framework, outlined the Canadian response to building a “resilient 
society.” As Toews (2012) himself suggests: “in a resilient society, everyone – including 
governments, first responders, critical infrastructure operators, communities and 
individuals – knows what they need to do when faced with a terrorist attack, ensuring a 
rapid return to ordinary life.”  
In an almost identical approach as the UK’s Contest framework, the Canadian 
strategy adopts a fourfold strategy to build resilient communities, including: Detect, 
Deny, Prevent, and Respond. As one part of the fourfold Strategy, the Government 
introduced the Prevent framework aimed at preventing the uptake, adoption, and 
proliferation of ‘terrorist ideologies’ among vulnerable individuals and groups. As an 
explicit counterradicalization framework, Prevent seeks to work with local, national, and 
international partners to counter violent extremism and provide alternative narratives to 
individuals and groups whom may be transitioning towards violent activities. In this way, 
and similar to Prevent in the UK, Canada’s version overtly seeks to engage local 
communities as stakeholders in countering radicalization in their communities and 
highlights the need for local officials to engage with community members. However, as I 
will discuss in the next section of this Chapter, the practices of Canada’s variety of 
Prevent are very different than those in the United Kingdom.  
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The Canadian trajectory of establishing legal frameworks aimed at diffusing 
techniques of preemption throughout the public apparatus seems to, at present, be 
following the UK. However, these developments have seemingly progressed mostly at 
the provincial and municipal, rather than national, levels. Federal legislation mandating 
public organizations to engage in counterradicalization practices have for the most part 
proven difficult to establish in country. As such, the country has been less successful in 
downloading responsibility for monitoring and intervening in suspicious activities related 
to terrorism. I will return to this in the following section of this Chapter.  
Canada’s Prevent provided impetus for the establishment of official policing 
programs aimed at countering radicalization and transitions towards violent extremism. 
Two such programs have been developed in very different geographic locations within 
the country: the Calgary Police Service’s Redirect program and the City of Montréal’s 
Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV). In September 
2015, Inspector Mike Bosley of Calgary Police Service (CPS) unveiled a new police-led 
program aimed at preventing youth from becoming involved in what they refer to as 
“criminal radicalization.” When the program was first launched, Bosley explicitly 
highlighted both the fact that Prevent (CAN) provided CPS with the necessary 
foundations for establishing ReDirect and noted its influence from “international best 
practice” (CBC 2015). In Québec, the CPRLV was created in March 2015 by the City of 
Montréal in cooperation with the Québec Government. It represents the first independent 
non-profit organization in North America aimed explicitly at countering radicalization. It 
is quite different from ReDirect insofar as it is not primarily a law enforcement initiative, 
but rather an autonomous entity aimed at policing radicalization.  
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With the variety of institutional structures thus evident in law enforcement 
counterradicalization strategies across the West, it is important to reflect upon how they 
are arranged in terms of their material and ideal practices and techniques as well as their 
logics and guiding rationales. The following section thus outlines some of the key 
strategies and techniques adopted in each counterradicalization policing initiative 
outlined above. Here I pay particularly close attention to the connections, consistencies 
and inconsistencies between the techniques and the guiding logics of such techniques in 
order to explore some of the material and ideal practices that encompass 
counterradicalization policing. To conclude, I then connect these policing techniques and 
logics to a broad analysis of counterradicalization as a coherent policing framework that 
embodies a discriminatory approach to social inclusion.  
 
Embedding Preempting in Everyday Life: Practices of Counterradicalization Policing 
While policing strategies of counterradicalization in London may not be the most 
nuanced of the cases analyzed in terms of practices and guiding logics, the overarching 
Prevent strategy is by far the most developed, coordinated, and embedded in the United 
Kingdom.46 As of July 2015, for example, all schools in the United Kingdom have a 
legislated duty to cooperate with Prevent to assist in safeguarding institutions from 
radicalization and extremism. The adoption of Prevent within British schools largely 
stemmed from UK’s Department for Education (DfE) published guidance on promoting 
                                                
46 While I suggest that policing radicalization in London is less nuanced than similar projects in Calgary 
and Montréal, I do not suggest that London’s strategies are not complex and robust. The argument I 
advance here is that counterradicalization policing programs specific to London have been mostly 
disbanded and the City’s practices are now embedded in a more national, networked approach to 
countering radicalization.  
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‘British values’ in schools to “ensure young people leave school prepared for life in 
modern Britain” (Department for Education 2014).47 In addition, as of February 2015, all 
staff working in UK’s National Health Service (NHS) are now required to complete 
Prevent framework training and align with the objectives of the Prevent strategy. The 
UKs broad responsibilization of counterterrorism practices across social institutions 
remains quite innovative today, and highlights the widening of counterradicalization 
practices across agencies and private interests. 
 Unveiled in 2007, as a response to the 2005 London bombings, the Prevent 
strategy represents an approach to community engagement based on ‘capacity-building’ 
which focuses particularly on counterradicalization projects which intervene on local 
theologically- and youth-based communities. The strategy reflects a move away from 
traditional policing strategies such as the use of crime mapping, confidential informants, 
and secretive police infiltrators (see Figure 8.1). The analysis here suggests that although 
these techniques remain in use by UK government officials, they are not primary aspects 
of the UK’s shift towards preemption. The Strategy focuses much more on community-
building practices; practices which may have traces of ‘traditional’ policing techniques, 
but are not foundational characteristics of the country’s counterradicalization program. 
For instance, police agencies have long utilized crime mapping as a means of deducing 
geographical areas ‘at-risk’ of increased crime and deviance. The analysis of the UK’s 
Prevent, focusing particularly on policing in London, indicates that while the mapping of 
                                                
47 See Chapter Six for a discussion of the use of ‘othering frames’ such as the aforementioned ‘British 
values.’ 
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risky geographic or institutional locations is conducted, it is not a primary logic of 
London’s counterradicalization program.  
 The use of ‘agent provocateurs’ – or government authorities, typically police or 
intelligence agents, who infiltrate at-risk groups with the goal of provoking criminal 
activities – is evident in some of London’s counterradicalization projects, not least of 
which are outlined in Lambert’s (2011) account of MCU officer conduct. In the early 
years of the MCU, the unit deployed officers who might be considered ‘agent 
provocateurs’ in order to incite criminal behavior amongst Islamic communities for 
which they could predict and prepare. Notwithstanding these practices, the disbanding of 
the MCU highlighted the MPS’s aversion to utilizing such techniques in modern 
counterradicalization policing. Under Prevent, the MPS now utilizes more novel policing 
techniques with the rationale of building communities of trust and communication rather 
than focusing on infiltration, arrest and prosecution.  
 Prevent has led to shifts in policing techniques associated with 
counterradicalization around notions of police-led interventions which focus on building 
linkages between government authorities and at-risk communities. This reconfiguration 
has resulted in the use of inter-agency cooperation schemas which emphasize the need for 
community-building through the targeted deployment of education initiatives aimed at 
providing counter narratives and support to individuals identified as at risk of 
radicalization. In London, these programs are most often police-led but involve inter-
agency cooperation in the form of providing support for those subjected to such 
programs. Those involved in providing support include teachers and school 
administrators (as mentioned above), university employees, health professionals, and 
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local community organizations and religious leaders. Prevent has also led to the 
proliferation of an aggressive public service announcement (PSA) campaign to embed 
notions of insecurity into the populous. These PSAs are now pervasive in London’s 
transit stations, known as the ‘Tube,’ Underground, or simply London Transit, and 
responsibilize the citizenry with reporting suspicious activities. PSAs often include 
explicit references to counterterrorism as a main goal of such responsibilizing techniques 
(see Figure 8.2). Advertising for “counterterrorism hotlines” or simply advising 
individuals to report suspicious activities can be found in trains and buses and heard 
repeatedly over the public speaker system in major train stations and even on individual 
buses. PSAs are also present at locations where large numbers of people often 
congregate, including football stadiums, tourist attraction, and university campuses.  
 The goal of these techniques often reflects law enforcement strategies of 
embedding notions of preemption and security into citizens’ everyday lives. The logic of 
embedding preemption therefore serves a twofold purpose: (1) embedding preemption 
makes the population aware of the omnipresent threat of terrorism and downloading 
responsibility for reporting possible threats, law enforcement officials are able to engage 
communities as stakeholders in the preemption process; and (2) to borrow from Foucault 
(2010), inserting these notions of preemption across the social apparatus – in schools and 
universities, on television and radio, and in public places – constructs a population that is 
capable of the self-governance of, in this case, terrorism. Through the responsibilization 
of the population vis-à-vis counterterrorism, Prevent ensures increased efficiency with 
respect to the policing of radicalization by constructing practices of observation, 
surveillance, and information sharing within and among the populous (Foucault 2010). 
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The citizenry therefore becomes agents of counterradicalization and notions of 
preemption diffuse to areas of the population which had not previously held 
responsibility over counterterrorism (i.e., teachers, professors, medical professionals, lay 
citizens, etc.).  
 
 
Figure 8.2: National Police Chiefs’ Council Anti-Terrorist Hotline PSA 
 
In Canada, counterradicalization policing strategies are seemingly the most 
nuanced and perhaps even innovative, yet not widely adopted. Contrary to much of the 
scholarly literature in this area, the analysis here suggests that local counterradicalization 
policing structures are certainly more intricate than the United States’ and likely more 
than the United Kingdom’s. While Canada’s version of Prevent is heavily indebted to the 
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UK, both case studies examined here highlight that local level counterradicalization 
policing programs are much more nuanced than those carried out in London or New 
York. Both Calgary Police Service’s and Montréal’s Centre for the Prevention of 
Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) offer complex inter-agency and multi-
interest group networks for the prevention of so-called radicalization processes. This is 
perhaps highlighted by the CPRLV’s own assertion that there exists a “Québec model” of 
counterradicalization that has received international recognition and is now the basis of 
several memoranda of agreement with European nations for practice-sharing (CPRLV 
2016).  
In Calgary, the entire purpose of ReDirect is to provide micro-level interventions 
that are delivered in partnership between the City of Calgary Community & 
Neighbourhood Services, the CPS, private sector organizations,48 certain schools and 
education representatives, and other public-sector entities. As a referral based program, 
ReDirect works to firstly identify and assess young people who are ‘vulnerable to being 
radicalized’ and secondly provide support and prevention strategies to work with those 
individuals before engaging in violent activities. When ReDirect receives a referral, the 
following process is engaged:  
(1)  The ReDirect Coordinator reviews the referral to decide if the program is 
needed based on the individuals’ engagement with a radical ideology, intent 
and ability to cause harm. If the individual in question is judged to be at risk 
                                                
48 Through the Safe Communities Opportunity and Resource Center (SOURCe), ReDirect enlists the help 
various public and private organizations to assist in countering violent extremism, including: the United 
Way, Alpha House, The Alex, Neighbourhood Link, Office of the Chief Crown Prosecutor, Chief 
Probation Officer Calgary, Alberta Health Services, and the Calgary Homeless Foundation.  
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of committing criminal behavior not related to radicalization, the coordinator 
may deflect the referral to another youth program.  
(2)  If the individual is deemed a fit for ReDirect by the Coordinator, the case is 
reviewed by the Case Planning Team (CPT). The CPT is made up of a 
number of representatives from all stakeholders listed above.  
(3)  If the CPT decides the individual should be accepted into the program, they 
develop an individualized support plan which may include referrals to other 
programs, support from police officers and social workers, and meetings with 
the CPT and the individual to work through an individualized support plan.  
(4)  The individuals’ progress through ReDirect is measured through periodic and 
regular evaluations by the CPT. Once the CPT is confident that the individual 
is no longer ‘vulnerable to radicalization’ the person has completed the 
program.  
(5)  Following completion of the program, the CPT follows up with individuals 
regularly to determine if the person requires further support.  
ReDirect is thus based on a several notable assumptions. The first is that 
individuals will accept and be willing to participate in the program. Since it is referral 
based, and not court-mandated, individuals are not obligated to participate in the 
program. Second, since ReDirect is premised on community referrals, it assumes that 
community members have the ability and desire to report others to ReDirect (which is 
explicitly led by law enforcement). Thirdly, the program assumes that its ‘individualized’ 
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support programs help prevent, rather than potentially cause or precede further 
radicalization.49  
Calgary is also the home of an education-based program called Extreme Dialogue 
which aims to “build resilience to radicalization among young people” through new 
media, such as art and short films, which foster critical thinking and digital literacy. Co-
Funded by Public Safety Canada’s Kanishka Project (see Chapter Seven) and the 
Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme of the European Union, the program 
brings together public and private sector entities, such as the Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, film-makers, and the charity Tim Parry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace. 
While the program is not embedded in educational institutions, its aim is to provide 
information and disseminate knowledge about tactics of radicalization and critical 
exploration of potentially harmful activities and beliefs. Extreme Dialogue aims to offer 
counter narratives to extremist ideologies through short films, art displays, testimonials 
and other forms of new media.  
Québec’s CPRLV is another innovative counterradicalization initiative developed 
in partnership between the City of Montréal, the Québec Government, and numerous 
community organizations. The structure of the CPRLV includes three teams: (1) research 
team, responsible for analysis and publication of research projects; (2) prevention and 
skills development team, focusing on prevention, public awareness, and training; and (3) 
psychosocial intervention team, which focuses on intervention, counseling, and providing 
psychological support. These specialized teams work together to provide an all-
                                                
49 This is an important assumption which has been challenged elsewhere, most notably by O’Toole et al. 
(2016) and Mythen, Walklate and Khan (2013). 
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encompassing cross-sectoral approach to develop and implement strategies for dealing 
with radicalization, as well as “hate crimes and incidents” (CPRLV 2017). The Centre is 
guided by a Board of Directors consisting of former and current academics, social 
workers, school board and education officials, lawyers, mental health professionals, and 
government officials.  
The aim of the CPRLV includes the development of a strategy that “favours 
prevention over repression, psychosocial counselling over prosecution and social 
ostracization” (CPRLV 2017). Noting that the Centre “rejects stigmatization of all kings, 
and seeks to prevent all forms of radicalization,” the CPRLV, like ReDirect, adopts an 
explicitly agnostic approach to developing strategies for countering radicalization. The 
CPRLV is also operationally autonomous from government authorities, even though it 
was created in partnership with government institutions. The Centre is thus not a 
policing- or law enforcement-based program, but a community-level organization which 
engages in some policing techniques. This strategic and operational structure allows the 
CPRLV remain autonomous from law enforcement and governmental mandates while 
employing researches from governmental agencies. For example, the CPRLV operates an 
anti-radicalization hotline similar to Calgary’s ReDirect program, called “Info-Radical,” 
that mobilizes law enforcement officials in extreme cases, but operates primarily as a 
helpline for families rather than a tip-line for police.   
The Centre has established partnerships with numerous local or provincial, 
national, and international organizations and governmental agencies.50 Partnership 
                                                
50 Agencies include: City of Montréal, Dalhousie University, Ordre des travailleurs sociaux et des 
thérapeutes conjugaux et familiaux du Québec, Dawson College, Fédération des Cégeps, Concordia 
University, Ordre des Psychologues du Québec, Forum Juenesse de L’Ile de Montréal, Collège de 
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agreements include funding arrangements, training programs, information sharing, and 
CPRLV-led workshop for organization employees. The Centre offers practical training in 
psychosocial intervention, education, criminal justice, and public safety, to stakeholder 
employees, government officials, and other stakeholders. Developed for “front-line 
workers and administrators,” training courses developed and led by CPRLV employees 
offer those in attendance with strategies for countering radicalization that takes place in 
prisons, local communities, public and private organizations, and education institutions.  
One of the innovative features of the CPRLV is that it provides psychosocial 
training for individuals tasked with identifying and intervening in processes of 
radicalization (i.e., police officers, teachers, public sector employees). Finally, the Centre 
also provides training for negotiating provincial statues related to workforce and labor 
standards, including Québec’s Act Respecting Labour Standards. As highlighted above, 
and unlike the UK, Canada has yet to fully develop legal frameworks which force public 
and private workplaces to monitor and intervene in suspected cases of radicalization. 
While provincial statues do provide some mechanisms for the reporting of such activities, 
federal lawmakers have been mostly unsuccessful in developing legal frameworks that 
force employers to monitor and report potential cases of radicalization to governmental 
authorities. Unlike ReDirect, then, CPRLV is much more of a research- and training-led 
                                                
Maisonneuve, Èseau des Carrefours Juenesse-Emploi du Québec, Les Offices Juenesse Internationaux du 
Québec, and Soutien Aux Familles D’Origine Marocaine. Canadian Society of Evidence Based Policing, 
Strong Cities, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, Be Brussels, S.A.V. E Belgium, Sauvengarde de Seine-Saint-Denis, Capri, French Ministère 
de L’Intérieur, Parents for Peace, and Hedayah.  
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initiative which fosters collaboration and information sharing between numerous 
stakeholders – only one of which is law enforcement.  
While ReDirect and CPRLV may be nuanced in terms of practical arrangement at 
the community level, such programs represent very localized examples of 
counterradicalization policing initiatives. The UK’s Prevent strategy has embedded 
techniques of policing radicalization into everyday life much more successfully than in 
Canada. Practices of counterradicalization policing might be deployed in specific 
geographic contexts in Canada, but the UK has developed a much more networked 
approach in its version of Prevent which unites stakeholders in a number of social 
institutions at the national level. In Canada, very similar policing arrangements are 
evident, but they are only deployed in very specific geographic locations with very little 
national, or even provincial, coordination.  
Canada’s policing radicalization strategy is thus much more focused on referral-
based initiatives which direct individuals and groups judged to be at-risk of radicalization 
into intervention programs aimed at providing institutional and social psychological 
support (See Table 8.1). While the precise techniques are different in each context, the 
overarching logic of governance is similar between ReDirect and CPRLV – focus on 
preempting radicalization by providing socio-psychological support to individuals judged 
to be at risk of radicalization. Both programs also adopt an explicitly agnostic approach 
to threats of radicalization. While the UK has somewhat moved away from focusing on 
specific populations in its own counterradicalization strategy, Canada has adopted a much 
more neutral attitude towards the construction of the subject of radicalization processes. 
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This trend is highlighted by the County’s refusal to develop law enforcement strategies 
explicitly focusing on certain communities by name.   
Federal counterterrorism efforts in the United States are designed to work 
together with local authorities to provide a layered approach of information collection, 
sharing, and intervention to counter potential threats. Again, dissimilar to the UK and 
Canada, the US counterterrorism strategy aggressively utilizes traditionally “hard” 
counterterrorism measures such as the use of electronic surveillance of suspects and the 
insistent use of confidential informants to penetrate terrorist networks. 
In New York, counterterrorism operations are layered with four distinct, yet 
interconnected, operational objectives: (1) support the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF); (2) provide real time surveillance in lower Manhattan through the Lower 
Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI); prepare for terrorist attack through training with 
the Counterterrorism Division; and identify and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur 
through the Intelligence Division, which has developed a network of officers, informants, 
and surveillance mechanisms within the city.  The LMSI focuses primarily on security 
issues and safeguarding communities through the installation of security cameras and 
other forms of surveillance. The Counterterrorism deploys mostly “hard” 
counterterrorism practices of intelligence, investigations, and arrest, while the 
Intelligence Division’s mandate focuses on intelligence collection and dissemination to 
other Divisions within the Department. However, since the mid-2000s, the Department 
has increased focus on community relations and engagement through a Bureau known as 
the Community Affairs Bureau (CAB). While not explicitly focusing on 
counterradicalization, the Bureau is the NYPD’s unit aimed primarily at preventing crime 
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through community policing and development. As such, the CAB’s mandate includes the 
prevention of all forms of crime, including terrorism.  
The NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau developed out of the former community 
relations division and Community Affairs Division. In 1966, the NYPD incorporated a 
community relations division to oversee relations between the community and law 
enforcement. In 1971, the division was expanded under the Deputy Commissioner and 
renamed the Community Affairs Division. Finally, in February of 2006, the Community 
Affairs Division was restructured and named the Community Affairs Bureau. Within the 
CAB, the NYPD has established a number of programs, not least of which include the 
Immigrant Outreach Unit and the Clergy Liaison Program. They thus present forms of 
community-oriented policing which aim to foster communication, tolerance, and 
understanding amongst police and diverse communities. In fact, the CAB hosts periodic 
meetings with clergy, community organizations, and law enforcement with the explicit 
goal of fostering information and promoting stronger relationships in mind (NYPD 
2017).  
As part of the NYPD’s counterterrorism strategy, the department has developed 
the New Immigrant Outreach Unit (NIOU), Clergy Liaison Program, and the Community 
Partnership Policing Program, all of which focus in some way on fostering lines of 
communication between officers and local communities. None of these programs are 
explicitly aimed at countering radicalization, however they are the Department’s only 
programs primarily focusing on preempting crime through some sort of community 
intervention. As part of these programs, NYPD officials visit schools, businesses, and 
community-based organizations to raise awareness of community programs offered by 
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the CAB. Such programs include the establishment of NYPD United, a community 
cricket and soccer league organized by the Department, a civilian observer ride along 
program, terrorism awareness training, civilian observation patrol program, and citizen 
policy academy.  
The NIOU focuses explicitly on new immigrants within African/Caribbean, 
Muslim, Asian, Eastern European, and Hispanic communities to maintain and strengthen 
relationships with community leaders and organizations within immigrant communities 
(Kelly and Banks III 2007). The Clergy Liaison Program formalizes relationships 
between the clergy, their congregations, and law enforcement to address “mutual 
concerns” (Kelly and Banks III 2017). Clergy Liaisons are nominated by Commanding 
Officers based on their work with faith-based organizations to receive specialized 
training related to hate crimes, domestic violence, drug abuse prevention, gang 
awareness, and counterterrorism. As of 2013, the department had approximately 300 
liaisons enrolled in the program. Both the NIOU and the Clergy Liaison Program are 
explicitly agnostic in terms of the subject of possible law enforcement intervention, 
advocating for an approach that does not single out specific religious groups.  
While the current community engagement schema in the NYPD adopts a mostly 
agnostic approach, past strategies have focuses primarily on Islamic communities. In 
2011 and 2012, a series of exposés were published by Matt Apuzzo and Joseph Goldstein 
documenting the development of a specialized unit within the NYPD that focused 
primarily on Muslim communities in the name of preventing terrorism. Following the 
publication of the article, the NYPD announced that it would disband the unit known as 
the Demographics Unit. According to the American Civil Liberties Association (ACLU), 
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the unit had been in operation since at least 2002 (ACLU 2017). Comprised of a handful 
of NYPD officers, the DU focused on 28 “ancestries of interest” and detectives were 
advised to gather information related to how members of Islamic communities perceive 
America and foreign Policy (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012a)  
The Unit, part of the NYPD Intelligence Division, operated in practice as a 
surveillance mechanism that singled out Islamic communities and those who appeared to 
be practicing Muslims (Neuman 2014; Sledge 2014). The Unit mapped Muslim 
communities both inside and outside of the city, tracking where individuals frequent and 
send clandestine officers into those locations to document conversations and gather 
information (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012a). The DU also captured photo and video 
surveillance of individuals leaving and entering places of worship, recorded the license 
plate numbers of worshippers attending services, and tracked the movement of those 
individuals (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012a). In addition, the DU made use of police 
informants and even reportedly deployed agent provocateurs – known as ‘rakers’ – to act 
as inside observers in mosques and “bait” conversations about jihad or terrorism 
(Goldman and Apuzzo 2012c).  
Relying on more traditional techniques of informants, surveillance, infiltration, 
and detention and arrest of suspects, the DU is a case study of the NYPD’s commitment 
to “hard” tactics of counterterrorism outlined in the approach adopted by the US 
government as a whole (see Table 8.1). Yet, despite this commitment, the DU was highly 
unsuccessful in terms of producing traditionally acceptable measures of law enforcement 
quality. As NYPD Assistant Chief Thomas Galati stated, the Demographics Unit did not 
result in a single investigation resulting in terrorism-related arrests, stating that the unit 
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“has not commenced an investigation” (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012b). The relative 
failure of the DU to produce leads for law enforcement investigations, coupled with 
public and legal criticisms related to potential constitutional violations, the DU was 
disbanded in April of 2014 by Commissioner William Bratton.   
Table 8.1: Primacy of Counterradicalization Policing Techniques and Logics 
    
 United States United Kingdom Canada 
Techniques    
Mapping X O - 
Volunteer Interview X O O 
Internet Monitoring X X O 
Informants X O - 
Community Engagement O X X 
Preemptive Arrest X O O 
Criminal Prosecutions X O O 
At-Risk Programs - X X 
Agent Provocateurs X O - 
Education Programs - X X 
Health Initiatives - X O 
Psychosocial Assistance - - O 
Public Service Announcements - X O 
Inter-Agency Cooperation - X X 
Research Programs - - X 
Training Programs - O X 
Citizen Responsibilization - X O 
    
Guiding Logic    
Referral-based - O X 
Policing-based X X O 
Support-based  - O X 
(X) Primary Tactic/Logic; (O) Secondary Tactic/Logic; (-) Tactic/Logic Not widely 
adopted (or little evidence to suggest that it is used) 
 
No other country has been more successful in embedding practices of preemption 
into daily life than the United Kingdom. While Canada has to some extent moved 
towards building prevention into various institutions and approaches to countering 
radicalization, the United Kingdom’s approach focuses primarily on the proliferation of a 
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precautionary logic that extends throughout the social apparatus and explicitly downloads 
responsibility for counterterrorism to the country’s citizenry, particularly evident in major 
cities such as London. The UK’s counterradicalization policing strategy is also robust in 
terms of its deployment of more traditional policing practices in cooperation with novel 
techniques aimed at providing forms of social assistance to those identified as presenting 
an increased risk of terrorist activities. The London police therefore make use of 
traditional policing strategies of mapping, surveillance, and informants in conjunction 
with education and training programs as part of its application of Prevent. 
In Canada, counterradicalization policing is far less networked at the national 
level, and policing techniques are less embedded in the everyday lives of Canadians. 
Despite the country’s national counterradicalization strategy being in place for several 
years, political and structural arrangements make it more difficulty for the development 
of an all-encompassing national policing strategy aimed at preempting radicalization. 
Unlike the UK, Canada is separated into a number of Provinces and Territories which 
each have relative autonomy over its own police agencies at both the provincial and 
municipal levels. While Canada does have a national police force – the RCMP – tasked 
with leading counterradicalization strategies, each municipal and provincial locality with 
a police agency has jurisdiction over its own policing operations. It is therefore much 
more difficult to develop an all-encompassing counterradicalization policing initiative 
across the country. The development of such policing strategies has thus been more 
disparate and disconnected in Canada than in the UK. Police agencies have adopted 
counterradicalization programs, but they remain distinct from one another and reflect a 
relatively less comprehensive strategy and more of a singular approach which shows 
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signs of increased networking at the local level to combat terrorism. This has resulted in 
the development of specific cases of radicalization policing, rather than a national 
approach adopted in the UK (see Figure 8.3 for an illustration of this trend).  
 
 
Figure 8.3: Structural Mapping of Counterradicalization Policing Programs 
 
Yet despite the separation of local counterradicalization policing in Canada, the 
country has developed some of the most nuanced preemption policing strategies. Moving 
away from traditional policing techniques in its counterradicalization specific 
programming, Calgary and Québec have established some of the most novel practices in 
terms of preemption. For example, Québec’s focus on psychosocial assistance and its 
overt use of research- and evidence-based training and education programs has garnered 
international notoriety as being amongst the most innovative and effective approaches to 
countering radicalization. This style of programming has decentered the police as the 
primary authority in terms of counterradicalization while simultaneously utilizing the 
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resources provided by law enforcement (i.e., powers of search, arrest and detention, 
surveillance infrastructure, etc.) through the establishment of a community hotline for 
reporting suspicious activity that connects directly with local police. The explicit 
separation from law enforcement allows the CPRLV to act as an autonomous community 
organization divorced from operational motives of the police. In this way, the CPRLV 
can provide services typically underdeveloped in law enforcement strategies, such as 
social support, psychological assistance, and community and private sector training. In 
this way, Canada’s counterradicalization policing can be contrasted to that of the UK 
with respect to its focus on support- and referral-based programming rather than 
primarily policing-based.  
While the United Kingdom’s strategy is far more complex in terms of its network 
and embeddedness of preemption techniques, local Canadian efforts have in some ways 
out-paced techniques of preemption in the UK. Part of the reason that Prevent has been 
modelled by the Canadian government has been the ability of the United Kingdom to 
embed the strategy’s practices into everyday lives of its citizenry, and Canadian 
approaches have utilized similar tactics. In both Calgary and Montréal, phone hotlines 
have been set up to allow community members to report suspicious activity. However, 
unlike the UK, Montréal has not yet been the site of a widespread increase in public 
appeals aimed at responsibilizing citizens in the counterradicalization process. In London, 
travelling by public transit includes notable references to public duties vis-à-vis reporting 
suspicious activities, as noted above, which have yet to similarly proliferate in Montréal.   
In the United States, counterradicalization policing is very much led by law 
enforcement and does not appear to focus on building community-level partnerships with 
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vested organizations. While the CAB does explicitly reference community building and 
engagement with organizations, the Bureau has relatively fewer formal cooperation with 
social assistance organizations and other stakeholders in its policing strategies 
(inexplicitly) aimed at countering radicalization. Unlike Canada, which focuses on formal 
arrangements between law enforcement and a series of community stakeholders, the CAB 
represents an overarching law enforcement strategy aimed at preempting radicalization. 
While it may interact with a host of community organizations, the CAB is first and 
foremost a law enforcement program and thus utilizes many of the more traditional 
policing practices while deploying relatively fewer community-based programming than 
the UK or Canada. The CAB, however, does provide interesting and innovative programs 
aimed at community engagement, most notable in this respect is the establishment of 
local sports teams for new immigrants (whom the NYPD approaches as vulnerable 
populations vis-à-vis risk of terrorism). Yet even the name of such programming reflects 
the authority of the NYPD and thus cannot be adequately disconnected from techniques 
of law enforcement. 
In Canada and the United States, official counterradicalization policing programs 
have yet to proliferate throughout the education and health sectors.51 While this may be 
changing, particularly in Canada, institutions such as education and healthcare are viewed 
principally as partners in the so-called deradicalization process. They are relied upon to 
inform and alert police and other stakeholders of possible threats of radicalization among 
vulnerable populations. In the US, very few formal arrangements between law 
                                                
51 There have been numerous calls, particularly in Canada, for the explicit inclusion of schools in the 
national counterradicalization strategy (see Jama, Niyozov and Yusuf 2015). 
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enforcement and educational and healthcare professionals were identified in this analysis. 
While, as Vidino (2010) notes, this may be due to the country’s aversion to any breach of 
the first amendment, it also highlights the lack of embeddedness of practices of policing 
radicalization.  
In the UK, the education and health sectors are formally mobilized in the 
country’s Prevent strategy – compelled by law to receive Prevent training and inform law 
enforcement of individuals perceived to be at risk of radicalization. Prevent (UK) has 
therefore contributed to the formal responsibilization of counterradicalization across 
whole institutions in addition to attempting to mobilize lay citizens as stakeholders in 
strategies of preemption. Counterradicalization policing in the United States remains 
dissimilar from initiatives in Canada and the United Kingdom with respect to its 
overarching logic. In the United States, police agencies, such as the case of the NYPD, 
continue to adopt a community-oriented approach to countering radicalization which 
places the police at the center of any strategy. The United Kingdom and Canada, on the 
other hand, have developed similar, yet distinct, holistic community-based policing 
initiatives with the aim of countering transitions towards terrorism.  
Finally, differences in logic between the UK and Canadian counterradicalization 
policing strategies are evident in this analysis. Most notable in this respect is the 
positioning of police authority in each country’s radicalization preemption programming. 
In the UK, police remain primary authority tasked with leading inter-agency cooperation 
and initializing strategies under Prevent. In Canada, by contrast, efforts have been made 
to explicitly de-center the police as the main authority tasked with leading 
counterradicalization programs. This is perhaps most evident under the “Québec model” 
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of counterradicalization, whereby the police are viewed as a resource for the community-
led counterradicalization strategy. This novel approach is perhaps the most innovative 
and new development in the recent trajectory of preemptive intervention practices.  
The United Kingdom adopts what is seemingly a hybrid of traditional policing 
and innovative risk-based techniques in its counterradicalization policing strategy. While 
the country still deploys many of the traditional law enforcement techniques to disrupt 
criminal behavior, specific practices at the local level are increasingly focusing on 
fostering community engagement through means of education, community development, 
and embedding preemption. Canada, on the other hand, has mostly moved away from 
more traditional policing techniques in its specific strategies aimed at countering 
radicalization. Instead, policing radicalization in Canada focuses much more on 
developing mechanisms of social and psychological support through inter-agency 
collaboration – with law enforcement as both a stakeholder in a comprehensive strategy, 
in the case of Québec, and as a central authority in the case of Calgary. The United 
States, in contrast to both the United Kingdom and Canada, deploys much more 
traditional law enforcement strategies to combat radicalization. While individual police 
agencies, such as the NYPD, do attempt to foster community engagement and attempt to 
adopt more novel policing strategies, they have yet to explicitly move towards the 
establishment of large-scale network collaboration premised in providing educational and 
other social support mechanisms for those at risk of radicalization.    
In sum, the UK has been among the most successful in embedding a logic of 
preempting radicalization throughout the public sphere. Through both formal and 
informal practices, the rationality of preemption has diffused throughout the social 
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apparatus with the aim of instilling the population with a sense of self-governance or self-
responsibility for preventing terrorism before it manifests. Relying on a host of traditional 
and more innovative policing practices, the UK, and law enforcement in London in 
particular, has been able to make radicalization preemption a central guiding logic for 
ensuring security that now extends beyond the police and intelligence community. 
Through references to Prevent and preemption in public spaces (i.e., public transit, 
sporting events, on television and radio, etc.), the country has been able to extend 
responsibility for ensuring security from terrorism to spaces not previously responsible 
for national security in the past. Similar developments have been highlighted in Canada, 
although mostly at the local, case-specific level. The United States, as an outlier in this 
analysis, has yet to adopt similar approaches in its counterradicalization policing strategy. 
Although the country has yet to develop an explicit counterradicalization program, even 
the inexplicit policing approaches have yet to proliferate throughout the public sphere.  
An interesting finding highlighted by this analysis is the failure of certain types of 
counterradicalization policing programming. More specifically, two policing programs 
developed in recent years have failed in spite of the relative success of preemption as an 
emergent logic for governing issues of terrorism and radicalization – London’s Muslim 
Contact Unit and NYPD’s Demographics Unit. Despite the proliferation of similar police 
programming in areas of Canada, the US, and the UK, these two programs have become 
non-operational, raising questions related to why those particular programs failed while 
other, similarly framed, programs have succeeded. The next section of this chapter 
explores some of the conditions by which preemption policing programs are more or less 
likely to succeed. Here I highlight the importance of the adoption of an agnostic approach 
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in official counterradicalization policing strategies, while challenging the underlying 
biases and questioning whether any such program can live up to its agnostic claims.  
 
The Agnosticism of Counterradicalization Policing: Failures of London’s Muslim 
Contact Unit and New York’s Demographic Unit 
As noted in the previous section, a number of counterradicalization policing 
initiatives have been developed in the US, UK, and Canada, not least of which include a 
series of more or less successful programs operated at varying degrees of autonomy by 
law enforcement agencies in each jurisdiction. Following the discussion of policing 
practices and techniques that encompassed the previous section, I now turn my attention 
to the analysis of the structural and operational conditions which make such 
counterradicalization programs more or less likely to emerge and continue to operate. 
While the following discussion is not intended to be an all-encompassing analysis of the 
sociopolitical context for which the counterradicalization policing programs analyzed 
have operated, my aim is to outline some of the primary conditions by which programs 
are more likely to succeed. In doing so, I focus on the ways in which policing programs 
are framed by government authorities and representations of policing practices and 
techniques throughout the public sphere.  
As an analysis of the framing and representation of new mechanisms of governing 
radicalization, I move away from explorations of the internal dynamics of the emergence 
and maintenance of such programs for two reasons: (1) internal discourses related to the 
development and establishment of counterradicalization policing strategies are 
increasingly difficult to locate due to national security concerns; and (2) I focus here on 
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how discourses of radicalization justify/challenge the existence of specific 
counterradicalization policing initiatives, rather than the operational structure of such 
programs. I thus hope to provide the empirical basis for further analyses into how modern 
policing programs founded on notions of preemption emerge and dissipate over time. The 
findings from this analysis highlight the importance of officially agnostic policing 
strategies as well as important differences in each country’s willingness to tackle 
ideology as a fundamental aspect of their counterradicalization programming. A brief 
outline of each program analyzed and their operational status is included in Table 8.2.  
Table 8.2: Current Status of Counterradicalization Initiatives 
  
 Status 
Canada  
ReDirect Operational 
Extreme Dialogue Operational 
CPRLV Operational 
  
United Kingdom  
Muslim Contact Unit 
Non-operational 
(since 2012) 
Community Engagement Team Operational 
  
United States  
Demographics Unit 
Non-operational 
(since 2014) 
Community Affairs Bureau Operational 
 
Of the seven policing programs explored in this case study analysis, two have 
become non-operational, the UK’s Muslim Contact Unit and the NYPD’s Demographics 
Unit, and five remain operational as of the time of this writing. Despite the deployment of 
similar policing techniques and practices, both the MCU and DU were disbanded 
following a series of notable events, the failure of which offers an opportunity to reflect 
on some of the conditions for which they could no longer be maintained. I thus begin by 
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providing some explanations for why the MCU and DU were disbanded and how other 
programs utilizing similar policing strategies have been more successful in terms of 
sustainability.  
The MCU and DU both approached radicalization as a fundamental problem 
amongst predominantly Islamic communities. Built into the logic (and even the name in 
the case of the MCU) of each program was an inherent bias towards Muslim communities 
as a source of risky behavior. The surveillance program operated by the NYPD in New 
York and New Jersey called the Demographics Unit, for instance, explicitly targeted 
Islamic communities, whereas London’s MCU made its practices of targeting Muslims 
explicit in its name. The disbanded DU was partly pressured out of existence by the US 
legal system and increasing public condemnation of the intensification of surveillance 
techniques.52 More specifically, two federal lawsuits criticized the Unit it for violating 
civil rights of those subjected to law enforcement interventions. There was also a mass of 
public criticism of the DU, not least of which was highlighted by Linda Sarsour of the 
Arab American Association of New York, who suggested that the “Unit created 
psychological warfare” on Muslim communities in the city (Apuzzo and Goldman 2014). 
As Vidino (2010) argues, the United States’ historical anxieties regarding possible 
violations to the country’s first amendment creates a context whereby government 
interventions targeting specific religious communities are placed under a microscope, 
both within the legal system and public sphere.   
In similar fashion, the Muslim Contact Unit received numerous complaints 
regarding its discriminatory policing practices that targeted Muslim communities. 
                                                
52 Raza v. City of New York, 998 F. Supp. 2d 70 and Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F. 3d 277. 
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Criticisms directed at the MCU came from both liberal and conservative sources and 
cited a wide range of issues including discriminatory policing, violations of civil rights, 
and even problems associated with cooperation with suspected terrorists and terrorism 
sympathizers (Bright 2008; Milne 2008). Seamus Milne (2008), for instance, condemned 
the MCU for sympathizing with fundamentalist Islamic leaders, thereby cooperating with 
individuals suspected of contributing to the radicalization of young people. Unlike the 
DU in New York, the MCU faced relatively little legal pressure to cease operation, 
highlighting the UK legal system’s willingness to tackle underlying religious ideology as 
a foundational source of so-called radicalization. Throughout the mid-2000s, the MCU 
was a sustained, and well-documented, policing strategy in London, whereas the NYPD’s 
DU operated overtly under a veil of secrecy. Following a series of articles documenting 
the DU’s existence, the Unit immediately faced public and legal challenges calling for its 
termination.  
Notably different, then, are the country’s approaches to policing religious 
difference. The London strategy was able to operate in the public sphere for many years, 
while the NYPD’s Unit was almost immediately forced to cease operation following its 
uncovering in the public sphere. While this is a demonstrable difference, both policing 
programs ultimately became non-operational, illustrating a more interesting development 
– that targeted policing strategies focusing on specific religious groups are likely 
pressured out of existence by public criticism and legal challenges. The data therefore 
illustrate the importance of underlying logic and rationales of remedy vis-à-vis 
radicalization throughout the West. Official counterradicalization policing programs are 
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more likely in countries with little overt reluctance to tackle ideology as a fundamental 
source of transitions toward terrorism.  
Conversely, less explicit policing strategies that focus on preventing radicalization 
across the community in general seem to be much more successful.53 Of the five 
counterradicalization programs that remain operational, no publically available 
documentation officially state that they focus on specific religious communities. In fact, 
increasingly official documentation related to such programs highlight the agnostic 
approach of adopted strategies aimed at countering radicalization. For instance, the 
ReDirect program’s official website maintains that there is “no typical profile of someone 
who is vulnerable to radicalization” and that individuals might be at risk of radicalization 
regardless of “region, nationality or system of belief” (see Figure 8.4). Moreover, a 
survey of the public websites for ReDirect, Extreme Dialogue and the CPRLV in Canada, 
the NYPD’s CAB, and London’s MPS, make no explicit mention of religion as a 
fundamental source of so-called radicalization. This agnostic approach is also 
exemplified by the names chosen by governmental authorities for their 
counterradicalization programs – Prevent, ReDirect, Extreme Dialogue, Community 
Affairs Bureau, and Community Engagement Team all present an imaginary of 
counterradicalization governance as embedded with agnostic techniques that do not focus 
on specific populations. While some targeted policing strategies remain, such as NYPD’s 
Clergy Liaison Program and New Immigrant Outreach Program, they do not officially 
target specific religious groups or communities.  
                                                
53 I must note that I use the term ‘successful’ not as an indicator of moral success, as if such strategies are 
good or bad for society. Rather, I use the term to indicate the relative sustainability of each program over 
time.  
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Figure 8.4: Conceptualization of Radicalization in Calgary’s ReDirect Program  
 
Based on these findings, I argue that a key structural condition for the emergence 
and, more importantly, maintenance of counterradicalization policing programs is an 
officially agnostic stance on the subjects of governmental intervention. As the findings 
presented above illustrate, policing programs which focus explicitly on building relations 
with Muslim communities, rather than local communities in general, have for the most 
part failed in the United States and the United Kingdom. Conversely, programs which 
highlight the need to strengthen community engagement with members of all at-risk 
communities have been relatively successful. These programs present a narrative that 
radicalization can affect anyone regardless of religious or ideological background and 
have, to date, remained sustainable and visible in the public sphere in all three counties.  
217 
Navigating the lines between police intervention, protections of free speech, and 
freedom of religion is therefore vital to the relative success and failure of 
counterradicalization policing programs. Even in countries that adopt a predominantly 
explicit focus on Muslim communities in their overarching counterradicalization 
strategies, such as the United Kingdom, police agencies must remain relatively agnostic 
in their deployment of new initiatives in order to survive. In countries adopting a more 
agnostic approach, such as Canada, the decentering of police as the primary force 
responsible for countering radicalization as well as the explicit refusal to approach the 
issue as a fundamentally religious one allows for the opening of a social space in which 
such counterradicalization programs can operate.   
The comparison of legal and political developments in each country, both in this 
chapter and in Chapters Four and Five, highlights a key area of difference between the 
United States approach to counterradicalization and that of Canada and the United 
Kingdom in relation to the embeddedness of preemption in everyday life. As noted 
above, the proliferation of preemptive governance strategies aimed at countering 
terrorism seems to be connected to the entrenching of logics of preemption in the daily 
lives of the populous. It is therefore unsurprising that countries that have developed more 
networked, overarching preemption strategies – Canada and the UK – have established 
more robust counterradicalization policing programs. The likelihood of official 
counterradicalization programs is thus linked with constructions of responsibility that are 
successfully imbued into the population. Counterradicalization governance is 
increasingly making use of citizens as stakeholders in the surveillance, information 
sharing, and preemption process.  
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Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that despite public challenges to policing 
strategies which focus on specific religious communities, modern practices of governing 
terror through preemption have proven sustainable when they do not officially focus on 
those groups. Instead, representing radicalization as distinct from religious ideology is 
now a useful strategy for government authorities and other stakeholders in the 
establishment of innovative governance strategies aimed at preempting terrorist activities. 
Policing initiatives, most notably archetypal programs such as ReDirect and CPRLV, 
now increasingly adopt an overtly agnostic conceptualization of radicalization to justify 
new techniques of intervention. But can such programs ever be disconnected from the 
very discourses of radicalization which I have explored in detail throughout the chapters 
of this dissertation? In the final section of this Chapter, I explore this question and 
highlight how the underlying logic of radicalization discourses cannot be disconnected 
from emergent law enforcement strategies built in their name.   
 
Conclusion: The Governance of Radicalization and the Construction of “Muslim 
Strangers” 
 
Despite the success of officially agnostic counterradicalization governance 
throughout the West, the underlying logic of such strategies cannot be disconnected from 
the very construction of radicalization discourses that increasingly permeate the public 
sphere. Policing programs, such as those analyzed here, aimed at preempting terrorism 
through counterradicalization interventions tend to explicitly reference the concept of 
radicalization while avoiding references to religious background. A notable exception to 
this is the NYPD, which tends to avoid using the notion of radicalization all together 
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despite clear adoption of the construct as an underlying logic of its counterterrorism 
strategy.54 But when the layers radicalization discourse produced throughout the public 
sphere are peeled away, as I have attempted to do in the preceding chapters, one may 
conclude that any agnostic deployment of the concept is unlikely, if not impossible. 
Policing strategies that evoke the concept are so embedded with historical, political, and 
cultural meanings that have been given constructions of radicalization discourses, and 
thus must be explore through such contexts.  
It is therefore unsurprising that modern counterradicalization policing initiatives 
have adopted a mostly agnostic approach to their preemption programs. For even the 
evocation of radicalization as a construct is so imbued with significant meaning that an 
explicit reference to risky Muslim communities is not necessary. Continuous references 
that link radicalization to Islam a priori throughout the public sphere make focusing on 
such individuals and groups politically, legally, and culturally unnecessary and therefore 
ineffective for governance strategies. Linking the cultural, legal, scientific, and political 
conceptualizations of radicalization which now permeate the public sphere with the 
material practices of policing radicalization highlights the impossibility of disconnecting 
those discourses and materialities. When we, as a cultural system, are incessantly 
presented with the idea that radicalization qua Islamic communities qua terrorism, 
governance structures aimed at intervening in the so-called radicalization process do not 
need to explicitly focus on specific activities.  
                                                
54 Indicated by the NYPD’s influential report Radicalization in the West which explicitly focuses on 
radicalization as a problematic issue amongst Islamic communities.  
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Entire apparatuses that embed the logic of preemption are becoming increasingly 
diffused across Western jurisdictions in the global fight against so-called radicalization. 
In the UK, this logic of preemption has become an overarching security paradigm which 
now authorizes a host of new management and surveillance mechanisms, from law 
enforcement strategies to education and healthcare interventions. In Canada, similar 
trends are currently taking place but at a much more geographically specific level. 
However, because of Canada’s adoption of a national counterradicalization strategy, one 
might speculate the increasing networking capabilities of local initiatives like the ones in 
Calgary and Montréal. Further research should be conducted on the proliferation of new 
counterradicalization networks across time and space. In the United States, 
counterradicalization policing remains relatively underdeveloped compared to initiatives 
in Canada and the UK. The reasons for this may begin with the government’s refusal to 
adopt a national counterradicalization strategy or demographic, political, and legal 
differences. However, local cases of policing terrorism through preemption have been 
developed in certain areas and one might expect these types of programs to spread 
throughout local jurisdictions given the interconnectivity of police cooperation between 
the US, Canada, and the UK.   
Through the explicit and implicit eliciting of specific communities, diverse 
Islamic communities are approached by law enforcement in two rather inconsistent ways: 
as suspect communities and as partners in the counterradicalization process. 
Counterradicalization strategies in all three countries focus more or less explicitly on 
engagement with Muslim communities as a fundamental aspect of governing terrorism. 
Community engagement has emerged in some ways as synonym for engagement with 
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Islamic communities. Engaging notions of community engagement, rather than more 
specific practices targeting Muslims, may present law enforcement as an agnostic entity, 
but the historical and political context for which the entire logic of radicalization has 
emerge clearly demonstrates that even such engagement initiatives inherently focus on 
Islamic communities as both risk subject and counterradicalization stakeholder.  
As noted in previous chapters, Therese O’Toole and colleagues (2016) have 
highlighted how modern conceptualizations of terrorism preemption have resulted the 
emergence of “risky subjects” within Muslim communities. Islamic communities are 
represented as a risk in terms of radicalization by government officials, news media, and 
law enforcement agencies, and those representations impact the material elements 
involved in the governance of terrorism. State engagement with Islamic communities 
through counterradicalization initiatives such as Prevent (UK) has led to the problematic 
construction of Muslims as risk subject and, paradoxically, as risk mitigation partner 
(O’Toole et al. 2016). Based on the findings from this analysis, and borrowing from 
Georg Simmel (1921), I advance the less agnostic argument that Western cultural, 
political, legal, and scientific systems have contributed to the creation of “Muslim 
Strangers” – to the configuration of a social category of religious difference that creates 
social distance between Islamic communities and the broader population. This figure 
masks and legitimizes new forms of surveillance, policing, and intelligence gathering that 
spread throughout the social apparatus. Even in policing strategies that adopt a 
conceptualization of radicalization disconnected from religious ideology, those programs 
are based on a logic of preemptive intervention that inherently focuses on Islamic 
communities.  
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It is therefore important to theorize about the role of underlying logics that 
continue to justify and maintain new forms of social control. While policing practices 
may, on the surface, appear to be agnostic and not directed at specific communities 
judged to be at risk, the findings here suggest that those very practices are built on a 
discriminatory logic that disproportionately impacts cultural and ethnic minorities. This 
chapter thus represents an analysis of modern counterterrorism policing programs not 
rooted only in official governmental discourse, but in the underlying assumptions and 
construction of practices which form the basis of radicalization policing initiatives. The 
present work also contributes to the growing body of literature aimed at challenging 
techniques of surveillance and intelligence that have emerged in the name of 
counterterrorism and which help construct risky subjectivities within the population.  
Finally, I also advance notions of the responsibilization of citizens in the context 
of counterterrorism. It is clear through this analysis that part of the logic of governing 
terrorism through preemption involves downloading responsibility to the populous for 
ensuring security and reporting suspicious activity. I therefore contribute to the theorizing 
of new mechanisms of governance which aim to discipline the citizenry and engage the 
population in the risk preemption process. In this way, this chapter highlights how 
preemption has emerged as an overarching governmentality which, at least in the context 
of counterterrorism, works to construct a self-governing populous capable of more 
efficiently safeguarding security.  
With that said, one limitation of the present work is the relative lack of analysis 
into the geopolitical differences between case studies. While the specific geopolitical 
differences between the US, UK, and Canada warrant further analysis, this chapter lays 
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some of the empirical foundations for future research in this area. By illustrating some of 
the structural and sociopolitical conditions that make governing through preemption more 
or less likely, this chapter offers a starting point for future scholars attempting to theorize 
the emergence and maintenance of modern practices of preemptive intervention, 
particularly so in relation to counterterrorism. While the aim of this chapter was to 
highlight some of the most important structural conditions making counterradicalization 
policing initiatives more or less likely, an analysis of the interplay of geospatial and 
political arrangements is quite admittedly beyond the scope of the present work. Further 
analyses would adequately investigate this area as its own unit of analysis.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION
The goal of this dissertation was to explore the proliferation of radicalization discourses 
throughout the public sphere. How has radicalization emerged as a dominant framework 
by which social institutions understand issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism? 
How is the construct of radicalization conceptualized by various influential social 
institutions? What are some of the material implications involved in the adoption and 
diffusion of counterradicalization as a novel governance strategy? How do governmental 
strategies of preemptive intervention related to a so-called radicalization process 
reconfigure more traditional forms of counterterrorism policing? These important 
questions formed the basis of investigation for this dissertation and provided a foundation 
for which the empirical exploration of radicalization discourses could commence.  
This dissertation represents the first systematic attempt to empirically trace the 
diffusion of counterradicalization discourses throughout the public sphere and across 
multiple jurisdictions and social institutions. While scholars in political science and 
psychology have highlighted the importance of theorizing radicalization processes, the 
discipline of sociology has yet to adequately address processes of radicalization and the 
material consequences of techniques of government implemented in the construct’s 
name. Notably missing from scholarly studies of radicalization, then, is a macro-level, 
topographical analysis of the very construction of discourses which are increasingly 
permeating governmental and nongovernmental counterterrorism strategies. The present 
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work aims to bring such questions to the center of sociological focus and inquiry, by 
analyzing inter-systemic communications related to radicalization as a governmental 
logic based on notions of risk, security, and preemption. As an investigation of the 
emergence and diffusion of radicalization discourses in the public sphere, this dissertation 
principally develops a sociological analysis of shifts in governing terrorism through 
notions of preemptive intervention. The findings of this study suggest that the construct 
of radicalization is not temporally or spatially static, but rather develops in interesting and 
inconsistent ways across social systems and by different jurisdictional authorities. 
The data gathered for this dissertation provided a wealth of information regarding 
the ideal and material practices of preemptive governance which have proliferated in the 
public sphere. While the empirical base of this dissertation provided several important 
insights to the development, configuration, and proliferation of radicalization discourses 
throughout social institutions, the data also present opportunities for deeper analyses. The 
data can therefore be used to further explore some of the causal linkages between the 
adoption and deployment of radicalization and the ‘flow’ of communications across 
social institutions. While this dissertation provides some of the empirical basis for 
sketching out such flows of communication between and amongst influential institutions, 
further analyses might highlight some of the causal linkages of the transmission of 
radicalization discourses from one institution to another. One prospect in this area would 
be to adopt theories of social and cultural change and framing, as Christopher Bail (2012, 
2015) has done quite extensively, to explore the uptake of radicalization discourses 
relative to the social and institutional resources of the communicator and audience.  
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In addition, this dissertation provides a basis for more in-depth analyses of the 
material policing practices formed under a logic of radicalization preemption. A 
worthwhile area of future research would thus be ethnographic and interview work of 
some of the counterradicalization governance programs explored in the preceding 
chapter. Scholars might build on this project by connecting the findings here with specific 
techniques and practices of policing taking place on the streets of our local communities. 
How do community stakeholders conceptualize radicalization and the practices of 
counterradicalization for which they participate? How do police officers understand their 
role related to counterradicalization? What can we learn from the experiences of 
community members who are subjected to new counterradicalization initiatives? How 
have stakeholders, both those tasked with intervening and those subjected to 
interventions, navigated public understandings and representations of radicalization? 
These are all questions that could be addressed through the deployment of ethnographic 
and interview based research methods.  
Further, this dissertation broadens our understanding of new forms of preemptive 
intervention which increasingly focus on mitigating risk of crime through early action. 
By contributing to theorizations of strategies of making futures governable, this study 
provides an illustration of exploring the diffusion of risk mitigating ideas and concepts in 
other notable contexts. Future research might explore similar ideal and material 
trajectories in areas not obviously germane to terrorism or radicalization. For instance, 
scholars might, as others have done already (Aradau and van Munster 2007; Anderson 
2010; de Goede 2008), pay attention to the development of specific ideas or concepts that 
emerge in the contexts of risk mitigation such as global climate change, disease outbreak 
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or future health forecasting. These projects might challenge not only the development of 
seemingly objective frames of understanding, but also potentially targeted and 
problematic processes involved in the ways we make sense of diverse and complex social 
harms.  
Future research in this area should attempt to grapple with questions of law’s 
violence as legal systems are increasingly faced with decisions related to terrorism and 
counterterrorism. While law has typically been avoided by scholars working in the area 
of risk, security, and preemption, it presents a fertile unit of analysis for explorations into 
modern techniques of counterterrorism. As more case law emerges that deploys the 
concept of radicalization in legal decision-making, scholars might explore how lawyers 
and judges give meaning to both ideas of radicalization and some of the governmental 
interventions that are challenged on legal grounds.  
A common criticism of scholarship within the Orientalist paradigm is that it 
essentializes diverse communities in the East by referencing an East/West dichotomy. 
Wherever possible, I have attempted to avoid such essentialist thought by noting the 
diversity within and among communities subjected to counterradicalization discourses 
and interventions. Admittedly, this dissertation makes use of an East/West dichotomy to 
understand cultural representations which take place in the Western hemisphere. But the 
present study accepts and advocates for an understanding of the internal complexities of 
individuals and communities who are subjected to such discourses. Further studies would 
therefore benefit from this analysis by more deeply exploring the intersections of race, 
class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality which make up the complex demographics of 
cultures subjected to radicalization discourses. While such interdisciplinary analysis is 
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beyond the scope of the present work, it is vitally important to move beyond the broad 
exploration of institutional discourses to the in-depth understanding of personal 
experiences with discourses and material forms of intervention.  
The following four chapters focused on tracing discourses related to radicalization 
across important social institutions, including politics, law, media, and science. In 
Chapter Four, I traced out the emergence and development of political conceptualizations 
of radicalization, highlighting how narratives related to terrorism, risk, and preemption 
have been evoked to justify new forms of governmental intervention. Following the 
analysis of political discourses, Chapter Five shifted focus to explorations of legal 
elements related to radicalization and counterradicalization to highlight the relatively new 
(and inconsistent) ways in which the construct is deployed in an increasingly focused and 
potentially discriminatory manner. The tensions imbued in legal decisions making use of 
the concept of radicalization raises important questions regarding due process and legal 
equality and in many ways highlights the potential for new forms of legal violence related 
to issues of terrorism. In Chapter Six’s discussion of mass media representations of 
radicalization, I highlighted how public narratives about issues germane to terrorism 
reconfigure ideas of radicalization to focus overwhelmingly on specific cultural and 
ethnic minority groups. While media has long used the construct of radicalization as a 
device for labelling politically extreme individuals and groups, the concept is 
increasingly deployed by Western media systems to create social distance between 
Western citizens and Islamic populations of the East. In Chapter Seven, I pay particularly 
close attention to how expert knowledge claims related to radicalization and 
counterradicalization influence the development and adoption of counterterrorism 
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interventions explored in previous chapters. Here, I illustrate how the scientific system is 
embedded in the meaning-giving process on issues related to radicalization, but further 
contend that academic discourses related to the concept are selectively, and in some ways 
problematically, taken up in other social systems. Finally, Chapter Eight seeks to ground 
the analyses of preceding chapters in some of the material, structural, and institutional 
practices which have emerged in the name of radicalization. Here I explore several 
notable governmental interventions aimed at governing social harms related to terrorism 
through practices and techniques of preemptive intervention. Through an analysis of 
official and unofficial counterradicalization policing initiatives, I explore some of the 
governmental processes involved in the construction of Muslim identities as primary 
subjects of control. Myriad new policing strategies formed with an underlying logic of 
governance through preemption thus construct Islamic communities as a threat and 
therefore further create social distance between communities and diverse Muslim groups 
within those communities.  
 These analyses thus contribute to the development of a sociology of radicalization 
by adopting a macro-topographical perspective to explore the creation, proliferation, and 
configuration of modern discourses related to transitions towards political violence. 
Developing such a perspective allows for the interrogation of inter-systemic discourses 
which justify new forms of governance aimed at intervening in the daily lives of specific 
individuals and groups. The chapters of this dissertation therefore begin to challenge the 
taken-for-grantedness of modern security discourses by investigating the inner 
complexities embedded in the construction of cultural ideas that aim to understand 
terrorism and counterterrorism. By unpacking the seemingly presumed logics of 
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radicalization, I highlight the powerful political, legal, cultural, and scientific systems 
that structure normative practices developed in the name of security. I consider the 
material and ideal consequences that emerge through such discourses and urge 
sociologists to further investigate how logics of radicalization preemption continue to 
justify and sustain new mechanisms of social control.  
 This research interrogates a relatively new form of terrorism governance that has 
emerged to explicitly intervene in, and thus prevent, individual and group trajectories 
towards political violence. Social scientists have explored similar governance strategies 
in relation to notions of risk and insecurity, but there remains a dearth of empirical 
research theorizing the development of specific concepts, ideas and rationales involved in 
modern practices of terrorism preemption. Articulating the ways in which social systems 
come to understand and communicate about terrorism preemption, I highlight the 
tensions involved in understanding terrorism as a social issue and ensuring security of the 
population (more specifically, the nation-state). These tensions, as I have illustrated here, 
are both rooted in social anxieties related to ‘outsider’ cultures as well as the basis of new 
forms of governmental intervention which disproportionately impact specific groups. The 
empirical analyses here contribute to new theorizations of modern terrorism governance 
by focusing on how new logics for understanding and countering terrorism emerge, take 
shape, and justify novel interventions.  
Within the governmentality framework, techniques and practices of governance 
are often (but not always) approached in a relatively apolitical and uncritical manner – as 
if governmental strategies are based simply on notions of objective efficacy and 
efficiency. But modern techniques of social control are imbued with meaning about the 
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foundation of social harms, potentialities of remedy and assessment of risk which cannot 
be detached from the very construction of cultural ideas about social problems. This 
dissertation moves beyond descriptions of modern practices of preemptive intervention to 
highlight and theorize the problematic nature of governmental interventions built in the 
name of counterradicalization. Challenging discourses of radicalization as sources for the 
governmental justification of new forms of social control thus broadens understanding of 
how ideas shape material practices that impact individuals and groups. Studying this 
contemporary form of understanding terrorism also opens a space for deeper sociological 
insight into notions of social and cultural change, risk, security and social control. Future 
analyses should thus build on this work by exploring the specific governmental 
interventions that have emerged in the name of counterradicalization. I have begun 
unpacking some of these interventions by analyzing the emergence of preemptive 
intervention policing programs aimed at preventing terrorism, but further research should 
expand on this form of analysis.  
The evidence presented here suggests that radicalization discourses have been 
constructed with Islam as the central foci despite a relatively low risk. Notwithstanding 
all of this, official governmental interventions aimed at countering radicalization remain 
relatively agnostic at first glance – presenting a narrative that radicalization can affect 
anyone regardless of religious background. As the findings of this dissertation illustrate, 
major governmental counterradicalization strategies avoid mentioning Islam at all. 
Rather, they focus on broad and abstract notions of risk, security, preemption, and 
community engagement. This governmental logic, as I noted in Chapter Eight, has been 
relatively successful for justifying and maintaining new policing programs seeks to 
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preempt radicalization through techniques of community engagement and partnership. 
But the emergence of such social control mechanisms cannot be detached from the very 
development and configuration of radicalization as a governmental ideal. While 
governments and influential stakeholders continue to advance notions of security, risk, 
and policing as agnostic and hold that practices of counterradicalization do not focus on 
specific populations, the entire construction of germane discourses make it improbable, if 
not impossible, to disconnect programs of counterradicalization from programs targeting 
Islamic communities. As I have demonstrated in the analysis of emergent 
counterradicalization policing programs, representing practices of counterradicalization 
as agnostic policing tools has allowed for the increased sustainability and proliferation of 
novel governance strategies that are increasingly embedded in everyday life. This 
dissertation, focusing primarily on the emergence of discourses, speaks to the 
problematic nature of such approaches. Is it possible to disconnect notions of risk and 
security in the context of modern counterterrorism from the discriminatory contexts in 
which they emerge? This study provides a foundation for future explorations into some of 
the biases and potentially problematic assumptions related to supposed objective and 
neutral ideas of risk, security, and preemption.  
Radicalization has emerged as one way to make unknowable futures known and 
actionable in the present. Modern conceptualizations of radicalization emerged in such a 
way as to justify governmental interventions that act on possible future behavior and 
activities. In this way, radicalization has developed into a risk mitigation concept that 
evokes material practices vis-à-vis new techniques of governance. The data here lend 
support to the argument that modern practices of risk, emerging in the name of security 
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and preemption, are subjective and disproportionately focus on specific groups. By 
uncovering some of the discursive strategies that have emerged to create social distance 
between citizens of a nation-state and Muslims, this study links discourses with material 
practices of counterradicalization to show the inconsistencies and problematic nature of 
notions of risk that are often approached as neutral. The findings of this dissertation also 
suggest that radicalization has been constructed in such a way that is has relatively little 
to do with actual terrorist activities or terrorism risks and more to do anxieties rooted in 
religious differences. Not only have notions of “national identity” and “national values” 
been adopted by news media, law, and politics across all three countries to construct 
social distance between itself and perceived outsiders, but there seems to be very little 
justification for such othering frames in so-called objective assessments of risk. This 
dissertation, focusing on the development and configuration of the concept of 
radicalization, illustrates how notions of risk are mobilized in very problematic ways to 
justify increasingly intrusive mechanisms of social control aimed at preventing terrorism 
far before it manifests.  
This dissertation firmly contributes to the growing body of scholarly literature 
that challenges new forms of governance that have emerged in the global war on 
terrorism. I have perhaps even highlighted the possibility that the West is now in a ‘post-
war on terror’ period. Governing terrorism once meant the deployment of military 
interventions to ‘root out’ problematic individuals and groups who support and stimulate 
terrorism and terrorist activities. Modern notions of terrorism, however, are much more 
focused on the preemptive identification, monitoring, and prevention of terrorism before 
it manifests through evocations of radicalization. As I have demonstrated, this 
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governmental approach to counterterrorism has significantly rearticulated modern 
intervention strategies which increasingly adopt a community stakeholder and population 
responsibilization strategy to make practices of identification, monitoring, and support 
possible and more efficient. This rearticulation has proliferated and continues to expand 
across Western jurisdictions. One might even speculate that community-based referral 
strategies which aim to engage communities in the counterradicalization process, are 
becoming the norm for national and international counterterrorism governance. Scholars 
might be well-suited to continue documenting this trend through empirically rigorous, 
evidence-based research.  
 I opened this project with a brief anecdote outlining how governmental discourse 
shaped my interest in issues germane to terrorism and counterterrorism. If nothing else, 
this highlights the power of government authorities to influence what has become a major 
portion of a young scholars’ academic life. At the very most, it illustrates the ability of 
governmental authorities to shape the very foundation of public ideas of important issues 
related to national security and counterterrorism. Nevertheless, my anecdotal experience 
underlines the value of questioning some of the ways in which seemingly inconsequential 
ideas give rise to myriad interventions that disproportionately impacts certain groups 
within our societies. While the words of Prime Minister Harper might have given impetus 
to the present project, the discourses of current and future government authorities, in 
Canada and elsewhere, should be equally illuminated and challenged by scholarly 
research. Future research would do well to develop research questions and empirical 
projects that begin with taken for granted notions that configure, justify, and sustain new 
mechanisms of control, despite insistence that such notions may be uncontroversial.
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